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In the late 1940s, Leo Fender, a radio repairman in Anaheim,
California, invented the first solid body electric guitar to be mass-
produced—the Fender Telecaster. Fender guitars became a classic
American product like Harley-Davidson motorcycles. They have been
played by rock stars from Jimi Hendrix to Bruce Springsteen, and Leo
Fender himself was inducted into the Rock n’ Roll Hall of Fame. The
company prospered and was sold to CBS in 1965, but by 1981 the
company was in desperate straits—losing market share to foreign com-
petitors and plagued by declining quality. In 1985, at a point when
almost all Fender guitars were manufactured overseas, company man-
agers bought the company from CBS. In a bid to bring production
back to the United States, company management began producing a
small number of guitars in a Corona, California, plant with the 60
employees remaining from the original production group. For a long
time the plant struggled to achieve acceptable quality at a reasonable
cost, but by 1998, the company was in a position to open a new 177,000
square-foot plant in Corona, employing over 400 people. Today, the
new plant manufactures over 350 Fender guitars a day, along with
Fender amplifiers. The company’s dramatic resurgence is a product of
many factors, but one factor always mentioned by local managers is an
obscure state-funded training program, the Employment Training Panel
(ETP), which provides public funding to train California workers
whose jobs are threatened.
The company, which was considering moving its remaining Cali-
fornia production to a lower-cost state or overseas, decided instead to
invest in a dramatic effort to improve productivity and quality. The
centerpiece of this effort was training in state-of-the-art manufacturing
techniques, such as total quality management and statistical process
control, for Fender’s predominantly Spanish-speaking workforce.
Through ETP, the state spent over $700,000 to underwrite much of the
cost of Fender’s large-scale training program.
Quality-control technicians, most of them weekend rock musi-
cians, wail away on each guitar as it comes off the production line. If
1
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it plays well, it is tuned, buffed with a special cloth, and carefully
placed in a guitar case. If its quality is unacceptable, it is hung on a
rack to be reworked or scrapped. One of the technicians told us that,
before the training, they filled up twelve racks with rejected guitars
every two days. Since the training and implementation of the quality
program, they only fill two racks a week.
STATE-FUNDED TRAINING PROGRAMS
California isn’t the only state that sees value in subsidizing the
training of incumbent workers. In 1998–1999, 45 states spent $593
million—7 percent more than the previous year—on customized
worker-training programs paid for exclusively with state funds. Put
into perspective, this is more than half of the $950 million the federal
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) program spent on training adults in
2000, and about one-third of the $1. 6 billion that WIA spent retraining
dislocated workers in all 50 states (Employment and Training Adminis-
tration 2000). Customized worker-training programs are scattered
across the states and vary greatly in size and in how they are managed.
California, for example, spent over $117 million, while Vermont spent
only $570,000. Despite their size and importance, there is little avail-
able data on these programs and their impact. A profile of the 45
existing state programs is included in Appendix A, which comes from
a survey of the status published in State Financed and Customized
Training Programs (Duscha and Graves 1999).
Our purpose here is to provide a comprehensive description and
evaluation of California’s Employment Training Panel Program—the
largest state-funded customized training program in the nation, to use
this program as a window into these important but overlooked pro-
grams, and to draw policy implications for the development of similar
programs.
Program History
These state-funded programs are often referred to as customized
training programs, or incumbent-worker training programs. The pro-
grams were often designed as incentives for businesses to locate, re-
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main, or expand in a state. They typically provide funds to companies
to train either newly-hired workers (called new hires), or to retrain
existing employees (called retrainees or incumbent workers). In 1999,
states spent about 60 percent of training funds on retrainees and the
balance on new hires. These programs differ dramatically from federal
job-training programs in that they do not target individual disadvan-
taged workers who may be unemployed or have other difficulties in the
labor market. Rather, they target groups of workers who are employed
by a particular company. Thus, these programs serve a wider array
of people than federal programs and, in general, a less disadvantaged
population of workers.
These programs first appeared in Southern states in the late 1950s
as these states attempted to move from an agrarian-based to an industri-
alized economy. One strategy these states employed was to try to
attract Northern manufacturing by offering incentives, one of which
was free worker training. The programs also helped workers make the
transition from agriculture to manufacturing. North Carolina estab-
lished the first program in 1958 and was soon followed by South Caro-
lina and other Southern states. As the programs grew, existing
businesses demanded new services as well (Duscha and Graves 1999).
Program Financing
Programs are usually funded by one of three sources: a) a special
tax associated with Unemployment Insurance (UI), b) general reve-
nues, or c) bond financing:
• Ten states, including California (with the largest program), fund
their training programs with a UI-associated tax. Here’s how
the system works: the state reduces UI taxes by a small percent-
age and creates a new tax equal to the amount of UI tax reduc-
tion, then the revenue from the new tax goes into a separate fund
to support training projects. Since the net tax burden does not
change and the tax is collected through the same mechanism,
the tax does not generate the opposition a new tax resulting in a
net increase might. For example, in 1982, California reduced
the UI tax rate by 0.1 percent and enacted a new 0.1 percent
‘‘Employment Training Tax’’ on the first $7,000 of annual earn-
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ings (the amount subject to the UI Tax), thus generating a maxi-
mum per-worker contribution of $7 (Duscha and Graves 1999).
• Thirty-one states tap their general revenue pool each year to pay
for their training programs.
• Four states use bond financing to pay for their training. These
systems work by having public colleges, which provide the
training, sell bonds to investors. The proceeds from the bonds
finance the training, and the bonds are repaid by dedicating new
payroll tax withholdings from participating businesses towards
repaying the bonds.
Complete descriptive data on the 45 states with incumbent worker pro-
grams is provided in Appendix A.
Training Providers
Most states (33 of 45) allow companies to use any training provider
they choose. Companies may use in-house trainers, hire private train-
ing companies, or contract with public or private vocational schools or
colleges. Some states reserve the right to approve specific trainers. In
two states, the program is administered through a public training
agency, but these programs still allow employers to contract with pri-
vate providers. Twelve states allow use of only designated training
providers, such as community colleges or public vocational programs.
PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK
Despite the size and growing importance of these state programs,
there is very little published research on them. Over ten years ago,
Leigh (1989) studied existing state programs helping displaced workers
find new jobs. The focus of the study was an examination of the ser-
vices provided and their effectiveness. The study mostly pulled to-
gether data from secondary sources to compare the programs’ methods
and effectiveness, relative to federal programs. The study did not at-
tempt to examine services to incumbent workers. In the intervening
decade, research on state programs has been mostly limited to a few
descriptive profiles of state efforts. Over the last 15 years, the Califor-
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nia Employment Training Panel has commissioned a number of studies
of its own performance and of a number of program-related special
issues. The primary purpose of this book is to pull together what is
known about ETP, use this knowledge to examine the operation and
impact of the ETP program, and then draw policy implications for
other state programs. Also, we believe ETP’s experience can offer
some valuable insights to administrators of the new federal Workforce
Investment Act (WIA). WIA allows states to spend some of their train-
ing funds on ‘‘customized training,’’ which is designed to meet the
needs of a particular employer. ETP’s years of experience in designing
and funding such customized training can help WIA managers and
policymakers avoid some potential pitfalls inherent in the customized
training model.
We begin our analysis by reviewing the history of ETP and exam-
ining the forces that shaped its development. Next, we consider what
insights theory and research can provide into the motivations of the
various groups and individuals involved in incumbent worker-training
programs and the policy implications of these motivations. Returning
to ETP, we then examine in detail the actual implementation of the ETP
program in the field, based on 23 case studies. As part of this analysis,
we identify the factors influencing the effectiveness of individual proj-
ects and propose a model to explain why some programs have a sig-
nificant impact on the companies served and others do not.
We then examine the impact of ETP training on the individuals
trained, on the growth of companies served by ETP, and on the Califor-
nia economy as a whole. Note that in projects ending in 1998–1999,
95.2 percent of ETP trainees were incumbent workers being retrained
on their existing job (called retrainees by ETP), and only 4.8 percent
were displaced workers (called new hires by ETP) trained in the hope
of finding a new job (Employment Training Panel 1999). In previous
research, we have focused equally on retrainee and new hire training
(e.g., Moore et al. 2000a). In this book we focus only on retrainees, as
they are the vast majority of ETP trainees as well as the majority of
workers trained in most other state programs (Duscha and Graves
1999).
Finally, we make a series of policy recommendations aimed at im-
proving the performance of state-funded customized training programs,
and suggest evaluation methods that are a good fit for these programs.

2
A Policy History of ETP
Unlike the programs begun in Southern states, the California Em-
ployment Training Panel (ETP) was not initially created to attract or
retain businesses. It was created by the state legislature in 1982, to
respond to a wave of layoffs in the early 1980s that shocked Califor-
nians, who were used to an unemployment rate consistently lower than
rest of the nation in the post-war era. The idea was that ETP would
use funds from the unemployment insurance system to retrain workers
and move them quickly back into employment. The logic was that
by reducing periods of unemployment, the program would recoup the
publicly funded cost of training through long-term savings to the UI
fund.1 The agency was located within the Employment Development
Department, but governed by an independent panel made up of man-
agement and labor representatives. Since 1982, ETP has spent $762
million, and trained 417,000 workers.
From this straightforward beginning, ETP’s policy purpose has
grown increasingly complex and subtle. Looking over ETP’s history,
it is clear that the program was shaped by three factors that emerged
repeatedly in policy issues. The first and most dominant factor was
ETP’s strict adherence to the principal of ‘‘pay for performance.’’ Two
lesser factors that shaped the program were its targeting priorities and
its methods for setting the price it paid for training. The following
section looks briefly at each of these three factors.
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE SHAPES THE PROGRAM
The key idea driving ETP since its inception has been ‘‘pay for
performance.’’ ETP’s policy of ‘‘pay for performance’’ means that
ETP will only pay for the training of workers who complete all training
and stay on a training-related job for 90 days. This policy has shaped
the character of ETP more than any other factor. The ‘‘pay for per-
formance’’ policy responds to a frequent criticism of other publicly
funded training programs: that training generates revenue for training
7
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agencies but does not lead to jobs for trainees. ETP aimed to avoid
this trap by paying only for training of individuals who complete train-
ing and hold a related job for 90 days. Essentially, the agency sought
to shift the risk of unsuccessful training from the state to the training
agencies or employers with whom the state contracts. In the traditional
arrangement, the state pays public or private training agencies to enroll
displaced workers or other trainees. Payment is based on trainee atten-
dance. If the trainee fails to find employment related to training, the
agency is still paid the cost of training. Hence, the risk of training
failure is borne by the state and the individual trainee. In the ETP
system, the training agency also bears significant risk—if the training
does not lead to related employment, the agency will not be paid for
the cost of the training. This powerful incentive immediately moved
ETP away from its initial mission.
This policy was a dramatic departure from the norm at the time
ETP was founded. Over the ensuing decades, federal training pro-
grams have become increasingly concerned with performance and have
devised a variety of policies to reward performance. The new Work-
force Investment Act (WIA) includes 17 separate performance mea-
sures, most of them related to program completions and success in the
labor market after training.
ETP’s initial mission was to train recently laid-off workers and get
them back to work promptly. The training of incumbent workers was
an afterthought, and employed workers could only be trained if they
were in danger of being laid off. Although ETP’s primary goal was
retraining displaced workers, 76 percent of the workers who completed
ETP training in fiscal year 1983–1984, its first year of operation, were
incumbent workers (‘‘retrainees’’). The portion of retrainees grew
every year, reaching 97 percent in 1989–1990. ETP’s first executive
director, Steve Duscha, explains what happened:
The performance contract won out over legislative intent. The
performance contract said retention was what mattered and only
employers could drive retentions and employers had little interest
in training new hires. They wanted to train incumbent workers
and that is what ETP did. It was not too hard to make the case
that almost any California worker was in danger of displacement,
if that is what it took to support incumbent worker retraining.
(Duscha 2000)
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Even with a focus on retraining incumbent workers whose future
employment was fairly certain compared to displaced workers, ETP
was unable to allocate all of its funds until 1989 because many employ-
ers and training agencies were hesitant to take performance-based con-
tracts. In fact, it was a widely held belief in public training agencies
that it was illegal for a public agency to take a performance-based
contract because it would have to tap other funds to pay for the cost of
training if the program did not place its trainees.
FUNDING PRIORITIES: A MOVING TARGET
In the late 1980s, ETP staff and state legislators began to examine
ETP’s experience and reconsider the legislation governing the pro-
gram. Much of the reform discussion revolved around the types of
companies and individuals who should receive priority for ETP fund-
ing. The legislation governing ETP was overhauled in 1989, shifting
ETP’s focus in several ways. Faced with mounting evidence that Cali-
fornia businesses were losing their competitive edge, the legislature
recognized that ETP needed to help both businesses and workers meet
the threat of foreign and domestic competition. Typical of the events
that were driving the policy discussion was the closing of the last
U.S. auto plant in California. ETP was to prevent unemployment by
increasing the productivity of existing workers. These legislative
changes, rather than driving change, actually reflected what had come
to be ETP’s practices, which were powerfully shaped by the pay-for-
performance policy.
The legislation also set clear priorities for the type of projects to
be funded. Training new hires (unemployed workers seeking training
for a new job) remained the official top priority, but in practice these
workers remained a small percentage of ETP trainees. Other priorities
were retraining workers in small businesses, and retraining workers
whose jobs were threatened by out-of-state competition.
The legislation also tried to commit ETP to funding only training
for ‘‘good’’ jobs. The legislation set a wage floor of $7.66 per hour,
meaning that ETP could not fund training for any job that did not pay
at least this much after its training was completed (although exceptions
were allowed). Companies that offered substantial fringe benefits, such
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as health care, could meet the standard by adding these costs to the
actual wage. Today there is no single fixed-wage floor—rather, mini-
mum wages are set based on industry and region. In most California
counties the minimum acceptable wage is $10.68 per hour, rising to a
high of $11.54 in high-wage counties such as Los Angeles and San
Francisco (Employment Training Panel 2001). In addition, ETP tries
to avoid funding training in companies with high turnover rates. ETP
has established a regulation that says, ‘‘The Panel shall fund training
for employment that is stable’’ (Employment Training Panel 2000,
Regulations, Section 4417a). In practice, this means the panel will not
fund training at sites with an annual self-reported turnover rate of over
20 percent, unless the Panel is convinced that training will lower the
turnover rate.
The wage and job security requirements reflect a persistent fear by
some parties, such as labor unions, that ETP funds would be exploited
by large employers to train low-wage workers for poor quality, high
turnover jobs. Thus ‘‘training for a good job’’ became a key idea in
ETP policy. A crucial event illustrating this controversy was an ETP
project in Ventura County that trained field workers to pick various
crops. As is standard practice, workers were paid a per-piece rate for
what they picked and were employed seasonally. Many lawmakers
objected to the project as a misuse of ETP funds, since it did not lead
to ‘‘good jobs’’ but merely subsidized a large agricultural producer. In
response to the complaints, and several news stories, then-Governor
Deukmejian removed the three members that he had appointed to the
panel that approved the project.
In the early 1990s, several analyses of ETP concluded that the
program would have a greater impact on the state’s economy if it tar-
geted basic industries (e.g., Moore and Blake 1992). The logic of the
recommendations was the same in each analysis: when basic industries
prosper, they generate economic growth by creating jobs in the compa-
nies that supply them. After an extended discussion of the basic indus-
try concept, ETP decided in January 1994 to limit its funding to
companies that ‘‘faced out-of-state competition.’’ The logic was that a
company was a basic industry if it manufactured a product or produced
a service that could be imported from out of state. Conversely, if
a company having only in-state competition grew and became more
competitive, the company’s growth would come at the expense of other
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California companies and there would be no net gain to the state in
employment. This decision was controversial, as ETP had been fund-
ing large programs in the banking sector that trained many branch em-
ployees. Retail banking was now to be considered a non-basic, service
industry, and hence would not be eligible for funding. In addition,
several major department store chains that previously had large ETP
contracts would now be excluded from the program.
In fact, this new policy dealt with an additional problem: Sophisti-
cated human resource managers in companies with large-scale training
operations and high turnover (such as retail banks and large retail store
chains) had found that they could subsidize large parts of their training
budgets by applying for ETP funding. Many ETP observers believed
that these projects did not add to the stock of training in the state but
merely substituted state investment for private investment.
There were some nuances in the policy. Corporate headquarters
were considered eligible on the argument that corporations, using mod-
ern communications technology, could move their corporate offices
anywhere. Thus, the corporate headquarters of a fast-food chain would
be eligible for ETP training, but not workers in fast-food restaurants.
Also, new-hire training was allowed in any type of business because
reemploying displaced workers officially remained the primary ETP
goal. All manufacturing was considered basic industry, and over time,
this policy led to a significant shift in the mix of industries served by
ETP. From serving mostly the service and retail industries, ETP came
to serve predominantly manufacturing industries.
The 1994 policy also changed which basic industry workers were
eligible for training. Previously, ETP’s standard had been that retrain-
ees must be ‘‘potentially displaced’’ to be considered eligible for train-
ing. In practice, this meant that employers had to certify that if workers
were not retrained, they were in danger of being laid off. In reality,
most employers found a way to rationalize this certification. Under the
new regulations, workers were eligible for training if it would ‘‘lead to
a high-performance workplace.’’ These new regulations opened the
program to employers who wanted to train workers in modern produc-
tion techniques such as Total Quality Management (TQM), Statistical
Process Control (SPC), or Just-In-Time Inventory (JIT). With this
change in policy, a host of consultants who helped companies adopt
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these techniques became salespeople for the ETP program. The issue
of managing these training consultants is discussed in a later section.
Controversy over ETP-funded projects did not end with these
changes, as a controversy erupted in 1997 that threatened ETP’s very
existence. ETP funded a $500,000 project that trained a large firm’s
lawyers to use a new computer system. The law firm had argued that
they were a basic industry because their clients could take their legal
business to out-of-state law firms. Senator Patrick Johnston, who had
sponsored ETP’s original legislation and had shaped and promoted the
program as a State Assemblyman and as a State Senator, was outraged
at news of this project. Though not a firm policy, ETP’s practice had
always been to focus its funds on ‘‘front-line workers’’ (typically pro-
duction workers in manufacturing). The thought of ETP funds being
spent on highly-paid lawyers set off a large-scale public controversy.
Attacking ETP as ‘‘an example of egregious corporate welfare,’’ Dem-
ocratic Assemblyman Dick Floyd introduced legislation to shut it down
(City News Service 1998). The legislation did not pass, and ETP sur-
vived, but policymakers’ views on the appropriate role for ETP were
clear. After much discussion, ETP adopted a policy that prohibits
training individuals who have ‘‘advanced degrees’’ (defined as a mas-
ters degree or higher) and are employed in service industries.
Today, ETP sees itself as an agency helping both businesses and
individuals prosper in uncertain times. Its current mission statement
reads:
The Employment Training Panel is a significant economic devel-
opment tool for business attraction and business retention. ETP
will work in partnership with business, labor and government to
provide funds for training California’s workforce in the skills nec-
essary for businesses to remain viable and compete in the global
economy, while providing workers with reasonable wages and se-
cure employment. (Employment Training Panel 1998)
Flexibility for experimentation was built into the 1989 legislative
amendments authorizing ‘‘Special Employment Training’’ (SET) proj-
ects. These are projects that wouldn’t normally be approved under
ETP’s eligibility requirements but, because of some special circum-
stance, seem appropriate for ETP funding. For example, ETP has used
SET money to fund the training of people, such as welfare recipients
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or youth, who would not normally be eligible for ETP training because
they are ineligible for unemployment insurance. SET projects have
also combined ETP funding with other funding sources, such as the
Federal Job Training Partnership Act Funds (JTPA), to serve special
groups such as veterans. The SET exception also allows ETP to re-
spond to political pressure to put its resources to work in exceptional
situations such as the aftermath of the 1994 Los Angeles riots or wel-
fare-to-work initiatives. Today ETP sets aside ten percent of its train-
ing funds for SET projects and invites proposals concerning workers
with multiple barriers to full-time employment, career ladders for low-
wage workers, and small-business owners.
HOW, AND HOW MUCH, TO PAY FOR TRAINING
Awarding training money is tougher than it sounds, and the key
question is, of course, how much money to award. ETP has wrestled
with this question since its inception. When ETP began, each proposal
included a training budget detailing the costs of training to be reim-
bursed by ETP. Budgets quickly became complex, and negotiations
between ETP and contractors contentious. It was very difficult to de-
termine, for example, when ETP should pay for equipment that would
be used for instruction but could also be used for production. How
much should ETP reimburse training agencies for instructors? What if
a company wanted to fly in a $2,000-a-day industry expert to provide
training? These conflicts led to rapid proliferation of budget rules and
guidelines specifying what expenses ETP would and would not reim-
burse. Still, standards were never completely clear. Staff members,
often unfamiliar with a particular industry and having little budget or
accounting experience, were quickly overwhelmed. Often it was left
to the Executive Director and the Panel to resolve budget disputes.
The 1989 legislation allowed ETP to establish fixed training fees.
In 1990, after some internal study, ETP adopted a schedule of fixed
fees for 14 different types of training. Within each type, the rate varied
by type of trainee (new hire or retrainee) and type of trainer (in-house
or contract trainer). The fees were set per trainee hour. Fees ranged
from $6.49 per trainee hour for employer-provided, new-hire ‘‘Certi-
fied Nurses Assistant’’ training, to a high of $17.39 for ‘‘Computer-
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Assisted Numerical Control’’ training. Most rates were between $8
and $10 per trainee hour. This system remained in place until 1994,
by which time it had been revised six times. The new fee schedule
brought some clarity to the problem and sped up program development,
but it generated other conflicts. No set of fees could cover every type
of training, and companies and their training consultants naturally tried
to get their training classified into the highest fee category, leading
again to conflicts between the staff and applicants (Employment Train-
ing Panel 1994). ETP was still willing to accept proposals with a
negotiable training budget. It did not force all applicants to use the
fixed fee, but the efficiency of the fixed fee appealed to both staff and
applicants, so few applicants chose to submit a budget.
In October 1994, the Panel attempted to streamline the fixed-fee
system by eliminating the 14 funding categories. Instead, ETP would
reimburse all retrainee projects using a training vendor at $13 per
trainee classroom hour, while company-provided training would be re-
imbursed at $10 per hour. Class size was limited to a maximum of 20
trainees. New-hire fees were set at higher rates of $14 per trainee hour
for vender training and $10 per hour for company trainers, and class
size was restricted to no more than 15 trainees. Under this system,
ETP reimbursed employers for a total of either $260 or $200 per class
hour for retrainees, and either $210 or $150 per class hour for new
hires. A separate rate of $8 per trainee hour was set for structured on-
site training (SOST).
This fee structure paid more for vender-provided training than for
in-house training and much less for SOST, which was really practicing
skills on the job with some coaching. The unintended consequence of
this structure was a dramatic increase in demand for training consul-
tants, because a company got 30 to 40 percent more money for using
consultants than for providing the training themselves. For the host of
consultants who used the availability of ETP funding to attract clients,
there was a powerful incentive to design training that could be offered
profitably at $13 per trainee hour. This difference shifted the mix
of ETP training away from highly technical skills that might require
specialized equipment and labs to ‘‘softer skills,’’ such as TQM, that
could be offered profitably at the going rate. Public training agencies
also saw an opportunity in the new policies. A number of community
colleges and nonprofit training organizations began to offer generic
A Policy History of ETP 15
computer skills training, such as word processing and spreadsheet
training, that could be offered profitably at the fixed fee. These agen-
cies also found that they could create programs in which employers
sent trainees to their campuses after hours and ‘‘off the clock,’’ reliev-
ing the employer of paying wages for training time. These programs
proliferated quickly and came to make up as much as 30 percent of
ETP’s training expenditures. This arrangement is discussed in detail
in the next chapter.
Another unintended consequence of the new fee structure was an
increase in the amount of SOST included in projects. Companies could
collect $8 per hour for up to 20 trainees who were effectively working
on production while an instructor coached and monitored them. This
generated much more revenue at lower cost than classroom training,
both for companies and for their training contractors. ETP responded
to this by limiting the number of SOST hours allowed in a contract.
Currently, ETP does not allow more than two hours of SOST (only one
hour for certain types of training) for every hour of classroom training
(Employment Training Panel 2000, Regulations, Section 4425c). In
1999, ETP made a further reform: It no longer counted trainee hours.
Rather, ETP reimbursed employers $80 per hour for instructor time
spent on SOST, with an overall limit on the number of SOST hours,
based on the number of trainees and number of classroom hours. The
logic was that a SOST instructor could not work with more than 10
trainees at a time, and the reimbursement rate for SOST was $8 per
hour—hence the $80 per hour rate. This eliminated the burdensome
problem of tracking trainee SOST hours.
ETP’s experience to this point clearly showed that it was a major
purchaser of training services, and that both employers and training
contractors were highly responsive to its payment methods. ETP’s
responses, in turn, shaped the types of training done by employers and
thus the character of the entire ETP program. Recognizing this dy-
namic, ETP commissioned a study comparing its fixed-fee system to
the fees charged in the open market by public and private training
providers. Not surprisingly, the study found that the $13-per-trainee
fixed fee created incentives to use training consultants, and that the fee
was higher than the usual charge for ‘‘soft skills’’ and substantially
below the usual charge for more technical skills. For example, the
median market price of TQM training was $11.88 per hour, while the
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median market price for CAD/CAM (computer assisted design and
computer assisted machining) training was $20.00 (Moore, Blake,
Honick, and Cohen 1997). In 1997, in response to this study, all re-
trainee fees were set at $13 per trainee hour, and all new hire fees at
$15 per hour. These changes acknowledged that there was no benefit
in creating an incentive for companies to prefer outside venders.
Recently, ETP again reviewed its fee policy to address two more
unintended consequences—the fee structure disadvantaged small busi-
nesses that could not assemble a class of 20 students to generate the
maximum allowable fee, and certain types of high-tech training re-
quired smaller classes and higher costs than allowed. As a result, ETP
created a new fee category of $20 per trainee hour for classroom train-
ing in 2000. To be eligible for the higher fee, training must be in a
high-technology area, such as multimedia, and class size must be 10 or
fewer. Alternatively, small businesses may qualify if they have fewer
than 100 employees and train the employees in on-site classes of 10 or
fewer.
ETP’s experience with structuring payments clearly shows that it
is necessary to continually adjust the payment system to create incen-
tives and controls that produce the desired policy results. Furthermore,
policymakers must carefully monitor the response of employers and
consultants to the payment system and make changes to it as needed to
avoid the unintended consequences that appear to be an inevitable part
of the process.
Note
1. Much of this history is taken from a timeline of important events in ETP’s history
compiled by Steve Duscha, ETP’s first executive director, who remains an active
consultant to many organizations on ETP and other training-related matters.
Other data came from ETP’s Web site, www.etp.ca.gov.
3
A Theoretical Perspective on
the Participants in State
Training Programs
State incumbent-worker programs bring together numerous agents
with varying motivations and interests that shape the programs. Under-
standing and anticipating the behavior and interactions of these agents
is essential to developing effective policies. In this section we exam-
ine—from a theoretical perspective—the behavior and motivations of
several of these agents, including individual workers, companies, train-
ing consultants, and government program administrators. We then
identify several policy implications for those designing state training
programs. We bring to this analysis several questions:
• How do individual workers decide whether or not to get
training?
• How do companies decide whether to offer their workers
training?
• Why do states get involved in employee training—traditionally
the domain of individual workers or companies?
INDIVIDUAL WORKERS: ‘‘SHOW ME THE MONEY!’’
We begin with the individual worker who is motivated to find cost-
effective training that offers a good chance of a better job with higher
earnings (or perhaps, maintaining a current job in the presence of tech-
nological change). When deciding whether to train or not, our proto-
typical worker performs an economic cost-benefit analysis, comparing
the expected benefits and costs of available training programs and con-
sidering what the best work and income alternatives are. For instance,
individual workers may need to decide whether they will be better off
spending the next three months in training or working at the best job
they can get now (or perhaps pursuing other alternatives). Workers
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only consider training programs about which they know enough to
estimate potential benefits and likely costs—they reject those programs
that do not offer greater expected benefits than costs, and they will
more likely consider programs that offer an excess of benefits (gains
in working conditions or earnings) over costs. Our prototypical worker
embraces training programs that offer the greatest benefits relative to
cost. What are these benefits and costs on which all depends?
The worker’s perceived benefits from a training program are his or
her gains from it, and an increase in earnings is one major benefit
people look for in training programs. Thus, training in higher-level,
more valuable skills is attractive because of the prospect of greater
earnings. Workers also consider other training benefits not directly
linked to immediate earnings increases, such as the work environment
in certain skilled jobs and attractive career paths that enhance future
earning power and promotion opportunities. Considered in conjunc-
tion with these potential benefits is the likelihood of obtaining them.
For risk-averse workers, which modern financial theory suggests most
people are, greater certainty of earnings increases would be preferred
to less certainty. For these workers, skills offering high earnings in a
technology that is widely perceived as likely to become obsolete in a
few years, or skills associated with jobs that are difficult to find, would
be less desirable than skills with lower but more certain earnings.
Also, better earnings far in the future are discounted relative to those
that are nearer. This is, in part, due to the lower degree of certainty
regarding far-future earnings, but also because a more immediate earn-
ings increase can fund more current opportunities or at least earn inter-
est in a savings account while future earnings increases are still on the
horizon. Finally, workers are unlikely to seek training in programs or
skill areas about which they have little awareness because the benefits
are uncertain to them. Unknown programs, then, will not be consid-
ered.
In summary, individual workers will consider the following bene-
fits:
• Incremental earnings associated with training
• Other benefits enabled by training, such as job environment or
career path
• Certainty and longevity of training benefits
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• Timing of the benefits of training—earlier benefits preferred
• Knowledge of the program
The greater any of these benefits are, the more likely the worker is to
participate. (Far more about the benefits of training and the economics
of choosing training, whether transferable to many jobs or specific to a
single employer, has been rigorously studied. A classic initial refer-
ence is Becker (1993). Most current labor economics texts [e.g.,
Ehrenberg and Smith 2000] will devote numerous pages to detailed
models of the above.)
What are the costs and what role do they play in training decisions?
Workers’ costs include any out-of-pocket costs of training, such as
tuition, training materials, travel costs, and parking. Training costs also
include time spent locating and undergoing training, since the worker
could spend that time doing something else. The value of foregone
wages or income is a common measure of the implicit cost of time. If
training takes place when the individual normally would not be work-
ing, the implicit cost is the value placed on activities precluded by the
training program, such as watching Monday Night Football. If the
benefits are approximately equal, people prefer lower costs. Obvi-
ously, training that imparts useful knowledge and skills in less time
will be favored. Also, training that imparts knowledge in a more pleas-
ant or engaging way will be preferred because, generally speaking,
we all prefer pleasant to unpleasant tasks. Geographically accessible
training is favored because travel-time costs are lower, and workers
also favor training programs offered during time that is less valuable to
them. Training offered in a ‘‘flexible time format’’ that lets the worker
choose his own training time is preferred, however training provided
while the worker is ‘‘on the clock’’ (being paid by their existing em-
ployer) is the most desirable.
In summary, the worker will consider the following in calculating
the opportunity cost of training:
• Direct, out-of-pocket training costs
• Indirect or time costs of training
• Pleasantness of the training experience
• Accessibility of the training
• Flexibility of the training schedule
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The lower these costs, the more likely the individual is to participate
in a training program for any given (acceptable) level of benefits.
Significant changes in any of the benefits or costs listed might
entice individuals to enroll in training programs or discourage them.
For example, a significantly greater earnings increase, more certainty
or knowledge about the benefits or programs, access to better career
opportunities, or nearer-term benefits might induce more individuals to
seek training. Likewise, training programs that offer significant reduc-
tions in the time or costs of training, better access to training sites,
more flexibility or convenience, or that are simply more effective will
attract more trainees. The converse is also true: if costs increase or
benefits decline, workers will be less likely to enroll.
Policy Implications
State-funded training programs alter—some may say confound and
twist—the economic decision-making process described here. Often
individuals do not choose training themselves, but rather it is selected
by their employer. With state funding, individuals need not consider
out-of-pocket training costs. Indeed, when training is completed dur-
ing regular working hours, as is often the case, workers need not even
consider the opportunity cost of training. State programs remove train-
ing from the traditional setting described above, in which individual
workers search for training, and that raises many questions. How do
employers motivate individuals to work hard in training? If workers
don’t pay for training or even choose it, will they see value in it? How
will the market separate good programs from poor programs if workers
can’t ‘‘vote with their feet’’ by choosing the program they think is best
(assuming, of course, that individuals are able to distinguish between
different qualities of training)? In our analysis of ETP’s experience we
will answer these and other questions.
COMPANIES: AN INVESTOR’S PERSPECTIVE
A company is motivated to seek training that offers a good chance
of generating quick benefits at a low cost. As with any investment
decision, training will be undertaken by companies if the expected
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gains exceed costs. Major benefits to a company may include in-
creased worker productivity and reduced labor turnover, either or both
of which would increase profits. Costs include the value of time lost
while workers are training (assuming that most training occurs during
work time), plus any direct or indirect costs of the training.
Companies realize many types of benefits from training. They
often provide new-hire training, usually including formal and informal
elements enabling workers to become more productive, but most com-
pany training consists of retraining current workers. Some retraining
is intended to move the company toward a moving target of ‘‘industry
best practices’’ (i.e., reaching a worker productivity level comparable
to the industry’s most successful companies). Promising new technol-
ogies, externally or internally developed, may lead companies to retrain
workers. Increased output per worker and reduced scrap rates and
rework time are common objectives of company retraining. Often,
retraining is required to expand into more profitable product lines. A
side benefit, but one increasingly considered, is that company-spon-
sored training might induce workers to stay with the company longer,
thus avoiding the costs of labor turnover. All of these types of training
can increase the value of a company’s workers and improve its bottom
line.
Nevertheless, companies often have questions about the benefits to
be realized:
• Will the new skills really translate into increased worker output?
• How much will scrap rates actually decrease?
• How long will new technology be relevant?
• How profitable will a new product line be?
• Is the training easily transferable to other employers or is it pri-
marily job specific? That is, will trained workers remain with
the company or defect to the highest bidder?
Greater certainty about training outcomes encourages companies to
train; less certainty (or not knowing about the benefits of training)
discourages it.
The risks and costs of training vary as much as the benefits. One
risk is that workers might leave soon after training, leaving the com-
pany with most of the costs and none of the benefits. The more likely
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this seems, the less likely a company is to mount a training effort.
Direct costs include training materials, space and equipment, and the
cost of instructors (whether on staff or not). There are also indirect
costs such as time spent planning, organizing, and managing the train-
ing, and the cost of diverting workers from productive activities.
If training is efficiently organized and managed, it will take less
clock time to teach given skills and will cost less. Obviously, if work-
ers can be induced to train ‘‘off the clock,’’ the cost is much less than
if they train on company time. The cost of diverting workers from
production varies with the timing of training; the foregone value of the
workers’ output is greater during very busy periods than when produc-
tion is slowed to a moderate pace. The pace of the work schedule adds
uncertainty to the costs of training because new orders may arrive just
as training begins. More than one company has aborted a training
program in response to unexpected new orders.
A company must, then, consider the following before deciding to
undertake training:
• The potential productivity gains from training (i.e., the differ-
ence between the company’s practices and the industry’s best
practices)
• The degree of certainty of training benefits
• The expected turnover rate of recently-trained workers
• The expected cost of training, in terms of workers’ time
• The expected costs of foregone production and revenues
• The expected costs of trainers, training materials, and space
• The firm’s capability to plan, organize, and manage training
Greater expected benefits from training at a given or lower cost will
increase the likelihood of a company’s decision to train.
Furthermore, a number of conditions might make companies more
likely to train their workers. A large gap between the company and
industry best practices, or a fast pace of technological change, would
imply a greater benefit from training. Lower expected costs, whether
from finding more efficient ways to train, a slowdown in production,
or worker willingness to train on their own time, would also lead to
more training. Hiring a manager with experience in planning, organiz-
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ing, and managing training also lowers training costs. Holding every-
thing else constant, receipt of information increasing the certainty of
benefits also makes a company more likely to train workers. Depend-
ing on what strings are attached, a government subsidy often makes
training more attractive by reducing employer cost. Interestingly, once
a company trains its workers, the resulting in-house management capa-
bility for training makes future training more likely.
Theory suggests a fairly obvious motivation for companies to un-
dertake training, and research shows that training does pay off for em-
ployers. Employer-provided training often benefits both employer and
employee. Many studies since 1980, including several of ETP trainees,
have found that employer-provided training boosts employee produc-
tivity and increases worker earnings by 5 percent to 12 percent annu-
ally (Bartel 1991; Hollenbeck and Wilkie 1985; Lillard, Hong, and Tan
1986; Moore, Blake, and Phillips 1994).
These studies lead to a broader question—are employers providing
sufficient training to keep American industry competitive in the long
run? After an extensive international study, the federal Office of Tech-
nology Assessment concluded: ‘‘When measured by international stan-
dards, American workers are not well trained’’ (Office of Technology
Assessment 1990). Many critics agree with this assessment and won-
der why any rational business would pass up an investment that yields
significant positive returns. Researchers speculate that employers fear
‘‘poaching’’ of their trained employees by other employers—perhaps
employers prefer to poach the skilled employees they need rather than
train workers who may not remain with the company. Perhaps many
employers simply are not aware of the value of training. Yet Frazis,
Gittleman, Horrigan, and Joyce (1998) suggest that larger U.S. employ-
ers provide significant training to employees, and Marquardt, King, and
Koon (2001) document the increasing movement worldwide toward
increased training using innovative means.
The existence of state programs is predicated upon underinvest-
ment in training by private employers—otherwise there would be no
need for intervention. Evidence is mounting that American employers,
from an economy-wide perspective, do in fact underinvest in worker
training, even though these employers are probably training at a level
appropriate to their own perceived benefits and costs. A number of
researchers who have compared training investment patterns of U.S.
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employers to those of similar companies in Europe and Japan have
concluded that the U.S. companies are underinvesting (Lynch 1992;
Bishop 1995). Underinvestment seems to be particularly acute in the
training of non-college-educated workers, who are the great majority
of the workforce. Lynch provides one view of the situation:
Underinvestment in training in the U.S. appears to be of two
forms. First, in certain sectors, U.S. firms may be spending less
and providing more limited training to their non-technical or non-
managerial employees than their competitors in other countries.
Second, in other sectors the level of expenditures or hours of train-
ing may be the same, but due to lower initial skill levels, this level
of investment is not sufficient to achieve the same degree of skill
proficiencies found in countries such as Japan or Germany.
(Lynch 1992)
Bishop examines in detail a number of specific barriers to em-
ployer investment in training and concludes that high turnover rates in
most U.S. companies lower the returns on training investment and lead
to less employer training than would be optimal for the overall econ-
omy (Bishop 1995).
Lester Thurow, former Dean of MIT’s Sloan School of Manage-
ment, reviewed the current state of the American economy and noted
that both companies and individual workers underinvest in training.
He explained the dynamic of underinvestment this way:
The basic problem in the United States is that every employer
wants a free ride in the training system. ‘‘You train, I’ll hire’’ is
the American way. Whenever unemployment is low, employers
who themselves do no training, bitterly complain about the short-
age of trained workers. They see nothing strange about their com-
plaints. As for employees, without career ladders they cannot
intelligently acquire the right skills on their own. Since they will
be switching employers frequently, they do not know which skills
they will need or how long those skills will be relevant to their
earning opportunities. As a result—rationally—they don’t invest
in skills. (Thurow 1999)
Despite the clear benefits of training, an empirical look at company
behavior raises questions. Company behavior is not uniform—the
most recent nationwide survey of employer-provided formal training
showed that in 1993, only 71 percent of employers provided any formal
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training for employees (Frazis, Herz, and Horrigan 1995). The use
of formal training varied systematically by employer size. Of large
employers (over 250 employees), 99 percent provided formal training,
but only 69 percent of small employers (under 50 employees) did so.
The use of training also varied by industry. Employers in the finance,
insurance, and real estate sectors were most likely to provide training,
followed by service industries, transportation and communications in-
dustries, and public utilities. Manufacturing, the target of much state
program training, was below average in providing formal training for
employees, as were the construction and retail industries. The most
common types of training, provided by 48 percent of employers, were
‘‘job skills’’ (technical skills directly related to a worker’s job); ‘‘work-
place skills’’ (more general skills like total quality management tech-
niques or just-in-time production techniques) were provided by 36
percent of employers.
Generally, employers tend to underinvest in training, most particu-
larly in training workers who are not in professional or technical jobs.
Employers generally invest the bulk of their training dollars in college-
educated workers. For example, a recent comprehensive survey by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics found that, of workers with a high school
education or less, only 60 percent received formal training from their
employer in the previous year, compared to 90 percent of employees
with a bachelors degree or higher level of education. The study also
found that, among employees who did receive training, the amount
varied substantially by level of education. Those with a high school
degree or less received 10.9 hours of formal training, on average, com-
pared to 16.1 hours for those with a bachelors degree or higher (Frazis,
Herz, and Horrigan 1995).
Policy Issues
Theory, and our own field experience, suggests that employers
benefit substantially from training but that, for a variety of reasons,
employers may not be aware of the potential benefits (Bishop 1995).
This provides a rationale for the state to tax businesses or workers and
redistribute the money as an incentive to train workers. In theory, the
availability of a training subsidy should tip the scale in favor of a deci-
sion to train, by lowering costs to the employer and thus increasing the
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likelihood of a positive ‘‘private’’ return to the employer from the train-
ing investment, although not necessarily a positive ‘‘social’’ return to
the state. Experience with state training programs shows that many
programs are unable to spend all available funds during their early
years because employers are unsure of the benefits—or wary of unex-
pected paperwork and regulatory burdens—and so resist committing to
training. Most state programs find that to interest employers in the
program they have to promote the benefits of training with aggressive
marketing campaigns. Also, since research suggests employers are
much more willing to invest in college-educated workers, it makes
sense for state programs to target frontline workers who typically don’t
have college degrees and who, therefore, would receive much less
training from employers in the absence of state programs.
THE TRAINING CONSULTANT: THE HIDDEN HAND
Most policy discussions regarding state training programs begin
with the workers to be trained and the companies that employ them, but
a third party—the training consultant—has become a powerful force in
state training programs over time. If states allow individual companies
to choose their own trainers, rather than designating providers, then
training consultants (public or private, profit or nonprofit) will play a
major role in the program. Consultants become, in a sense, part of an
industry regulated by the state training program. Like all regulated
industries, the consultants then form a powerful lobby attempting to
shape the program to their own best interests. In fact, ETP’s experi-
ence shows that shaping consultant incentives is one of the most power-
ful ways to direct the program.
Consultant motivations depend on their relationship to the primary
participants—companies and individuals. If the training consultant is
the company’s trade organization or the individual’s union, their con-
sulting will be part of their overall ‘‘care and nurturing’’ responsibili-
ties. Because their relationship is long-term and involves many other
services, they want the companies or individuals to be satisfied with
their training experience. The success of companies or individuals is
success for the consultant.
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Unrelated training consultants are generally profit-oriented indi-
viduals or companies whose business is training, but in some cir-
cumstances may be employees of not-for-profit NGOs or labor
organizations. These consultants seek out clients who provide an at-
tractive profit in the difference between charges for service and costs
of providing it. Like most businesses, these consultants would prefer
a large difference between fees and costs, but they provide services to
companies or individuals who want to keep their training costs down.
As in any market interaction, the more consultants there are making
their services known to companies or individuals, the more competitive
the market and the more likely that there will be only a competitive, or
normal, profit. Competition also motivates training consultants to seek
reputations as high-quality, low-cost providers, thereby attracting new
clients and generating repeat business. Conversely, the fewer known
consultants there are, the more likely it is that consultants will be able
to obtain substantial profits by charging fees well above costs. Of
course, high training fees will discourage many companies and individ-
uals from seeking training at all.
Whether in a competitive market or not, consultants are interested
in keeping their costs low. Consequently, they will seek out clients
that cost less to serve. Lower training costs are manifest in several
situations. Because there are economies of scale in training, as in
most other activities, larger training groups mean lower costs for the
company per trainee. Companies or individuals in industries with rap-
idly changing technology are more likely to offer training opportunities
and are often less expensive to persuade to train. Consultants also like
to train in areas with a set curriculum and readily available training
materials and trainers because training costs are lower. Consultants
will seek out and inform companies or individuals of available subsid-
ies because subsidies lower training costs and make the company or
individual more likely to train (and hire consultants).
In summary, consultants are more likely to offer training
• In an industry or skill with frequent training requirements
• To larger companies or groups where per-trainee costs are low
• With generic or standard, rather than customized, curriculum
and training materials, and with readily available trainers
• To companies or groups eligible for training subsidies
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If the training consultant has long-term relationships with its cli-
ents or is in a competitive market for training providers, then training
fees are likely to be lower and received value higher. In environments
with few competitors and little market information, training fees are
likely to be higher and quality uneven, and there is likely to be much
less training.
ETP commissioned two studies of the role of consultants because
their role in the program had become so important. Both studies rec-
ommended that, to manage the program successfully, the agency must
carefully consider how its policies shaped consultant incentives and
what the likely effects of those incentives would be (Moore et al. 1997;
Wilms and Moore 1989).
ETP has always allowed companies to select trainers. This allows
companies to identify specialized training providers who have experi-
ence in the company’s industry and can provide carefully customized
training. The availability of ETP funding has attracted the attention of
a host of training companies, ranging from individuals working out of
their homes to large accounting firms who have sought ETP contracts
for their clients. In addition to providers of training services to compa-
nies with ETP contracts, a second tier of consultants has sprung up to
help companies secure and manage ETP projects.
Market for ETP Consultants and Subcontractors
The key finding of the two studies mentioned previously is that
ETP has, in effect, created a substantial market for training and man-
agement consultants. ETP has become a major purchaser of training
services, allocating $85 million to training in the 1998 to 1999 period
alone (Employment Training Panel 1999). A unique feature of this
market is that rather than ETP directly buying training services, the
services are bought by hundreds of employers using ETP funds. In
addition, a substantial group of consultants has developed a specialized
practice in helping companies negotiate the labyrinth of regulations
created by ETP’s attempts to manage the process and protect public
funds.
The study of consultants and training contractors commissioned by
ETP in 1997 (Moore et al. 1997) concluded:
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. . . we find that the market in which both administrative and train-
ing subcontractors and consultants sell their services to employers
is best described as an inefficient market—one in which prices
range significantly above the competitive level and the product
quality may be low (Moore et. al. 1997, p. 23).
The study found the market inefficient because of four characteris-
tics:
1. Low levels of information among buyers
This study found surprisingly low levels of information avail-
able about subcontractors and consultants. This is largely be-
cause so many employers did not shop for subcontractors and
consultants. Half of employers considered only one subcon-
tractor or consultant—often the one that introduced them to the
idea of ETP-funded training.
2. Easy entry and exit, multiple paths into the market
Over the three years studied, there were approximately 300
subcontractors and consultants working on ETP projects—
individuals and companies were constantly moving into and
out of the ETP market.
3. Limited likelihood of repeat purchases
For most employers, an ETP project is a one-time event. It is
unlikely that an employer will be looking soon for another ETP
project subcontractor or consultant, and so subcontractors and
consultants need not be as concerned about repeat business as
other types of service providers whose success depends on it.
4. Third-party funding
A problem inherent in the hiring of ETP subcontractors and
consultants is that employers may not be as careful consumers
with ETP money as they would with their own.
An analysis of individual contractors and consultants found they
could be broken into seven subgroups based on size of company and
services provided. Each subgroup is listed in Text Box 3.1, with an
estimated percentage of the total.
The study found that most of the employers surveyed believed that
the subcontractors and consultants they hired played a key role in proj-
ect success. Most employers were satisfied with their chosen subcon-
tractors and consultants, however a group of problem subcontractors
and consultants was identified. The researchers estimate that 10 per-
cent to 20 percent of subcontractors and consultants on the projects
studied did not perform up to employer expectations.
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Text Box 3.1 Types of Consultants
Full-Service Companies (20 percent)
These offer a full range of ETP services, including proposal develop-
ment, administration, and training programs.
Public or Nonprofit Agencies (5 percent)
This category covers a wide range of public and private nonprofit
agencies.
Hollow Companies (approximately 25 percent)
These market a full range of ETP services but are actually small
companies, most of whose services are subcontracted out to a net-
work of individuals or other small firms.
Niche Trainers (20 percent)
These companies are small, highly specialized training companies,
usually with few employees. They provide specialized training in
niche markets.
Freelance Project Administrators (20 percent)
These are individuals, and occasionally partnerships, providing pri-
marily administrative services, often one project at a time.
Freelance Packagers (10 percent)
Individuals and occasionally partnerships who seek out companies
that may be interested in ETP training and help them to develop a
proposal that will be accepted by ETP.
Project Doctors (1 percent)
Much like Hollywood script doctors, these subcontractors and con-
sultants become involved when projects are in trouble. They special-
ize in solving administrative problems and negotiating with ETP.
Interestingly, the study found that none of the dissatisfied employ-
ers had shopped for a subcontractor—they had considered only one.
The study concluded that a lack of information about alternatives led
to less satisfaction with the choice of subcontractor.
Employers reported that the most important benefit of subcontrac-
tor use was help in managing the ETP process, which employers found
complex. Program management was given by 51 percent of employers
as the most significant benefit of subcontractor use, while only 30 per-
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cent identified the training itself as the most significant benefit. A full
25 percent of employers said that assistance from a subcontractor in
keeping track of ETP’s complex ‘‘rule and policy changes’’ was the
most significant benefit. Another 17 percent said ‘‘handling ETP paper
work the employer’s staff could not’’ was beneficial, and 11 percent
believed a subcontractor ‘‘made it easier to get ETP to approve the
project.’’ On the other hand, only 19 percent stated as the most sig-
nificant benefit that contractors ‘‘provide trainers employer did not
have in-house,’’ and 11 percent reported that they ‘‘designed custom
training.’’
Impact of Consultants on ETP
The study concluded with an analysis of the impact of training
contractors and consultants on all aspects of ETP’s operation, which
clearly showed that ETP had come to rely on consultants to deliver
programs to the targeted employers. In fact, the analysis implied that,
to be effective, ETP must manage the program through the consultants
and training contractors. The challenge for ETP is gaining enough
foresight into how policies will shape the behavior of these indepen-
dent, often profit-seeking organizations, so that ETP can attain its
major policy objectives.
A simple example illustrates this point. ETP initiated a policy of
targeting basic industries, meaning industries facing out-of-state com-
petition. On the one hand, training contractors and consultants quickly
reacted by bringing to the ETP panel many potential projects in the
targeted industries. On the other hand, the efforts of consultants to get
ETP funding for clients who were not clearly in a basic industry, by
challenging ETP rules and pushing the limits of the definition, created
a time-consuming and contentious process for ETP and its staff.
The risks and benefits of consultants for state training programs
are summarized in Text Box 3.2.
Policy Issues
Experience with these ETP participants suggests two major policy
issues for programs. First, how can subcontractor and consultant in-
centives be aligned with the larger objectives of the training program?
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Text Box 3.2 Benefits and Risks of Consultants in Various Aspects
of ETP
Marketing
Benefits: The strongest consensus was in this area. All groups inter-
viewed recognized that subcontractors and consultants play a major
role in marketing ETP. One senior manager estimated that they are
responsible for bringing in as much as 80 percent of all ETP projects.
Risks: Subcontractors are aggressive, they will test the boundaries of
ETP policies to try to qualify marginal projects by looking for loop-
holes for projects that may conform to the letter of ETP policy, but
not to the spirit of ETP priorities.
Project Development
Benefits: Many training and management companies doing ETP sub-
contracting and consulting have a wealth of specialized expertise in
skills, industries, and project management. Good subcontractors and
consultants help companies to effectively assess needs and link train-
ing to larger corporate goals, and they deliver customized, high-qual-
ity, state-of-the-art training.
Risks: Some subcontractors and consultants, driven by powerful
profit incentives, will try to shape projects for the greatest profit to them.
Project Management
Benefits: By knowing ETP procedures and promptly providing
needed documentation and information, good subcontractors and
consultants can save time spent by company staff monitoring the
project. Subcontractors facilitate ETP policy changes by tracking
them and keeping employers up to date.
Risks: By testing boundaries and seeking loopholes, subcontractors
may distort and undermine the effectiveness of ETP policies in order
to serve existing clients or generate increased profits.
Training Delivery
Benefits: Today, even relatively large companies may have few in-
house trainers, if any. Training subcontractors and consultants can
provide high quality state-of-the-art curricula and trainers for ETP
programs. Without them, companies lacking in-house training ca-
pacity simply could not participate.
Risks: Training subcontractors and consultants have an incentive to
skimp on training quality in order to lower costs and reap larger profits.
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Policy Process
Benefits: Because subcontractors spend a lot of time working with
employers and the ETP process, they have extensive and detailed
knowledge of how ETP policies are implemented in the field. Tap-
ping this knowledge source could improve the ETP’s policy develop-
ment.
Risks: Driven by profit incentives, subcontractors and consultants are
tempted to try to manipulate the policy process for their own gain.
This is a complex issue because every policy has unintended conse-
quences and, with many independent consultants responding autono-
mously to incentives, the impact on the program can be swift and
profound. Second, how can programs that allow an open market for
consultants ensure that the market is efficient? Employers need help
to make informed choices about subcontractors and consultants. In-
creasing the available information about consultants is particularly im-
portant. In essence, the program must ensure that the employers
spending public money are well-informed consumers of training ser-
vices.
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
The nature and motivations of government are much more complex.
Government seeks to benefit the central training participants—workers
and companies—but also seeks to benefit society by generating overall
economic growth through increased output and productivity, increased
employment stability, and reduced unemployment. If all the world is
a play, government agencies are actors attempting to influence the plot
by motivating other characters to act for them.
State government agencies could influence worker and company
training decisions in many ways. The most obvious would be to induce
more workers and companies to engage in training programs by subsi-
dizing the cost of selected programs. If subsidized programs were less
costly for individuals and companies, more of them would participate.
Training consultants also approach targeted companies and workers
with information on the state training program. By targeting compa-
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nies or workers in various situations, the state could encourage targeted
groups to engage in more training. For example, the state could offer
training subsidies to:
• Companies critical to an area’s economic development;
• Companies that hire certain types of workers (for example, dis-
advantaged or currently unemployed);
• Workers with certain personal or economic characteristics (e.g.,
displaced by trade, currently unemployed, or without a high
school education); and
• Out-of-state companies that the state wants to attract.
The state could also simply make more information available on train-
ing programs in general—their location, costs, and expected benefits.
More information would lead some previously unaware companies or
workers to seek training if it appeared advantageous to them. In addi-
tion to the gains by the workers and companies who would subse-
quently be trained, the state would stand to gain by higher tax revenues
from trainees’ increased income and spending, which may more than
offset the state’s expenses in promoting and subsidizing the training.
4
Training Outcomes:
Impact on the Trainees
This chapter examines the impact of training on worker earnings,
unemployment experience, and employment stability. The objective is
to determine whether, to what extent, and in what ways the trainees are
better off after training. Trainees’ post-training experience is compared
to estimates of the results of not training. The challenge, of course, is
estimating the ‘‘no-training outcomes’’ for the trainees. In this chapter,
the issues involved in developing a likely ‘‘no-training experience’’ are
discussed, along with the methodology used.
The reported results are compiled from four separate studies of
ETP trainees. Each study identified and followed a training cohort
defined by a period of ETP training contract completion. The first
three studies followed trainees in contracts completed in fiscal years
1989–1990, 1990–1991, and 1991–1992, and the last study covered
contracts completed in fiscal years 1994–1995 and 1995–1996. There
were two types of trainees in each of the studies: retrainees and new
hires. Retrainees were incumbent workers, and new hires were unem-
ployed workers qualified for unemployment insurance compensation.
The breakdown of trainees by type is given in Table 4.1.
A total of 167,415 workers were enrolled in training programs
under these contracts. The retrainees accounted for an overwhelming
Table 4.1 Trainee Type Breakdown
Cohort Retrainees New hires Total trainees
1989–90 45,023 1,923 46,946
1990–91 39,846 2,113 41,959
1991–92 18,118 2,919 21,037
1994–96 53,130 4,343 57,473
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
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93.3 percent of the total number, and the new hires for only 6.7 percent.
Because of the small number of new-hire trainees and some of the
complications in estimating the ‘‘no-training experience’’ of unem-
ployed versus incumbent workers, we have omitted the new-hire train-
ees from this analysis. Interested readers can obtain the results for the
new-hire trainees from the original study reports.1 Thus, the results
detailed below pertain only to retrainees (incumbent worker trainees),
hereafter referred to simply as ‘‘trainees.’’
THE IMPACT ON EARNINGS, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND
EMPLOYMENT STABILITY
Tracking the relevant experience of trainees requires extensive
earnings and employment data on workers for some reasonable period
before and after training. The Unemployment Insurance (UI) databases
provide extensive data on a limited number of variables. These data
sets include all UI-covered workers, but include only information on
worker earnings, employer, employer size, and employer’s industry.
The use of the UI databases to track training outcomes has become
more routine with the enactment of the Workforce Investment Act and
many recent state-level initiatives, which require databases of follow-
up on training outcomes. Difficulties in using these databases to track
workers are fairly well documented in recent literature.2 Nonetheless,
two issues are worthy of mention. One is the often overlooked require-
ment that all dollar-based data be adjusted for inflation so that changes
in price levels over time do not bias training impact estimates. The
other is that trainees appear in the available databases in some quarters
but not in others. There is no standard method for treating trainees in
the quarters they are missing from the database. We describe our ap-
proach below.
The greatest difficulty in estimating the impact of training is infer-
ring what would have happened to trainee earnings and employment
had they not been trained. In order to isolate the effect of training, the
trainees’ after-training experience must be compared with their likely
experience without training. Estimating trainees’ likely experience, if
not trained, is a major difficulty that has plagued many researchers
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and rendered the results of some training impact studies misleading or
useless.
In estimating hypothetical without-training experience, the prob-
lem is selecting and tracking a comparable group of workers. The
answer would seem to be the ‘‘random sample solution’’—just select a
random sample of workers who do not undergo training, track their
experience over a comparable time, and assume that the experience of
trainees would have been the same if they had not trained. Researchers
point out, however, that there is some voluntary aspect to many training
programs—workers ‘‘self select’’ themselves to enroll in training pro-
grams. The very fact of workers’ self-selection shows that they are
different from workers who don’t voluntarily enroll in training pro-
grams. The enrolling workers may be more motivated or perceive
themselves as more skilled than the average worker, and therefore may
be more likely to gain by training. If self-selected trainees really are
more motivated or skilled, then it is argued that tracking a random
sample of workers does not reflect the experience that trainees would
have had if not trained.
In evaluating the impact of the JTPA training programs of the
1980s and 1990s, researchers tried to overcome the self-selection prob-
lem by adopting the experimental method. This method overcomes
self-selection bias by randomly assigning training volunteers to two
groups—one received JTPA training (treatment group), while the other
was denied JTPA training (comparison group). The random assign-
ment into these two groups would seem to assure that they have identi-
cal personal characteristics. Researchers then tracked both groups and
statistically analyzed the experience of those not receiving JTPA train-
ing in an attempt to estimate what the actual JTPA trainees would have
experienced if not trained. This application of the experimental
method is subject to some controversy because the selection process
was not entirely random and many in the comparison group were coun-
seled into, or sought out, training from other sources. This creates a
problem in interpreting the experience of the JTPA comparison. Ques-
tions of exactly what the counterfactual experience of the trainees
really was continue to arise.3
Fortunately, the self-selection problem does not apply to ETP
training because its trainees are not self-selected. But while ETP train-
ees were not self-selected, they were ‘‘selected’’ by the companies in
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which they worked, and the companies were also ‘‘selected’’ by meet-
ing ETP’s eligibility requirements. Only certain types of workers in
certain types of companies were eligible for ETP-funded training. ETP
trainees were incumbent workers covered by unemployment insurance
(UI) whose employers selected them for training when the companies
secured ETP training contracts. The trainees had to be mainly frontline
workers, rather than management or other segments of the workforce.
Often trainees were entire work groups such as all workers on a partic-
ular production line. Though some managers did undergo ETP train-
ing, the purpose of their presence was largely to ensure that they were
well aware of the skills and capabilities that workers acquired. Prior to
January 1, 1994, ETP policy also required that, to be eligible for ETP
training, workers had to be in jeopardy of being laid off and the pro-
posed retraining had to be designed to forestall the layoff. Policy
changed on January 1, 1994, so that new ETP retraining contracts had
to satisfy one of following three requirements: a) workers must be
threatened with displacement if not retrained, b) the company must be
transitioning to a high-performance workplace, or c) the company must
be diversifying its product line.4 (Only a fraction of the last of the four
training cohorts were subject to the 1994 contract requirements, so that
the large majority of ETP trainees analyzed here were workers whose
employers were considering laying them off.) A final ETP eligibility
requirement, formalized in 1994, required companies to be in competi-
tion with out-of-state producers in its product market. This out-of-state
competition requirement had informal standing before 1994, so that
most companies in this study met this requirement.
These ETP requirements—frontline worker status, layoff jeopardy,
and out-of-state competition—undoubtedly introduce a selection bias
in the type of workers trained under ETP contracts. This means that
ETP trainees, compared to the average worker, are more likely to be
frontline workers, are more likely to be in jeopardy of layoff, and are
in companies that compete with out-of-state producers. Leaving the
‘‘frontline worker bias’’ requirement aside for the moment, the layoff
jeopardy and out-of-state competition requirements appear to reinforce
one another to some degree. Vulnerability to layoff that could be fore-
stalled by retraining would seem to place these workers in competitive
industries where new technologies or new skills play an important role;
and this suggests that manufacturing industries may dominate this
group. The out-of-state competition requirement also seems to favor
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the manufacturing industries because manufactured products easily
cross both state and national boundaries. The upshot of these two
requirements is that we expected the ETP trainee sample to be skewed
toward the manufacturing industries. This meant that, compared to a
random sample of workers, ETP trainees would be more concentrated
in manufacturing industries and less in other industries; there would be
an ‘‘industry concentration effect.’’ This meant that ETP trainees were
likely to have two biases relative to the average worker: a ‘‘frontline’’
bias and an ‘‘industry concentration’’ bias. These particular selection
biases have not received attention in the literature that is currently
available. They also make it impractical to design experimental studies
because what company manager, eligible for ETP-funded training,
would volunteer to have workers randomly assigned to miss out on
needed training?
In light of these possible biases, we estimated the likely result of
not training by making two adjustments. First, we took randomly
drawn samples of UI-covered workers for the same time period and
weighted their experience to match the industry concentration bias of
the trainees. We addressed the frontline worker bias by exercising
caution in interpreting the differences between the reweighted compari-
son groups and the trainees. Essentially, we assumed that the trainees
would be subject to the same economic trends as the reweighted com-
parison groups, but would not necessarily have the same level of unem-
ployment or earnings.
Specifically, to obtain the likely untrained experience, we drew a
random sample of California UI-covered workers during a comparable
period. The industry concentration adjustment was possible because
the industry of employment was identified in the data sets for both
trainees and comparison group workers. Unfortunately, because we
could not distinguish frontline from other workers in the random sam-
ples, no simple adjustment process existed for the frontline worker
bias. Hence, there was no simple procedure for eliminating this effect.
Fortunately, the only bias expected from the frontline focus was that
trainees’ earnings might average a little higher or lower, and their un-
employment a little higher, than that of workers as a whole. This
would be because management workers probably earn more than front-
line workers but support staff may earn less, so the non-frontline aver-
age earnings could be higher or lower. We allowed that the frontline
workers could have slightly different unemployment rates than the
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other workers because of their different positions in the companies. In
response to these possible frontline biases, we were careful to compare
the changes in the trainees’ earnings or unemployment with the com-
parison groups’ changes, rather than comparing absolute levels of earn-
ings and unemployment. In other words, we assumed that trainees
would experience the same trends in earnings and unemployment as
the comparison groups, rather than assuming that trainees would have
the same earnings and unemployment experience.
The extent of the industry concentration bias is apparent in Figure
4.1, which illustrates the dramatic difference between the industry dis-
tribution of all California workers and that of the ETP trainees.5 For
example, manufacturing industries employed only 14.7 percent of all
California workers in the 1994–1996 comparison group, but employed
nearly half (48.1 percent) of the 1994–1996 training cohort. Similarly,
the Other Professional Services category accounted for less than 5 per-
cent of the 1989–1990 or 1994–1996 training cohorts, but represented
over 27 percent of all workers in 1994–1996. To eliminate this source
of potential bias, the random sample of UI workers was broken into 20
to 25 industry groups (depending on cohort), and the relevant experi-
ence of each industry group was measured. The experience of each
industry group in the comparison group was then weighted by the per-
centage of trainees in that industry group. This process resulted in a
comparison group with exactly the same industry composition as the
training cohort studied, and thus neutralized the industry concentration
bias.
Figure 4.1 also reveals the changing emphasis of ETP training over
time. From the 1989–1990 cohort to the 1994–1996 cohort, ETP in-
creased its emphasis on training in manufacturing industries, as illus-
trated by the 33 percent manufacturing industries employment of the
1989–1990 training cohort compared to 48 percent of the 1994–1996
training cohort. In the same period, ETP also greatly de-emphasized
training in retail trade and banking—trainees in those industries
dropped from 41 percent of the total to less than 22 percent. Because
of the changing industry distributions of training cohorts, we generated
three different comparison group experiences from a single random
sample of California UI workers. The comparison groups for the
1989–1990, 1990–1991, and 1991–1992 cohorts were all based on one
random sample of California workers drawn in the second quarter of
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1990, but different weights were applied to the experiences of the in-
dustry subgroups to produce different comparison group experiences
for each cohort. The comparison group for the 1994–1996 trainees
was drawn from three samples of workers present in the California UI-
covered workforce in the second quarters of 1993, 1994, and 1995.
These samples were analyzed for differences and when significant dif-
ferences were not found, the samples were assembled into a composite,
industry-weighted comparison group.
California’s Economic Environment
California’s economic environment was marked by falling unem-
ployment during the second half of the 1980s, as the state recovered
from the 1981–1982 recession along with the rest of the country. The
unemployment rate bottomed out in 1989 and began to rise in 1990, as
California and the country entered the 1990–1991 recession (see Fig-
ure 4.2). While the recession was declared over for the nation as a
Figure 4.2 California Unemployment Rate, 1986–1999
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whole in the first quarter of 1991, the unemployment rate continued to
climb in California until it peaked in the first quarter of 1993 and then
receded at a slower pace than the nation as a whole. In spite of decreas-
ing unemployment in the last half of the 1980s, real hourly earnings in
manufacturing and trade were falling in California and continued to
fall into the early 1990s. Real hourly earnings leveled out and then
began to recover in wholesale trade in the early 1990s but did not level
out and begin to recover in retail trade and manufacturing until about
1995, as shown in Figure 4.3.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 also show the different economic environments
of the training cohorts.6 Trainees would generally be trained during the
fiscal year indicated, so the first three training cohorts were trained in
a faltering economy—a period of rising unemployment and falling real
earnings. In contrast, the 1994–1996 cohort was trained during a re-
covering economy—a period when unemployment was falling and real
earnings were beginning to rise. These different economic environ-
ments led to different trainee outcomes by several measures.
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The Completion Rate: A Measure of Program Success or of
Economic Environment?
A training program’s completion rate is commonly considered to
be one measure of its success. That is particularly true in the case of
ETP, where completion means being placed in a training-related job
and keeping it for at least 90 days. By this standard, ETP retraining
programs appear successful: roughly 80 percent of retrainees com-
pleted training in each of the cohorts, as shown in Figure 4.4. In a
voluntary training program, an 80 percent retrainee completion rate
would be very respectable, but does the completion rate really measure
success in a training program like ETP?
ETP contracts with companies to run training programs for incum-
bent workers who are in training as part of their jobs. What is the
meaning of the dropout rate in a training program where the trainees
are not volunteers? To answer that question, we must examine the
reasons for dropping out. Retrainee dropout happens in two ways:
either the employer decides that the worker will not complete training;














SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of ETP Data.
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or the worker quits the job. The company might pull a group of work-
ers out of training for several reasons:
• The company decides to lay off workers during training.
• The company decides that training is not worth the cost and
drops it.
• The company gets unexpected orders and has to suspend train-
ing to fill them.
In a small percentage of cases, a worker drops out by quitting the job,
but that could be for a better job, for health, or for other reasons. The
upshot of this dropout discussion is that it is not immediately clear
what the completion rate measures.
Presumably, companies contracting with ETP do not want to un-
dertake the expense of developing a training contract, only to drop
several workers later and receive nothing for their expense. Given that
a contracting company expects the workers it enrolls to complete the
training, it follows that trainee dropouts are caused by unexpected
events or new information in a dynamic economy.7 The 80 percent
trainee completion rate suggests that most companies, most of the time,
correctly anticipate the conditions that will exist during training, but
that companies sometimes make mid-course corrections that involve
about 20 percent of trainees. Intuitively, the 80 percent rate seems
reasonable in a dynamic economy, but there is no benchmark for com-
parison. If the economy became more volatile, the completion rate
would drop; if the economy became more stable and predictable, the
rate would rise. The retrainee completion rate would also rise if the
quality of ETP training improved (as fewer companies would stop
training in midstream), or as the nature and benefits of ETP training
become more widely known. Perhaps these considerations explain the
trainee completion rate’s slight upward drift over time.
The Participation Rate: Attachment to the Labor Force
One clear measure of training program success is the trainees’ at-
tachment to the labor force after training. By this measure, the ETP
program is successful. Training completers have significantly higher
post-training labor force participation rates in every cohort, as illus-
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trated in Figures 4.5a–4.5d. Also, while all of the depicted groups
experience some decrease in labor force attachment in the ‘‘post-train-
ing’’ period, the percentage decrease for the comparison group is al-
ways greater than it is for the trainee completers. Greater labor force
attachment is obviously a benefit to the workers (as they earn more),
to the companies they work for, and to the economy as a whole.
One interesting aspect of the labor force participation measure is
what happens to the training dropouts in various phases of the eco-
nomic cycle. It appears that, in a slowing economy like the first three
training cohorts’ post-training periods, the participation rates of drop-
outs are about the same as for the comparison group. In an improving
economy, like the last training cohort’s post-training period, the drop-
outs’ labor force participation rate paralleled that of the training com-
pleters—significantly above that of the comparison group. This finding












Completers Drops Comparison group
Completers 92 90 89 88 87 86 85 84
Drops 81 79 78 77 76 76 75 74
Comparison group 83 81 80 79 78 76 75 74
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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seems consistent with the variety of reasons for dropping out of train-
ing that were discussed in the last section. In a worsening economic
environment, trainee dropouts are more likely to result from company
layoffs. In an improving economy, dropouts are more likely to come
from companies abandoning training to fill unexpected orders.
Changes in trainee earnings seemed to reflect a similar pattern.
Trainee Earnings I: The Plague of the Zeroes
A critical measurement issue that complicates the tracking and
comparing of trainee earnings is the question of what to do with work-
ers who cannot be found in the UI database. (Workers are ‘‘found’’ in
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the UI database if they have recorded earnings or UI claims during the
quarter, they are ‘‘not found’’ if they have neither.) Should the not-
found workers be assigned zero earnings and then compared to other
workers who are found and who usually have positive earnings, or
should comparisons be made only between workers who are found?
Partly because of the nature of the UI database, a case can be made for
either approach.
The California UI database does not cover all earnings; it does not
include workers outside California, workers in California not covered
by UI,8 federal government workers, or proprietors and their immedi-
ate-family employees. Federal workers constitute about 1.6 percent of
the California labor force, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics recently
estimated proprietary income earners at 10.5 percent.9 This means that
if a worker takes a job in an uncovered occupation or with the federal
government, that worker will not be found in the UI database, but it
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would be misleading to assign zero earnings to the worker. This argues
for earnings comparisons being made only between people who are
known to be in the labor force during the periods for which compari-
sons are being made.
Is the limited coverage of the UI database a large problem? Per-
haps not: Given that trainees are in UI-covered employment when
trained, we do not expect many workers to move to uncovered or gov-
ernment jobs because ETP training is designed to enhance skills in
common private sector industries. On the other hand, a few trainees
will move into uncovered areas; and the tracking of some workers in
the comparison groups could be affected, even though they were all in
UI-covered employment when selected for the training or comparison
group.
Another reason for limiting the comparisons to workers who have
earnings is to isolate the effect of training on the pay rate of employed
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workers. Training is believed to enhance worker productivity, which
is usually measured by the rate of pay an individual can earn. Limiting
comparison to employed workers puts the comparison more in the con-
text of pay rate rather than a gross amount of pay (even though hours
can and do vary between employed workers).
On the other hand, the case for averaging zero earnings for not-
found workers into comparisons is that, for the most part, they are
workers who have dropped out of the labor force and are earning noth-
ing. If we want to compare the earnings of two groups of workers,
then it seems logical to average the gross earnings of a group’s workers
over the number of workers in the group. Trainees or comparison
group members who are not working are not contributing productive
output to the economy. If the earnings measure is supposed to capture
the average contribution of a group to the economy, then the zero earn-
ings of nonproductive members ought to be included. This is particu-
larly true if the groups have different labor force participation rates
over time. Averaging only those who have earnings would compare a
smaller percentage (the employed) of one group to a larger percentage
of another. Average earnings would not be measured on the same basis
in both groups, and would not reflect the full difference in earnings
between the groups. We have shown that trainees have a higher labor
force participation rate than the members of the comparison groups.
This means that an average earnings measure based only on those with
earnings would understate the difference between the two groups in
their total contributions to the economy.
Clearly, the question of whether or not to include individuals with
zero earnings in the average earnings measure is a difficult one. We
have chosen to report average earnings both ways in the various studies
of ETP. For the 1989–1990 cohort, the average earnings of the training
completers were calculated based on all trainees in the period from
four quarters before training to eight quarters after training. The aver-
age earnings for dropouts was calculated in the same way except that,
in each quarter, the dropout’s participation rate was brought up to the
same level as that of the completers by averaging in dropouts with
zero earnings. This yielded the same measurement basis for training
completers and training dropouts each quarter, so that the average earn-
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ings comparisons did not understate the productive contribution of
completers relative to dropouts.
Comparisons of average earnings of the 1990–1991, 1991–1992,
and 1994–1996 cohorts were based only on individuals who were
found in the labor force10 four quarters before training, four quarters
after training, or eight quarters after training (hereinafter termed the
4/4/8 population). In these cohorts, the average earnings vari-
able measures only the earnings of those found in the labor force, so
merely comparing average earnings understates the total difference in
productive contribution. To get the total differences between produc-
tive contributions of the groups, one has to factor in the various groups’
labor force participation rates.
To illustrate the difference, suppose that groups A and B each have
100 people, and that A has a 90 percent post-program labor force par-
ticipation rate, compared with an 85 percent rate for B. Further sup-
pose that group A’s average change in earnings is from $20,000 to
$23,000 annually for those found in the labor force, while group B’s is
from $20,000 to $22,000 for those found in the labor force. Comparing
the average percentage point changes in earnings for those found in
both groups indicates a simple 5 percentage point difference—group
A’s average earnings increased by 15 percentage points while group
B’s increased by 10 percentage points. Actually, there is a much larger
difference in the increased earnings of the groups. Group A’s in-
creased earnings are $270,000 for the 90 people found (the $3,000
increase in earnings times 90 people), but group B’s increased earnings
for 90 people are only $70,000 (85 people still working times $22,000
minus 90 people times $20,000). Factoring in the relative drop in
group B’s labor force participation rate means that group B’s earnings
only increased 3.9 percentage points ($70,000 increase in total earnings
divided by the $1,800,000 initial total earnings for the 90 people).
Thus, the true difference between the growth in these groups’ total
earnings is group A’s 15 percentage points compared to group B’s 3.9
percentage points, a difference of 11.1 percentage points instead of the
5 percentage points suggested by comparing only the ‘‘found’’ workers.
This hypothetical example shows that, if there is a difference in labor
force participation rates between two groups, comparing the change in
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earnings of only found workers understates the true difference in earn-
ings growth between the groups.
Trainee Earnings II: The Results
In every cohort, those who completed training increased their earn-
ings relative to the comparison group, providing an unambiguous indi-
cator of ETP program success. All earnings changes reported below
are stated in 1995 dollars to reflect only changes in real earnings, ex-
cluding inflation.
Those who completed retraining saw their earnings grow more
than the comparison groups, in every cohort. The difference was
greater when the economy was slowing than during a recovery. Table
4.2 shows an earnings-change difference of over 25 percentage points
Table 4.2 Trainee Earnings Results
Change Change
Retrainee Year First Second after one after two
Cohort before year after ($) year after ($) year (%) years (%)
1989–1990: Completers 32,640 35,447 35,433 8.60 8.56
Dropped 31,355 31,104 31,609 0.80 0.81
Control 36,334 30,284 30,699 16.65 15.51
1990–1991: Completers 29,143 34,995 37,232 20.08 27.76
Dropped 25,547 26,966 32,503 5.55 27.23
Control 34,325 35,200 35,047 2.55 2.10
1991–1992: Completers 34,369 34,740 1.08
Dropped 33,822 30,823 8.87
Control 34,568 34,003 1.63
1994–1996: Completers 24,155 26,780 27,780 10.87 15.01
Dropped 24,760 27,150 28,409 9.65 14.74
Control 25,642 27,183 28,667 6.01 11.80
NOTE: Earnings for completers in the 1989–1990 cohort were based on the average
earnings for all completers in the California labor market each quarter. Earnings for
1989–1990 dropouts and control group were adjusted to assume that the same propor-
tion of dropouts and controls as completers remained in the California labor market.
The other cohorts’ and control groups’ average earnings were based on the population
found in all of the 4/4/8 quarters for each group.
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
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for the 1989–1990 cohort, in the first year after training (the difference
between an 8.60 percent gain for trainees and a 16.65 percent decline
for the comparison group). In the second year, the earnings-change
difference was 24 percentage points for the 1989–1990 cohort (the
difference between an 8.56 percent gain for trainees and a 15.51 per-
cent decline for the comparison group). In dollars, the average 1989–
1990 trainee completer gained about $2,800 in earnings after training
while workers in the comparison group lost about $5,600 in the same
period. Recall that, for the 1989–1990 cohort, earnings for both drop-
outs and the comparison group were adjusted to reflect the same labor
force participation rate as training completers. This yielded lower
earnings for dropouts and completers than if average earnings had been
reported only for those found in the 4/4/8 quarters, as in later
training cohorts. The 1990–1991 trainee completers’ earnings increase
was over 17 percentage points more than the comparison group’s in the
first year after training, and over 25 percentage points more in the
second year. The difference was much less—about 3 percentage
points—for the 1991–1992 cohort, which was tracked for only one
year after training. For the 1994–1996 cohort, the difference between
retrainees and the comparison group was almost 5 percentage points
for the first year after training, and a little over 3 percentage points for
the second.
The trainee dropouts’ experience was mixed relative to the compar-
ison groups. For the 1989–1990 cohort (the participation-rate-adjusted
cohort), the dropouts’ earnings did not change significantly while the
comparisons’ earnings dropped significantly in both years after train-
ing. For the 1990–1991 cohort, the dropouts’ change in earnings was
3 percentage points higher than the comparisons for the first year after
training, but 25 percentage points higher in the second year (almost
even with completers). The 1991–1992 dropouts did worse than the
comparisons by 7 percentage points in the first year after training, but
the 1994–1996 dropouts bested the comparison group by over 3 per-
centage points in both post-training years, and again almost matched
the increase for the trainee completers in the second year. This sig-
nificantly smaller difference in earnings growth between completers
and the comparison group coincided with an improving California
economy in the mid to late 1990s.
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In summary, training completers always had higher percentage
earnings changes than the comparison groups. Whether the cohort
earnings were adjusted to reflect the same labor force participation rate
as training completers (as in the 1989–1990 cohort), or simply based
on who was in the labor force in the 4/4/8 quarters (as in the
last three cohorts), the same pattern was seen. Trainee dropouts usually
outperformed the comparison groups in earning change, but did worse
in one of the seven cases. One satisfying result was that dropouts
always did worse than completers, though they did come close to the
completers in two of the seven post-training cases.
Unemployment
In before-to-after change in unemployment, training completers
fared better than their comparison groups in every case, again attesting
to ETP’s success in achieving its goal of reducing unemployment. Un-
employment was increasing in the economy during the first three co-
horts, yet training completers’ unemployment increased less than the
comparison groups, as shown in Table 4.3. When the economy was
improving in the period of the last cohort, unemployment was falling
for everyone. Still, training completers’ unemployment fell more than
the comparison group’s unemployment in this improving economy.11
Training dropouts’ unemployment performance was not as mixed
as their earnings performance. The dropouts’ change in annual unem-
ployment was usually better than that of comparison groups, and it was
worse than that of completers, except during the improving economy
when the unemployment claim average of the 1994–1996 cohort of
dropouts actually went down more than that of the completers by one-
tenth of a week per year.
The drop in unemployment for ETP training completers relative to
comparisons may not be surprising, given that they must hold a job for
90 days after training to be considered as having completed.12 However,
the results are interesting for training dropouts, who range from being
enrolled but never beginning training to being fully trained but not
holding a job for 90 days after training. In every case we studied,
training dropouts did better than the corresponding comparison groups
even though they did not complete training.
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Table 4.3 Trainee Unemployment Results
Change Change
Retrainee Year First Second after first after second
Cohort before year after year after year (%) year (%)
1989–1990: Completers 0.4 0.6 1.1 0.2 0.7
Dropped 0.9 1.2 1.7 0.3 0.8
Control 0.7 2.0 2.9 1.3 2.2
1990–1991: Completers 0.4 0.8 1.4 0.4 1.0
Dropped 0.6 2.1 2.2 1.5 1.6
Control 0.9 2.2 3.3 1.3 2.4
1991–1992: Completers 0.5 2.1 1.6
Dropped 1.0 5.1 4.1
Control 1.2 3.6 2.4
1994–1996: Completers 1.8 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.6
Dropped 1.8 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.7
Control 1.4 1.2 1.3 0.2 0.1
NOTE: Based on the populations in each cohort present in the 4/4/8 quarters,
except for the 1991–1992 cohort, where the population is the one present in the 4/
4 quarters.
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
In the ETP studies, we also reported data on changes in UI pay-
ments to trainees and comparison groups. Because those results paral-
lel the results of UI weeks claimed, however, no new information
would be gained by reporting on UI payments here. The payments
data were very useful, however, in developing estimates of UI fund
savings generated by ETP training, which are covered in Chapter 7.
Employment Stability
An important goal of ETP training from the start was to increase
the employment stability of workers. Using the available data, we
attempted to measure ETP’s contribution to improving workers’ em-
ployment stability.
ETP training completers increased their employment stability rela-
tive to comparison groups in all but one case. In the one exception,
the training completers started with the same employment stability as
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the comparison group and finished the first year after training within
one percentage point of the comparisons. The employment stability
measure was refined in the course of the studies; the measure and its
refinement are discussed along with overall results.
In the first three training cohorts, we measured employment stabil-
ity by the average number of employers that workers had in a particular
quarter. Generally, having more employers indicates less employment
stability because it means that a worker was changing jobs or regularly
had more than one job. The quarterly experiences of the first three
cohorts are shown in Figures 4.6a–4.6c.
For the first two cohorts, the employment of training completers
started out less stable (more employers) than the comparisons and
ended up being more stable (fewer employers) after training, as shown
in Figures 4.6a and 4.6b. The 1991–1992 training completers’ experi-
ence was slightly different, as shown in Figure 4.6c. Their employment
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SOURCE: Moore, R.W., and D.R. Blake. 1992. Does ETP Training Work? An Analysis
of the Economic Outcomes of California Employment Training Panel Programs. Sacra-
mento, California: Employment Training Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Ser-
vice No. ED 360553.
Training Outcomes: Impact on the Trainees 57







Completers 1.21 1.18 1.15 1.14 1.12 1.13 1.12 1.11 1.1 1.09 1.09 1.09
Drops 1.27 1.25 1.23 1.21 1.32 1.33 1.31 1.26 1.2 1.17 1.17 1.15
Comparison 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.12 1.11 1.12
-4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8














NOTE: Averages include only trainees with earnings in each quarter.
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, and G.M. Phillips. 1994. Public Training with
Private Efficiency: An Analysis of the California Employment Training Panel Pro-
grams. Sacramento, California: Employment Training Panel. ERIC Document Repro-
duction Service No. ED 369935.
stability was similar to the comparison group before training and
slightly less afterward. We measured this cohort’s post-training experi-
ence for only four quarters and, at the end, the 1991–1992 completers
were closing in on the comparison group, as completers had done in
the 1989–1990 cohort. Perhaps if the tracking period had been ex-
tended, the 1991–1992 retrainee completers would have become more
stable than the comparison group. This brings up an interesting post-
training pattern of completers—they tend to have equal or lower em-
ployment stability just after training, but then improve relative to the
comparison group and become more stable in the second year.
The retrainee dropouts had worse pre- and post-training employ-
ment stability than the comparison group in all three cohorts. In the
1989–1990 and 1990–1991 cohorts, the dropouts experienced high in-
stability immediately after training but then closed in on the compari-
son group in the second year. In the 1989–1990 cohort, the dropouts
actually caught up with the comparison group in the eighth quarter
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NOTE: Average includes only trainees with an employer in the quarter reported.
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, and G.M. Phillips. 1995. Accounting for Train-
ing: An Analysis of California Employment Training Programs. Northridge, Califor-
nia: California State University, Northridge, School of Business Administration and
Economics. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 398386.
after training. Interestingly, dropouts also had significantly less pre-
training employment stability than completers.
During the course of the ETP research, we developed some con-
cerns about the one-dimensional nature of this employment stability
measure, because it might count people moving to better jobs in the
same industry as being less stable. We learned from our fieldwork with
the 1994–1996 cohort that more than a few workers did change jobs
after training to make full use of their new skills. Therefore, we de-
vised an index measure13 combining workers’ unemployment experi-
ence with their changes in industry of primary employer.14 This index
measure was then divided by the comparable comparison group index
value to produce an employment instability indicator. Indicator values
above 1.0 show the group to have less stable employment than the
corresponding comparison group; values below 1.0 show more stable
employment than the comparison group. Before-to-after comparisons
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of this indicator show whether the training cohort’s employment insta-
bility increased or decreased after training.
The results of applying this new employment instability indicator
to the 1994–1996 cohort are shown in Figure 4.7. Bearing in mind
that an indicator value of 1.0 means employment instability equal to
that of the comparison group, the results show that training completers
had less employment instability than the comparison group before
training (their indicator is less than 1.0), and their relative employment
stability improved after training. Dropouts experienced about the same
employment instability as the comparison group before training, but
improved somewhat relative to the comparison group after training.
In summary, training completion really does seem to improve
workers’ employment stability. The dropouts gain a bit of stability
from training, but not very much. We think our recently developed
employment instability index tells the story better and more accurately,
but both measures of employment instability that we have used show
the same results.
Conclusions from Comparing Trainee Cohorts to Comparison
Groups
The four studies of ETP training cohorts led to straightforward
conclusions:








Yr Before Training 0.9 1.01
Yr After Training 0.73 0.95
Completers Dropouts
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees, Com-
panies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training Panel.
ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
60 Moore, Blake, Phillips, and McConaughy
• Training completers were significantly more attached to the
labor force after training than comparison groups.
• Training completers had greater before-to-after earnings in-
creases than comparison groups, and those gains were relatively
greater in a slowing economy than in a recovering economy.
• Training completers’ average weeks of unemployment increased
less than the comparison group when the economy was slowing
and decreased more when the economy was improving.
• Training completers experienced an increase in employment sta-
bility after training in all but one case, and there the difference
was less than 1 percent.
Notes
1. Earlier studies include Moore and Blake (1992), Moore, Blake, and Phillips
(1994), Moore, Blake, and Phillips (1995), and Moore et al. (2000b).
2. For example, Stevens and Shi (1996).
3. For a discussion of the issues of non-experimental and experimental design, and
of some interpretation issues, see Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997).
4. ETP policy allows a set-aside of 10 percent of ETP funds that can be used to fund
training contracts that do not specifically meet one of the criteria but are deemed
by the Panel to advance ETP’s mission.
5. Figure 4.1 only shows two of the four training cohorts and one of the two compar-
ison groups. Showing all cohort and comparison groups would clutter the figure
unreasonably.
6. Remember that the cohorts are defined by the fiscal year in which the training
contract is completed, that is, when the last trainee completes training. For exam-
ple, some of the trainees in the 1989–90 cohort may have actually finished train-
ing before the fiscal year starts on July 1, 1989, however, most trainees would
have finished during that fiscal year.
7. A study of ETP disencumbrances (funds committed to training contracts are en-
cumbered and paid when training is completed, or disencumbered when trainees
drop out) concluded that the disencumbrance rate, and therefore the trainee drop-
out rate, fluctuates because of dynamic changes in the economy (Ong and Soohoo
1998).
8. Excluded from UI coverage are interstate railroad employees, the self-employed,
some domestic service workers in private homes, children under 18 employed by
a parent, persons employed by a son, daughter, or spouse, certain athletes during
off-season training, illegal aliens, professional and non-professional employees
of public and nonprofit schools during periods between academic years or terms,
all school employees of public and nonprofit schools during vacation or holidays,
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and certain other small groups of workers. (Labor Market Information Division
of the California Employment Development Department)
9. The overall self-employment rate was estimated at 10.3 percent in 1989 and at
10.5 percent in 1996. (Manser and Picot 1999)
10. ‘‘Found in the labor force’’ means that they had either positive earnings or positive
UI claims payments in each of the three quarters indicated.
11. There were no measurement issues in comparisons of unemployment experiences
similar to the zeros problem in earnings comparisons. Any adjustments made in
some groups’ unemployment to reflect divergent labor force participation rates
between groups would have inflated the affected groups’ unemployment weeks to
such an extent as to make comparisons confusing. All of the unemployment
averages reported in Table 4.3 are based on the workers found in the critical 4/
4/8 quarters for all cohorts except the 1991–1992, which was based on those
found in the 4/4 quarters.
12. The tracking of the completers’ unemployment experience does not begin until
the first full quarter after they completed training, which includes the 90-day
employment check. Thus, the follow-up period begins in the first full quarter
after the 90-day employment check.
13. We experimented with different weights for the two components of this index, but
changing the weights did not affect the results of applying the measure to the
trainees and the comparison group. Given that result, we assigned both variables
in the index a 50 percent weight.
14. The employer that pays the largest percentage of a worker’s earnings during a




A Qualitative Examination of the
Delivery of ETP Training
and Its Impact on Trainees
We began our series of ETP evaluations by taking the conventional
approach of measuring trainees’ earnings and employment. The stud-
ies clearly showed that ETP-trained workers had greater increases in
earnings and more employment stability than workers in similar indus-
tries who did not receive ETP training. While these studies were pow-
erful in that they tracked the earnings and employment experience of
more than 100,000 ETP trainees for several years, they were limited,
like many training program evaluations, by the method itself. One
comprehensive review of the research on public training programs con-
cluded that:
. . . information provided by current training program evaluations
is quite limited. Nearly all training program evaluations are
‘‘black boxes,’’ indicating only whether a particular program
‘‘works,’’ on average, for a particular sample under a particular set
of circumstances (including labor market conditions and service
delivery systems). Such information, although useful, may not be
readily generalizable to other programs, circumstances, or popula-
tions. (Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins 1997)
Like most training evaluations, the ETP studies left a host of other,
potentially more important, questions unanswered. For example, how
do projects unfold within the context of a particular company with a
particular workforce? What elements make one training program more
effective than another? We saw that ETP policymakers and managers
needed answers to these and other important questions in order to run
the program effectively. To open up the ‘‘black box’’ of ETP training,
we conducted case studies of 23 ETP projects representing a variety of
institutional arrangements. The purpose of these case studies was to
answer the qualitative questions that could not be answered by simply
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tracking the earnings and employment experiences of trainees. We
wanted to collect data that would allow us to take managers and policy-
makers inside ETP projects to show what makes them tick.
This chapter presents the case study results in five sections:
1. Summary of research methods
2. Description of a model of factors influencing the impact of ETP
training
3. Presentation of the results of our fieldwork, demonstrating the
impact of training factors
4. Examination of the impact of ETP training on workers




We chose a purposeful sample that was designed to capture the
wide variation in ETP projects that train incumbent workers. Purpose-
ful samples are valuable in evaluation studies because they allow the
researcher to capture the variety of types of cases while using a rela-
tively small number of cases. Evaluation experts recognize purposeful
samples as a valid method for describing both excellent and problem-
atic programs, without attempting to generalize to an entire population
(Patton 1980).
We selected a purposeful, nonrandom sample of companies with
the intention of balancing the sample along three key variables: 1)
whether the project was a consortium, training agency, or company
project; 2) the reason the company sought ETP training; and 3) the size
of the company served. In selecting particular companies, we also
considered geography (e.g., Northern versus Southern California), con-
tract size, and whether the company was in the service or manufactur-
ing sector. In the case of training agency and consortia projects, we
next selected three companies served by each project for a full field
visit. A summary of companies included by sampling criteria is pre-
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sented in Table 5.1. (To protect the confidentiality of the companies
we visited, we have changed their names and, at times, their locations.
All data reported, however, are completely factual.)
Evaluation Approach
We chose a case study approach because we wanted to examine
some ETP contracts in depth and capture the multidimensional dynam-
ics of the projects. The cases were selected to represent the varied
types of projects that ended during the 1995–1996 fiscal year. These
included training agency, consortia, and company contracts. The field
study method allowed us to make qualitative observations of the com-
Table 5.1 Fieldwork Company Sample
Stand alone projects by training Number of
purpose and employer size companies
Preventing displacement:














Total companies in sample 23
aThere were no projects in this category during the sample year.
bOne contract that was listed a business consortium actually served only one business,
so only one company was visited under that contract.
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
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panies in question and to examine each company’s training experience.
Each case study employed qualitative and quantitative methods to un-
cover the dynamics of successful and unsuccessful projects, and to
explain the nature of ETP’s impact on the companies.
Aspects of training
The case studies focus on five aspects of ETP training:
1. The quality of training
This analysis looks at the quality of training delivered under
ETP contracts, including the quality of instructors, training
materials, and the customization of training.
2. Learning from training
This analysis examines the degree to which trainees mas-
tered the material taught in training, and the degree to which
they were able to use it on the job.
3. Reinforcement of learning from training on the job
This analysis looks at whether learning was effectively rein-
forced when trainees returned to their jobs.
4. Impact of training on companies and individuals
This analysis measures, qualitatively and quantitatively, the
impact of ETP training on individuals trained and compa-
nies served.
5. Interaction of institutional arrangements and training impact
This analysis examines how the institutional arrangements
shaped the delivery, quality, and impact of training at each
site.
The complete definition of these aspects and how they were mea-
sured is described in detail in our account of the fieldwork.
Types of training delivery
The case studies carefully examine the dynamics of the three dif-
ferent institutional arrangements that ETP uses to deliver training:
1. Company contract
ETP contracts with an individual company to train its work-
ers. The company may use its own employees as trainers,
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hire outside trainers, or use a combination of in-house and
outside trainers.
2. Consortia contract
Several employers may band together to contract with ETP
to train their workers. Consortia are often developed around
an industry association, such as the California Manufactur-
ers Association, or a union such as the United Auto Workers.
Again, trainers may come from the employers, the associa-
tion or union, or from an outside vender.
3. Training agency contract
A training agency, such as a community college or a private
vocational school, contracts with ETP to train employees
from eligible companies. Training may be offered on the
employer’s site or at training agency facilities.
Field Methods
After selecting the sample companies, ETP sent each a letter intro-
ducing our research team and project. We contacted a representative
from each contract to set up interview appointments. Each company
was informed of the purpose of our study, the activities we would con-
duct, and the amount of time needed for the visit. We provided our
own Spanish translator when necessary, and translated all evaluation
questionnaires into Spanish.
Interviews
We met with the managers who developed the ETP contract to
discuss their motivation for undertaking training, the extent to which
they felt their objectives were met, and their view of the short- and
long-term impact of the training on the company. We also asked about
their relationship with ETP staff. In addition, we attempted to inter-
view the contract trainer or consultant on the project, if any. If the
company had a union, we also attempted to interview union leaders
who were involved in the training.
Focus groups
When possible, we conducted at least two focus groups consisting
of four to nine trainees as well as individual interviews with two or
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three supervisors of these trainees. The purpose of the focus groups
was to capture the experience of trainees, both during and after
training.
Evaluation questionnaires
Donald Kirkpatrick’s Evaluating Training Programs: The Four
Levels (1988) suggests that training may be evaluated at each of four
levels:
1. Evaluating reaction
The evaluator simply asks the trainees for their perceptions
of the quality and value of the training, typically through a
structured questionnaire immediately after the training.
2. Evaluating learning
The evaluator assesses whether the trainee mastered the
skills, knowledge, or behavior the training was meant to im-
part. This is measured by observing trainees on the job or
by collecting supervisors’ ratings of trainee performance.
3. Evaluating behavior
The evaluator seeks to measure what portion of the train-
ing’s intended skills, knowledge, or attitudes are actually
used on the job.
4. Evaluating results
At the highest order, evaluators look to see whether the
training had an impact on the trainees’ performance at work.
This can be measured in a variety of ways specific to the
company: scrap rates, reduced conflict on the job, reduced
absenteeism, increased productivity, etc. This method can
go as far as estimating a Return on Investment (ROI) for
training.
In conjunction with the interviews, we administered two separate ques-
tionnaires, one to trainees and another to their supervisors. Both ques-
tionnaires were designed to gather data regarding all four levels of
evaluation. The trainees evaluated training quality and commented on
their resulting changes in productivity, if any. We also asked whether
training led to changes in the work environment. The supervisors com-
pleted a similar questionnaire on their opinion of their trainees’ learn-
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ing effectiveness and change in productivity. Each company’s survey
results were tabulated and given back to the company so they could
benefit from our fieldwork.
Observations
We walked through the manufacturing process to observe trainees
at work and to note any effects of training. For example, we often saw
Statistical Process Control (SPC) charting at work, team meeting areas,
team notes, or the use of new technology in which trainees were
trained.
Document analysis
ETP provided copies of the contract files for all clients in the sam-
ple study. We focused specifically on the number of trainees retained
from the contract period, the type of training that occurred, and the
industry represented by each. We also read the field reports of project
monitors to get an understanding of issues that emerged during train-
ing. In addition, we examined any available curriculum or other mate-




As mentioned earlier, our research sample is purposeful and not
designed to be generalized to all ETP projects. Similarly, the data
generated by the evaluation questionnaires are based on the population
of trainees who remained with the companies until we conducted the
fieldwork. They may not be representative of all the trainees in that
particular project or other ETP projects.
Cooperation problem
While the majority of companies selected for the sample were co-
operative and helpful in allowing us to visit them, unfortunately quite
a few companies declined to participate. Two companies in the ‘‘pre-
venting displacement’’ category declined to participate. The most
problematic was the high-performance workplace category. The com-
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pany selected in the 101–250 enrolled size category was replaced four
times. A company in the 250 category had to be replaced twice.
Though companies in their ETP contract agree to cooperate with fol-
low-up research, our university code of ethics forbids us to use any
form of coercion to get cooperation in research projects. We cannot
estimate how companies who refused to cooperate may be different
from companies who cooperated.
Incomplete performance data
This is related to cooperation problems. Once we were on site, we
found it impossible to get all the data we desired. There were two basic
causes: First, most of the companies were private and unwilling to
share detailed financial and productivity information. Fortunately, they
often shared enough partial information to enable us to make estimates
of the impact. Second, many companies did not attempt to measure
the impact of training and therefore had nothing to give us. Our own
detective work allowed us to ferret out some information. This work
helped alleviate the performance data problem to a certain degree. A
complete discussion of how we assessed the impact of ETP on the
companies we studied is included in Chapter 6.
AN ETP TRAINING MODEL
Qualitative fieldwork allowed us to capture the complexity of ETP
training projects. The results of our extensive analysis of the 23 con-
tracts studied can be summarized in the model shown below in Figure
5.1. This model illustrates the basic dynamics of ETP training pro-
grams that lead—or do not lead—to increased company performance.
Figure 5.1 Training Impact Model
Potential gains 
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There are three key characteristics of the model: 1) it is sequential,
2) it is multiplicative, and 3) it generates feedback about training. It is
sequential in that each element appears in the chronological order in
which it occurs in a training program. Before training, a company’s
production has some level of ‘‘potential gains’’ based on its existing
relationship to the industry’s best practice. The planning of training
precedes the actual training. Next, the reinforcement of training must
come after the training. Finally, ‘‘Potential Gains Realized’’ can be
conceptualized as value of improved productivity in dollars. ‘‘Quality
of Training’’ and ‘‘Management Reinforcement’’ can be measured on a
scale of 0 to 1, or in percentages. Thus if both ‘‘Quality of Training’’
and ‘‘Management Reinforcement’’ are 1, then 100 percent of the ‘‘Po-
tential Gains’’ would be realized.
The model is multiplicative in that the quality of each component
amplifies or diminishes what has come before. For example, relatively
poor training with strong reinforcement of what was learned will still
have a significant impact. Conversely, if any of the factors are com-
pletely absent (a value of zero) there will be no impact. For example,
if there is absolutely no quality in the training, there will be no impact
regardless of how well planned or how much the training is reinforced
by management.
The model shows that training generates feedback about training
that shapes future training. For example, if training is successful, it
reduces the distance between the company’s practices and the indus-
try’s best practices. It also provides feedback about which aspects
of training were effective, and that feedback changes how training is
designed and delivered. Finally, the success or failure of training
changes management attitudes about reinforcing training. Thus, we
found that training that had a substantial positive impact led to more
and better-quality training, while a lack of impact led to less training.
Complete Explanation of the Model
Potential gains
A company’s potential gains from training are limited by the dif-
ference between its current practices and the industry’s best practices
(industry’s best practices minus company’s current practice). For ex-
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ample, if the application of new quality techniques produces processes
within the industry with scrap rates of only 1 percent, and a given
company has a scrap rate of 10 percent, costing them $1,000,0000
annually, then the potential gain from coming up to the industry’s best
practice is $900,000, a 90 percent reduction in scrap rates. Incongru-
ously, a company near the industry’s best practice, with a 2 percent
scrap rate for example, will only have a scrap cost of $200,000 and
thus gain only $100,000 by coming up to the industry’s best practice,
though this is still a 50 percent reduction. While it is possible for
companies to achieve even more dramatic results through innovations
that improve on the industry’s best practice, our fieldwork shows that,
most commonly, companies served by ETP are striving to come up to
the best practice level rather than make technological breakthroughs.
Quality of training
The quality of training has two components; the training design
and the training delivered. We discuss each component separately.
Our model implies that they are multiplicative. This means that if the
training actually delivered is of very low quality, it will lead to very
low quality training overall, even with good planning. The converse is
also true—a poorly planned but well-executed training program will
yield poor overall quality training.
Design
Decisions made in the design of training have an important influ-
ence on the ultimate impact of training. We learned from our fieldwork
that key design elements include:
• Selecting workers for training;
• Selecting skills to be taught;
• Selecting the level at which skills will be taught;
• Timing training in relation to other changes such as introduction
of technology, quality teams, or incentive pay;
• Planning to institutionalize training;
• Deciding to use in-house or contract trainers or both; and
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• Investing in sufficient planning to reinforce the changed behav-
ior after training.
All of these factors will be discussed. For now, one example illus-
trates the importance of planning the level of training. We found cases
where SPC training was too advanced and theoretical, requiring math
skills many trainees did not have. The trainees became discouraged
and increasingly negative about training in general because of this ex-
perience. Thus, in this case we found that the training had little ulti-
mate impact on the company’s performance because the trainees were
unable to master the skills. In other cases where trainees were taught
basic SPC skills after receiving a math refresher course, they were
able to immediately put their knowledge to use in production, and the
implementation of SPC had a significant positive impact on produc-
tivity.
Training delivery
Good training delivery also matters. Our results show that high-
quality ETP training has several key characteristics:
• It targets an appropriate level for the trainees.
• It is customized to the company.
• It has effective instructors.
In addition, high-quality ETP training communicates intangible mes-
sages to workers, such as ‘‘the company cares about the worker,’’ ‘‘the
worker has an opportunity to advance and improve,’’ and ‘‘the com-
pany as a whole is moving forward.’’ The ability of training to carry
these intangible messages seemed particularly important in companies
that had suffered repeated downsizing but were now moving forward.
This measure also assumes that where there is good training, there
is learning. We therefore conceptualize this variable as synonymous
with learning. In fact, a measure of training quality can be the amount
of useful skills and knowledge that trainees gain.
One thing we observed about this variable is that, while the quality
of training varied substantially, only one ETP training program’s qual-
ity was so poor that it actually undermined productivity. Otherwise,
all training seemed to hold at least some potential for improving pro-
ductivity.
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Management reinforcement of training
Many studies have found that management involvement is para-
mount to effective training (e.g., Lengermann 1996, and Wilms 1996).
Our fieldwork provides additional insights into the critical role that
management reinforcement of training played in ETP contracts. Man-
agement reinforcement occurs along three dimensions:
1. Messages about the value of training
If management sends clear messages to supervisors and
workers that training is important and valuable, then the
training is much more likely to have a significant impact.
Often the message is more than just words. For example,
we observed a company president who taught the basic math
course for SPC, sending a powerful message about the de-
gree to which he valued training.
2. Reinforcement of skill use and techniques
Trainees must have a chance to use skills on the job. Other-
wise, no amount of learning will make a difference in pro-
ductivity. If employees return from training to find that the
new technology they were trained to use is not in place, the
training will have no impact. Similarly, training in ‘‘soft
skills’’ such as decision-making or other TQM techniques
will have no impact unless teams are formed, assigned prob-
lems, and given an opportunity to meet soon after training.
3. Timeliness of reinforcement
We found training has a dramatically short shelf life. Even
in cases where management signals that training is impor-
tant, and is willing to invest in new technology or reinforce
skills in other ways, the impact of training will diminish
dramatically if the reinforcement does not come promptly.
For example, in one factory we found two groups of SPC
trainees—one that used their SPC skills effectively and one
that did not. Both groups had identical SPC training. The
group that used the skill effectively had immediately imple-
mented SPC when they returned to the production line after
training. The group that did not use SPC effectively had
to wait several months for SPC to be implemented in their
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production process, and by that time they had lost their mas-
tery of the skills.
Feedback
As the model shows, the company gets feedback about the training
that shapes future training. We observed wide variation in the degree
to which companies got feedback from the training experience and
used it to improve future programs. Some companies had precise mea-
sures of the impact of training and systematic assessment data, which
they used to design future programs. Other companies had only vague
impressions about the impact and quality of training but still used these
impressions as data for developing future programs. Thus, successful
programs that were carefully assessed tended to lead to more training
that was even more carefully customized. Conversely, failed training
programs that yielded no positive results often caused companies to
cease or reduce training.
How the model works
The workings of the model are illustrated in three cases from our
fieldwork. The examples include a very successful project, a partially
successful project, and an unsuccessful project. First, we assumed a
particular potential gain from training for illustrative purposes only.
Next, based on our field observations and survey data, we estimated a
percentage value for each of the variables in the model to indicate its
performance in the particular project. We then calculated the theoreti-
cal impact of training based on the dollar value of the potential gains
realized.
• Very successful project
This company manufactured pumps. Its productivity was
closer to the industry’s best practices than most companies,
but it still had significant room for improvement. Manage-
ment worked hard to design customized, high quality train-
ing, and they delivered it well. TQM, SPC, and other
training was followed by carefully planned implementation
of TQM teams and SPC practices on key production lines.
Scrap rates and warranty work dropped dramatically. Fig-
ure 5.2 illustrates the impact of this project. The positive
outcome led to the creation of permanent classrooms in the
76 Moore, Blake, Phillips, and McConaughy
Figure 5.2 Strong Positive Feedback
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plant and the development of a cadre of in-house instructors.
The plant continued to require formal training in TQM and
SPC for all new employees and offered periodic upgrade
training to existing employees without ETP subsidy.
• Partially successful project
This company made components for heavy equipment. It
was far below the industry standard. It hired a consultant to
deliver all of the training and, for various reasons, the qual-
ity of the SPC and TQM training was poor. After training,
management did follow up, creating quality teams and allo-
cating resources to make changes recommended by the
teams. As Figure 5.3 shows, despite the poor quality of
training, the large potential gains and good management re-
inforcement led to significant productivity gains. The posi-
tive outcome led to continued training of new workers in the
TQM system.
• Unsuccessful project
The unit in which training took place processed insurance
claims and provided customer service for a large insurance
company. Through a combination of in-house and contract
trainers, the company carefully planned a large-scale train-
Figure 5.3 Moderate Positive Feedback
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ing intervention and then provided excellent training to al-
most all of its employees. Immediately after training,
employees were encouraged to tackle difficult quality prob-
lems and were provided resources. After a short period,
however, the unit was reorganized. Most trainees were relo-
cated, and new management stopped reinforcing the prac-
tices. Employees were very discouraged by this experience,
new management perceived few gains from training, and
nonroutine training ceased. The result, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.4, was that there was no productivity gain.
This example shows that even when management in-
tends to reinforce training, unforeseen events can overtake
and disrupt the reinforcement, destroying any potential
gains and possibly undermining the effectiveness of future
training.
Figure 5.4 Negative Feedback
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Lessons from the model
The model briefly illustrates a few lessons from the fieldwork.
First, the companies’ potential gains from training vary substantially.
There are limits in the degree to which companies can actually improve
their productivity. Companies far down the proverbial learning curve
actually have more potential to benefit from training than better-run
companies that have already achieved a substantial portion of the po-
tential productivity gains. Second, high-quality training contributes to
the potential gains from training but does not guarantee productivity
increases. Next, management behavior controls the degree to which
potential gains are actually achieved. As the model suggests, if there
is no management reinforcement (a value of 0), there will be no change
in productivity. Finally, the ETP training experience shapes future
78 Moore, Blake, Phillips, and McConaughy
attitudes toward training, and toward the quality of training and man-
agement reinforcement. In general, positive training outcomes increase
the commitment to training and negative outcomes decrease the com-
mitment to training.
FIELD RESULTS
This section employs the training model to analyze our field results
from the 23 companies we visited. The organization of this section
follows the sequence of the components in the model, so we address
the potential gains from training, as they are shown in Figure 5.5, first.
Potential Gains from Training
In the field visits, we were struck by the wide variation in compa-
nies’ potential to gain from ETP training. Companies with strong man-
agement are likely to have achieved a large proportion of the potential
gains available through training. These well-run companies have al-
ready improved their production process and thus have less potential
for benefiting from ETP training. These same companies may best be
able to obtain and execute an ETP project, however, because they do
have strong management. Conversely, companies far below the best
practice standard for their industry, due to weak management or other
problems, have the most to gain; but they are likely to have the most
problems executing an ETP-funded program and supporting changes
in the production system.
A related observation is that companies that are at the best practice
level will need breakthroughs to improve productivity. These break-
throughs are less likely to come from training than from technological
Figure 5.5 Potential Gains
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or systems changes. Also, training investments that are intended to
break through current industry practices are high risk since the ideas
are new and untested. They do not have a proven track record, and
thus may not yield any results.
What we observed in the field is that companies with relatively
low-quality and inefficient production processes experienced tremen-
dous gains from basic training in techniques like TQM, basic produc-
tion planning, or decision making. Implementing even rudimentary
Text Box 5.1 A Tale of Two Companies
Just miles apart in a central valley city are two companies that rep-
resent the wide range of potential gains from ETP training. The first
company, T-Bar, which manufactures roll bars for heavy equipment and
related products, has grown rapidly. Production takes place in a dirty
and disorganized open-air shed. Prior to ETP training there was little
focus on improving production efficiency. Workers simply followed
traditional methods and pushed the product out the door. For example,
assemblers kept parts in a helter-skelter array of boxes on the floor
around the assembly area. The process was obviously far below the
industry best practices for any manufacturing process. After basic TQM
training, management formed teams and allocated resources based on
suggestions from the teams. The team of assemblers organized their
parts on shelves in a container near their work area. This simple change
dramatically improved their efficiency and ability to keep track of parts.
T-Bar experienced significant improvements from this and other basic
changes because they started far below industry standards.
A few miles across town, Flow Pumps produces stainless steel
pumps in a clean, modern, air-conditioned factory. Management has
invested in state-of-the-art equipment. The highly-trained human re-
sources staff carefully selects employees for motivation and basic skills.
Production is organized by an in-house staff of industrial engineers to
maximize efficiency and quality. The company still wanted to improve,
so through ETP, it invested in training its frontline production workers
in SPC and TQM techniques. After training, teams attacked difficult
lingering problems, many of which were eventually solved, leading to
important but relatively small gains in productivity. The gains were
relatively small because the production processes were already near op-
timum.
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team quality practices led to substantial improvements in quality and
productivity. In other companies that were much better managed and
had better-trained workers, substantial training in relatively higher-
order skills and careful implementation of management level reforms
led to significant but smaller improvements in quality and productivity
(for examples from the fieldwork, see Text Box 5.1).
To us, this dynamic is analogous to public health programs in de-
veloping countries where modest interventions can yield huge benefits.
For example, getting people to boil drinking water, a relatively simple
act, can have a significant impact on mortality rates in areas where
waterborne diseases are major killers.
Quality of Training
Use of our model to analyze data collected from the fieldwork
revealed that the quality of training had two basic elements: the quality
of planning that went into the training, and the quality of the training
actually delivered (as illustrated in Figure 5.6). In this section, we will
first discuss the elements that make up effective planning, and then
examine the quality of training delivered by the projects we studied.
Figure 5.6 Quality of Training
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From the fieldwork, we identified a series of key activities and
management decisions that have a critical influence on the quality of
training. These steps are listed below, with our observations about
each. Text Box 5.2 provides a description of what we view as good
planning.
• Clear Objectives
As with any major undertaking, ETP training projects need
clear goals to be effective. The fieldwork confirmed that
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companies with clear, explicit goals were more likely to
complete their ETP contract in a timely and effective man-
ner. In some cases external forces drove the goals. For
example, we saw several cases where companies had to train
to achieve quality certification from a third party, such as
Boeing or some other major contractor. In these cases, the
projects were clearly focused and had top management’s
attention, although they sometimes lacked the customization
needed to be optimally effective. In cases where goals were
either unstated or vague (for example, ‘‘we want to train to
improve quality’’), training suffered when conflicts occurred
between training and other goals (such as production).
Similarly, if the goals were not understood or shared
by all managers, conflict often erupted when the resource
requirements of training became clear. We observed that if
trainees did not understand the overarching goal that drove
training, they were less motivated and were unable to put
training in context. Clear goals also help companies make
other essential training decisions such as which training top-
ics to cover and whether or not to use in-house trainers.
• Assessing Basic Skills
Assessing the current skill levels of trainees is a key factor
in planning appropriate training, but this step was com-
monly overlooked in the projects we visited. For example,
we found several instances where companies attempted to
teach SPC techniques to frontline workers who lacked the
basic math skills to grasp or use the techniques. Companies
believe that they know their workers well, but we found they
often misjudged employees’ skills because they did not use
systematic assessment of individual workers. Some consul-
tants use systematic needs assessment and some do not.
Sometimes the experience in training leads to improved
skills assessment. For example, after having difficulty
teaching SPC to its existing workforce, one company began
screening new hires for basic math skills and added a course
in basic math skills to the training received by all new hires.
• Consultant versus In-house Training
Whether to hire training consultants or use in-house trainers
is a major strategic decision in the training design. The
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issues surrounding the use of consultants and contract train-
ers are complex and explored in an earlier study (Moore,
Blake et al. 1997). The fieldwork revealed many consultants
and contract trainers with industry-specific expertise, who
knew ETP well, and delivered high-quality programs. Some
trainers took the time to familiarize themselves with the
company’s processes and then customized instruction to the
company. Unfortunately, we also found trainers who pro-
vided poor delivery of generic training to unprepared
trainees.
The earlier study of consultants and contractors showed
that most employers do not shop effectively for consultants
and training contractors. ETP’s continued efforts to encour-
age employers to carefully evaluate consultants and contract
trainers should eventually improve the planning of projects.
The value of choosing to do training in-house was our most
telling observation. Companies received many benefits
when they chose to do the training in-house or teamed em-
ployees with outside trainers. First, the inside trainers’ inti-
mate knowledge of the company appeared to improve the
quality of training. Next, by using senior employees as
trainers, the company sent a powerful message that training
was valued and important to upper management. In cases
where frontline workers were teamed with managers to
serve as trainers, the cooperation between workers and man-
agement modeled the new cooperative environment the
training was to produce, again sending an important mes-
sage. Also, in-house trainers speed up and improve the
feedback cycle. In-house trainers are around to observe
whether the skills taught in training are used on the produc-
tion floor, which provides ongoing feedback that can be
used to improve future training. (Lengermann 1996)
Finally, we observed that training is much more likely
to persist beyond the ETP contract when training was pro-
vided by in-house trainers. There are some simple reasons
for this: With in-house training there is more likely to be a
customized curriculum owned by the company. Though in-
house trainers must take time away from regular duties to
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train (if they are normally production workers or managers),
it is less expensive than hiring outside contractors. In-house
trainers often teach multiple cohorts of employees over
time, helping to infuse training into the culture of the com-
pany. In general, using in-house trainers seems to increase
the company’s commitment to training.
• Intact versus Mixed Training Classes
A key planning decision is whether to train intact groups of
workers or mixed groups of workers. We found that suc-
cessful projects had a conscious strategy of forming groups
that would reinforce larger project goals. For example, one
company whose core process was processing insurance
claims knew it had a communications problem between
units that was undermining quality. The company deliber-
ately created training classes with employees from multiple
departments. In class, trainees built inter-departmental rela-
tionships and learned how others saw problems and barriers.
Back on the job, these new relationships and perspectives
led to a major improvement in communication. Conversely,
in another project, the focus was on creating quality teams
to solve problems within various production areas. Classes
were made up of entire work units, and teams were formed
that began to work on production problems. When training
ended, the workers were already functioning as teams,
which enabled them to begin solving problems and improv-
ing quality immediately.
• Planned Reinforcement
We discuss the importance of management strategies for re-
inforcing training at length later in the report. Here, we note
that we were surprised at how few companies consciously
plan to reinforce what was learned in training. It is well
known that changes in behavior promoted by training will
not persist unless they are reinforced after the training is
over. For instance, if training teaches a variety of group
problem-solving techniques and quality strategies, but
groups are not given authority to take on problems, time to
meet, and required resources, training will yield few quality
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improvements. Most companies we visited that eventually
developed effective reinforcement strategies did so in an ad
hoc manner after the training was over, and managers real-
ized they needed to do something more to make training pay
off. In the few cases where systematic reinforcement was
planned, we found the effects of training to be potent and
the payoff immediate.
• Importance of Creating Just-In-Time Training
The fieldwork impressed on us the importance of training
that is delivered ‘‘just in time.’’ Any experienced teacher
knows that the shelf life of new learning is short. No matter
how good the initial training, new skills and knowledge are
lost if not used promptly. We saw many examples in which
companies provided good training under ETP, but when
workers returned to the production line, the systems in
which they were to use these skills were not in place. For
example, when a group of production workers in one com-
pany was trained in SPC, there were no gauges or charts for
them to use to implement SPC when they returned to the
production lines. Only after six months was an SPC plan
ready for their part of the production line—by that time,
most trainees had forgotten the SPC they had learned and
they had a great deal of difficulty getting the SPC system
going. Much of the benefit of the original training was lost.
Similarly, training workers on new technology, long before
the technology is in place, is futile.
• Planning SOST to Expand and Reinforce Training
We will discuss SOST1 (Structured On Site Training) at
length later. For now, we note that the planning of SOST
was much more problematic than planning classroom train-
ing. Many projects included substantial SOST hours, but
the planning needed to ensure the quality of SOST was often
absent. Too often, trainers did not design SOST assign-
ments specific to the production process or provide coaching
while trainees worked on the assignments. We also found
that supervisors often lacked commitment to allowing em-
ployees time away from production to complete SOST.
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Text Box 5.2 Good Management Planning Leads to Effective
Training
In 1994, the managers at PHA Insurance (not real name) wanted to
become NCQA-certified (this is similar to ISO 9000 quality certifica-
tion). They went through the certification process but did not pass. ‘‘It
was a big blow to the company,’’ according to the managers inter-
viewed.
As a result of this failure, managers ‘‘wanted to improve the staff’s
ability to make decisions and make change.’’ According to the manag-
ers, training had three goals:
1. Make a visible improvement in the business process.
2. Achieve a ‘‘clear’’ NCQA accreditation in three years.
3. Improve customer service.
The managers also recognized that to be effective in the long run,
they needed to increase communication across various departments and
institutionalize training. ‘‘We wanted to establish relationships we
wouldn’t normally have.’’ ‘‘Training was to create an opportunity for
dialog; [employees] discovered who was a customer and who was a
supplier.’’ PHA submitted a proposal to enroll 600 trainees and com-
plete training for 500. Training would be in three areas: Management
skills, SPC, and office automation.
Management selected a widely recognized industry organization to
provide a tailored curriculum for the project. This organization offered
a wide array of training modules. Based on the managers’ experience
with a failed attempt to achieve quality certification, they selected mod-
ules that would eliminate the organization’s deficiencies. The modules
were then tailored to PHA’s particular processes. The organization also
trained existing staff to serve as trainers so that after the ETP training
was over, new-hire and refresher training would still be available. The
managers also believed that trainers who knew the organization’s cul-
ture would be better able to reshape it through training. Within six
months after the training, PHA achieved NCQA certification.
Not all projects are successful. The example in Text Box 5.3 illus-
trates how poor planning can lead to an unsuccessful project.
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Text Box 5.3 Wavelength: When Badly Planned Training Gets
Worse with Management Apathy
Wavelength manufactures precision radio components and subsys-
tems for the military, intelligence, and commercial sectors. As the de-
fense industry contracted, Wavelength was forced to move into the
commercial communications market, where the profit margins are lower
and customer demands for quality, service, and response time are much
higher. In response, the management set out to establish a ‘‘high per-
formance workplace.’’ They decided to train their 200 workforce
in vocational English as a second language, statistical process control,
management skills, and manufacturing resource planning. The result,
they hoped, would be that front-line employees would be empowered
and managers would be equipped to adapt to the changes.
Managers and supervisors filled out questionnaires asking what
they felt was needed in terms of training, and a senior human resources
manager selected a contractor. Trouble began when the trainees lost
interest during classes. Part of the problem was that the curriculum was
‘‘over their heads.’’ Also, managers had not realized how greatly train-
ing would disrupt their work. The resulting production delays were
further exacerbated by SOST, which was perceived as having little value
and had to be completed during working hours.
The situation did not become catastrophic, however, until manage-
ment lost interest. Instead of working with the instructors to adjust the
curriculum, the managers began leaving in the middle of class or
stopped attending altogether. Employee morale began to plummet.
TQM became the least useful component of training, simply because
the managers never gave the workers an opportunity to practice it.
On questionnaires, trainees expressed strong positive responses to
the opportunity to learn new skills and increase their motivation.
Thirty-four percent agreed and 34 percent strongly agreed that they
‘‘feel more motivated and involved’’ because of the training.
However, their worst memories of the training included the poor
match between what was taught and what they could apply to their work,
and the abandonment of training by their apathetic management.
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Quality of training delivered
We begin this section by summarizing data from our evaluation
survey, which was administered to trainees at every project we visited
to provide an overview of the quality of ETP training. Next, using
both the survey data and the fieldwork, we examine three quality issues
that emerged as critical to the successful delivery of training:
1. Effectiveness of trainers.
2. Customization of training.
3. Effectiveness of SOST.
As noted earlier, we asked trainees to rate the quality of the ETP
training they received on a standard evaluation questionnaire. As
shown in Figure 5.7, trainees rated the overall quality of training as
slightly better than ‘‘good,’’ giving it a rating of 3.14 on a 4-point scale.
The trainees rated nine aspects of training. The highest-rated aspects
were the quality of instructors and their ability to hold the trainees’
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interest, along with the clarity of the training objectives and the quality
of instructional materials. Lower-rated aspects included the degree to
which the training was customized to the company, the effectiveness
of SOST, the time dedicated to each topic, and the level of training.
Results varied substantially from one company to another. For
example, at some sites, trainees were very pleased with the effective-
ness of SOST and very critical of the instructional material. Overall,
field interviews and observations confirmed that the quality of instruc-
tors tended to be good, while the effectiveness of SOST and the degree
to which training was customized to the company varied substantially.
To explore the relationship of the different aspects of training qual-
ity to the impact of training, we used regression analyses. The impact
of training was measured three ways: the amount learned, how often
new skills were used, and the impact of training on productivity. The
results are summarized in Table 5.2. The coefficients measure the
strength of the unique relationship between quality measure and out-
come measure. The significance measures show the probability that
the measured relationship is due to chance or random error. A relation-
ship is only considered statistically significant if its significance mea-
sure is 0.05 or less, indicating a 5 percent or smaller probability that
the relationship is due to chance or random error. Significant relation-
ships are shown in bold type. Finally, the overall R2 measure indicates
the proportion of the variance in the impact measure accounted for by
all the measures of quality. This measure shows the degree to which
the measures of quality predict the impact of training. The higher
the R2, the stronger the quality measures are as predictors of training
impact.
Overall, the analysis shows that the quality of training was signifi-
cantly associated with how much of the material was learned, the use
of skills after training, and the self-reported impact of training on pro-
ductivity. Interestingly, the strongest relationship (R20.343) was be-
tween the quality of training and the impact on productivity, indicating
that better-quality training leads to larger increases in productivity. Re-
lationships between quality and how often new skills were used
(R20.310), and between quality of training and amount learned
(R20.284), were significant but weaker. Overall, these results sup-
port the training model we introduced earlier. Individual measures of















Clear objectives .048 0.481 0.028 0.701 0.044 0.527
Usefulness of topics 0.159 0.013 0.311 0.000 0.249 0.000
Length of time on topics 0.034 0.620 0.059 0.409 0.041 0.566
Quality of materials 0.065 0.315 0.067 0.316 0.001 0.983
Degree of customization 0.127 0.043 0.060 0.356 0.086 0.166
Quality of instructors 0.145 0.056 0.124 0.126 0.028 0.712
Effectiveness of SOST 0.306 0.000 0.344 0.000 0.258 0.000
Ability to hold interest 0.164 0.032 0.039 0.624 0.082 0.283
Right level 0.037 0.554 0.055 0.391 0.089 0.161
Quality overall 0.040 0.612 0.101 0.220 0.093 0.240
Adjusted R2 0.284 0.310 0.343
NOTE: Statistically significant relationships appear in bold type.
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a
Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees, Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training Panel.
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impact were the usefulness of the topics covered in training and the
effectiveness of SOST. We discuss SOST at length later, but it is im-
portant to note here that these results show that when the ‘‘effective-
ness of SOST’’ is rated highly by the trainees, they also report larger
positive training impact. Conversely, when SOST was rated poorly,
the impact of training was also rated lower. The degree of customiza-
tion and the ability of training to hold interest were also significantly
associated with the amount of learning reported by trainees.
Trainee learning
A second key indicator is whether or not trainees learned what was
taught in training. Again, the results show that overall ETP training
was successful—over two-thirds of the trainees report that they were
able to learn ‘‘most’’ or ‘‘everything’’ of what was taught. Less than 2
percent of trainees said they learned none of what was taught. Trainee
responses are graphed in Figure 5.8.
Again the results varied substantially from company to company
and from one skill area to another. For example, trainees trained in
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TQM reported mastering a larger proportion of what was taught than
trainees who took CAD/CAM (computer-aided design/manufacturing).
Effectiveness of trainers
As anyone who has ever taken a class knows, the effectiveness of
the instructor is a key to class success. In these projects, the quality of
instructors was the highest-rated item on our survey (3.31 for instruc-
tors versus 3.14 for overall training). We found many instructors (both
contract and in-house) to be motivated, skilled, and highly committed.
We found many instances where, even though trainees criticized the
training, they praised the instructors. When confronted with a generic
curriculum or materials that were pitched to an inappropriate level, the
skilled instructors often attempted to change the instruction to make
it more effective. Trainees responded well to instructors who were
knowledgeable about their company’s industry and took an interest in
the trainees as individuals. The individual trainer’s sensitivity was
particularly important to trainees who had limited formal education
and who were very anxious about being in a classroom situation.
Customization
The fieldwork convinced us that customization of training was crit-
ical to creating effective ETP training. Customization needs to occur
on three levels. First, as we noted in the planning section, the level at
which a topic is taught needs to be adjusted to the level of trainees.
Teaching college-level SPC techniques to trainees with limited math
skills is futile. Next, the training needs to be customized to the unique
processes used by the company. Examples pulled directly from the
trainees’ daily experience are much more powerful teaching tools than
generic examples. Finally, training needs to be in tune with the com-
pany’s culture (see Text Box 5.4). If a company operates as a rigid
hierarchy with a great social distance between workers and managers,
training that ‘‘models open informal communication’’ will fail because
these approaches will not be used on the job.
As previously shown in Figure 5.7, trainees rated the reported cus-
tomization of training below their overall quality ranking (2.93 for cus-
tomization versus 3.14 overall). The lack of customization in many
ETP projects has roots in several factors. First, managers often do not
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Text Box 5.4 Trophies Galore: Customized Training Is
High-Quality Training
Trophies Galore is a manufacturer of plastic components for tro-
phies. In order for this family-owned business to remain successful in
the face of low-priced international competition, it had to maintain its
product innovations and improve its service.
Trophies Galore’s management knew it needed to upgrade the skills
of all employees to remain competitive. Management had considered
hiring a training consultant to design a curriculum, but after learning
about a business association’s consortia program, they chose to join that
instead. The association connected them with a consultant who was
also a trainer. Before committing, however, a company executive sat in
on one of the consultant’s classes at another site. This executive also
reviewed the curriculum and arranged for the trainer to tour the plant
and learn the processes, so that an understanding of the company’s proc-
esses and culture could be built into the training. In short, management
wanted to make sure training would be customized to the company’s
needs.
Fifty percent of the trainees rated the quality of training as excel-
lent. Fifty percent also rated the quality of instructional materials as
excellent. ‘‘Jim (the instructor) added a great deal of interest. Even the
exercises were like games.’’
Over 75 percent of the trainees rated the customization of training
as ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘excellent.’’ ‘‘The instructor was able to customize to our
company.’’ ‘‘He got to know us on an individual basis and he also
learned the manufacturing process.’’ ‘‘It was a very well-put-together
program, and equally important, the selection of the trainer was excep-
tional.’’
understand the importance of customizing training or how training can
be customized. To simplify the process for themselves, they purchase
a standard training package including a set curriculum and outside in-
structors. An earlier study of consultants and training contractors re-
ports that many employers are sold on the training package and the
ETP program by the same consultant (Moore et al. 1997). Thus, some
employers have little exposure to training models other than those of-
fered by the training consultant. However, we also found that skilled
consultants can quickly customize training for individual employers.
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In several examples, consultants or training contractors spent time
studying a company’s processes and culture, and then incorporated that
knowledge into the training with examples, tools, or materials from the
company.
A second factor that leads to lack of customization is an outside
mandate to use a standard curriculum. This requirement may come
from a major customer (e.g., Boeing) that requires a standard quality-
training curriculum (such as ISO 9000), or it may come from a corpo-
rate parent. Again, if these curricula are not at an appropriate level for
the individuals to be trained, or do not provide specific examples from
the company’s process, they are often ineffective. Text Box 5.5 pro-
vides a clear example of the problems that can occur with generic
curricula.
A final factor that has diminished the customization of ETP train-
ing is the growth of training agency projects where individuals from
many different companies, and even several different industries, are
Text Box 5.5 TAC Aviation: Standard Curriculum Makes for Little
Learning
TAC Aviation is a small aerospace company that makes parts for
Boeing and other prime contractors. Its ETP training provided voca-
tional English as a second language (VESL), TQM, and SPC training to
about 50 workers.
The project operated under a significant constraint in that their big-
gest customer, Boeing, mandated use of the Boeing TQM/SPC curricu-
lum. All parties agreed that the curriculum was too technical and too
detailed for the needs of these employees. According to the training
consultant, ‘‘the Boeing curriculum is a major problem.’’ For example,
managers, supervisors, and trainers agreed that there were far too many
SPC charts in the curriculum and that the SPC was too technical for the
trainees, who were involved in very small production runs. There was
also a perception by all parties that there was too much material to be
covered in the time allotted.
Data from our trainee survey showed that while 25 percent of the
trainees reported they learned ‘‘all of what was taught’’ in the areas of
TQM, and 38 percent in production techniques, only 7 percent reported
that they learned ‘‘all of what was taught’’ in the SPC area.
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mixed together in a single class. In these situations it is impossible for
even a skilled instructor to customize the training. For example, an
office automation class may include technical workers who are there
only to learn how to manipulate data in a spreadsheet, clerical workers
wanting to learn advanced word processing functions, and production
workers wanting to learn basic database functions so they can maintain
inventory. In such a situation, all trainees are subjected to substantial
periods of instruction on topics of little or no immediate value to them.
We discuss this problem at length in our section on consortia and train-
ing agencies.
Effectiveness of SOST
Structured On Site Training (SOST) is ETP’s term for what is com-
monly referred to as on-the-job training. After trainees are introduced
to concepts in the classroom, they practice their skills on the job with
some sort of supervision from the training instructor or a company
supervisor assigned as an SOST instructor. During the 1995–1996
program year when these projects were operating, ETP reimbursed em-
ployers for each trainee hour of SOST, but at a lower rate than for
classroom training. Since SOST generated revenue for the training
program, and was less costly to deliver for both training contractors
and for employers (since workers were not away from production),
there were powerful incentives to design substantial amounts of SOST
into projects. ETP found it had to limit the number of SOST hours
allowed. It is important to note that the projects we studied operated
under an SOST policy different from the one in operation today. At
that time, payments were based on trainee hours spent on SOST assign-
ments. The policy allowed 10 trainees per instructor for SOST train-
ing, and each trainee had to document every hour spent on SOST
training. The current policy pays only for instructor time spent on
SOST and only requires documentation of the instructor’s time.
We found that the quality of SOST varied widely across the proj-
ects we visited. SOST is a powerful instructional approach when ap-
plied correctly, but all too often we observed that SOST activities had
limited relevance to training, were poorly supervised, and contributed
little to the effectiveness of training.
Good SOST has a number of key characteristics. First, the assign-
ments follow the topics covered in a timely manner. Next, the tasks
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assigned deal with immediate, work-related problems. In many cases,
we found that instructors assigned generic problems or had trainees
develop their own problems to work on. For example, in a case where
trainees were learning problem-solving skills, they were given generic
‘‘life problems,’’ such as planning a home remodeling project, rather
than problems germane to their job. Finally, trainees need attention
from instructors while they complete SOST assignments. Employees
need to be able to receive help promptly when they ‘‘hit a road block’’
Text Box 5.6 SOST at Correct Disk: Problems in an Otherwise
Successful Training Program
Correct Disk (CD), a maker of disk-drive parts in Silicon Valley,
experienced savings of over $5,000,000 from actions and plans started
during ETP-funded training. CD employed over 1,500 workers in Cali-
fornia and trained 950 of their workers at a cost of $1,700,000 paid by
ETP, and about $1,200,000 more paid by CD. The immediate improve-
ments in performance more than covered the costs of training, and the
impact of training has gone a long way to enable CD to survive and
prosper in an increasingly competitive and ever more commodity-driven
market. CD contracted with an industry association for the training,
which was done on-site by two training consultants.
In spite of the overall success of the training, the trainees com-
mented that the SOST was not effective. The contract called for a total
of 68 hours of class, 11 hours of lab, and 107 hours of SOST for which
ETP paid $9.69 per hour. From our interviews, it seems that the actual
time ‘‘spent’’ was 4 hours of SOST and 1 hour of lab per week for the
13 weeks of training. For the SOST component of the training, the
trainees had to devise problems to solve. Trainees reported that the
problems became quite contrived and were often not applicable to their
jobs. It was difficult for the instructors to assign appropriate SOST
homework because they lacked familiarity with the company’s proc-
esses. SOST took time away from more productive work and resulted
in trainee dissatisfaction with the entire SOST process. Given a 40-hour
workweek, the lab and SOST took an eighth of their time for a quarter
of a year. More than one worker, torn between being productive and
trying to fulfill the SOST requirements, signed off on the SOST even
though the hours were not spent on it, so that the contract could be
fulfilled.
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Text Box 5.7 Basic Batteries: The Right Way to Do SOST
Our questionnaires showed that 56.3 percent of the trainees at this
site rated the effectiveness of SOST as ‘‘good’’ and 31.3 percent thought
it was ‘‘excellent.’’ SOST worked well here because the company used
in-house trainers who knew the production processes. The trainer was
the union shop steward, so the company had the cooperation of the
union. Furthermore, the supervisors were extremely cooperative in
helping the trainees as they completed their SOST assignments. One
trainee we interviewed felt encouraged to use the new skills and knowl-
edge, because of ‘‘the on-site training that we received.’’
in their assignment. They also need immediate feedback on the quality
of their work so that they know when they are using the new skills
effectively.
We found that SOST was often poorly delivered. This observation
was confirmed by our questionnaire, on which trainees across the proj-
ects rated the quality of SOST as substantially below the overall quality
of training (SOST was rated 2.89, versus 3.14 for training overall). It
appears that SOST is added to a number of contracts to increase the
value of the contract without increasing the hours that employees are
off the job, and as such, the program seems to be implemented half-
heartedly. Trainees often complained about the seeming waste of time
associated with SOST. In interviews about SOST the topic that came
up most often was the difficulty of completing the paperwork required
to document SOST, and the pressure employees felt to complete assign-
ments. Consequently, when we asked them to recall their SOST expe-
rience, learning was seldom the first thing that came to the trainees’
mind. Text box 5.6 illustrates one project in which the SOST compo-
nent contributed very little, and Text Box 5.7 shows another project
where it was done well.
Management Reinforcement of Training
Management reinforcement of training (and good management in
general) maximizes the positive impact of training, and no reinforce-
ment (or generally poor management) negates the impact of even good
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training (see Figure 5.9). Based on our fieldwork, we identified five
categories of management intervention that contribute to the impact of
training on a company’s quality and productivity: 1) shaping the
meaning of training, 2) creating opportunities to use skills, 3) creating
rewards and incentives to use skills, 4) establishing levels of participa-
tion, and 5) institutionalizing training.
Shaping the meaning of training before and during training
Most frontline manufacturing workers have little formal education,
and have often had negative experiences in the classroom. Not surpris-
ingly, we found that most ETP trainees reported that their first reaction
to any announcement of training included anxiety and resistance. Un-
certainties about what the training would involve, fear of embarrass-
ment in front of co-workers, and worries about changes in their work
life as a result of training were reasons given by workers for their initial
negative impressions of training. Such anxieties are not unique to pro-
duction workers—few middle-aged managers are eager to have their
math skills tested.
In successful projects, managers anticipated these reactions and
worked hard to answer employees’ objections to training. It became
apparent to us that it was important that both top managers and imme-
diate supervisors send a positive message about training along with
enough specifics about the company’s plans to reassure anxious work-
ers. Text Box 5.8 provides an example of how one company did this
well.
Workers perceive that training carries important messages about
the future of the company and their role in it, and these messages can
be very powerful. One worker in a small aerospace company told us,
‘‘When I learned about the training program, I thought: At last . . . after
Figure 5.9 Management Reinforcement of Training
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all the layoffs something positive [is happening], something that is
moving us forward.’’ Another trainee said that training told her that
‘‘. . . the company cares about me, and I have a future here.’’ Our
survey data clearly showed that after training, most employees had
much more positive attitudes about their companies and their futures
in them. They attributed the attitude change to training.
Workers may also perceive training negatively. Some workers be-
lieve that training will be used to speed up production at their expense,
or that training classes will be used to sort out some workers for less
desirable jobs. Some workers fear that they will be laid off if they
cannot master the training material.
Communicating effective, positive messages about the training
program should involve the use of symbols and ceremonial events, in
a very direct and public way, to show employees what training is all
about. The more successful companies did this by giving the training
programs upbeat names, holding dramatic kick-off meetings, having
important executives or union leaders address employees about train-
ing, or using company newsletters, posters, or banners to reinforce the
key messages about training. These symbolic events emphasized to
workers that the company valued the training and its employees.
Creating opportunities to use skills
Newly-learned skills have a very short shelf life. If employees do
not soon put to work the skills they learned, most of what was learned
will be forgotten and trainees will grow cynical about the value of
training. Effective programs ensure that trainees have the opportunity
to put skills to work during or immediately after training. For example,
one small manufacturer of printed circuit boards had a policy that, as
trainees moved through the course in printed circuit board design, they
were systematically assigned more difficult tasks. As they neared the
end of the program, they were allowed, for the first time, to talk directly
to designers and engineers at client companies to resolve design prob-
lems. Each step allowed trainees to use newly-acquired skills and gain
prestige in the eyes of their co-workers and customers, cementing the
learning that had taken place in the classroom.
One small aerospace supplier provided an example of effective
reinforcement of skills immediately after training. During training,
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Text Box 5.8 Fret Musical Instruments: Shaping the Meaning of
Training
Fret manufactures internationally-known musical instruments em-
ploying a mostly Spanish-speaking workforce. In 1986, Fret only had
about 50 employees at the site. After a management buyout, the com-
pany grew rapidly and committed to producing high-end instruments.
To achieve the quality levels necessary to compete, Fret had to dra-
matically upgrade the skills of its workforce. It was faced with training
a workforce that had little formal education. The managers anticipated
that employees would be anxious about training and resistant to it. Fur-
ther, the managers recognized that it would be difficult to motivate the
trainees to complete the training and use their new skills on the job.
Therefore, Fret created a program called Qual to be a visible symbol
of the company’s commitment to quality and employees. Training
began with an all-company meeting where the Manufacturing Vice
President introduced both the training and the Qual program. Inter-
estingly, he did not emphasize the value of the program to the company
but rather the value to the individual worker. ‘‘I told them this was their
chance to improve. They could learn valuable skills that would help
them here, in their personal lives, or in another job.’’
‘‘I measure the success of the program by the smiling faces when
employees become members of the Qual team.’’ ‘‘We use the training
not just to build skills but to build a sense of membership and family at
Fret,’’ said the Vice President for Production. Training is tied to the
Qual program in that when employees complete training there is a
formal ceremony where graduates get a pin and diploma, which makes
them a member of the Qual team. The only meeting room in the
factory is called the Qual room. In our fieldwork, we found that
Fret’s employees valued their membership in Qual and bought into
the idea that the problem-solving and decision-making skills learned in
training benefited them individually and not just the company.
employees were told about the new quality system and how it would
work. As soon as the training was over, management formed quality
teams and created a process where teams could request time to meet
to work on problems. When the teams generated plans for quality
improvements, they were allowed to make formal presentations to a
management committee. If the committee accepted the plans, re-
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sources were allocated for the process changes and the team was given
public recognition. Management’s quick action on the first proposals
from quality teams sent the message that the training was important
and that the quality program was for real.
We also saw examples of what can go wrong in this process. We
found two major barriers to the immediate reinforcement of skills after
training. The first barrier is that necessary technology or programs are
not in place when training is completed. The second major barrier is
the lack of buy-in from line managers and immediate supervisors. Top
management often works hard to ‘‘sell’’ training to frontline workers,
but they often overlook first-line management and supervisors, whom
they assume will see the value of training. We found several cases
where supervisors who had to struggle to maintain production while
workers were away at training became very negative about the training
and did little to reinforce it once workers returned. Part of the resis-
tance to reinforcing training was simply that implementing new tech-
niques or programs initially slowed production, which was already
behind schedule. These supervisors had been put into the double bind
of having to maintain production while resources were taken away from
production for training and implemention of production innovations.
Creating rewards and incentives
The companies we visited held widely varying views on how to
provide incentives to employees to get them to complete the training
and take it seriously. We found we could split the companies’ strate-
gies into four categories:
1. Explicit incentives
In some systems, employees receive immediate rewards for
completing training (see Text Box 5.9). These rewards
come in the form of guaranteed promotions or pay raises, or
at least eligibility for promotion. This was the approach
taken at Basic Batteries.
2. Implicit incentives
In other systems, trainees expect they will eventually be re-
warded for completing training, but the timing and nature of
the reward is not explicit. This is illustrated by the case of
Sports Brace (see Text Box 5.10).
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Text Box 5.9 Quid pro Quo at Basic Batteries: Explicit
Reinforcements to Training
Basic Batteries (BB), located in Southern California, is a major
producer of lead-acid batteries for automobile and marine use. They
have three facilities in the LA area. The ETP project studied was in the
main manufacturing facility. The batteries are sold under a number of
private labels. About half the workers are Hispanic and half are Viet-
namese. BB has long had an interest in employee training and develop-
ment—for example, they began providing ESL training in 1991–1992.
BB workers can make an above-average living for the semi-skilled work
they perform and, as a result, turnover is very low. BB is certified for
QS 9000, which is stricter than ISO 9000, to satisfy the Original Equip-
ment Manufacturers they supply.
All training was done in-house with in-house trainers. A consultant
trained the trainers. Their goal was to reduce costs, especially through
lower scrap rates. They were successful: the scrap rate fell by 50 per-
cent, dropping from over 4 percent to 2 percent of the cost of goods
sold.
Halfway through the training, to reinforce its importance, BB insti-
tuted performance-based pay for key activities valued by management.
The idea was that the workers would value the new methods more if
they were paid for using them. Average wages were $13 per hour, plus
benefits. This was above-average pay in this area, considering that
workers only needed to be semi-skilled and semi-literate. Nevertheless,
management decided that they still needed to emphasize the importance
of the lessons of training by offering monthly bonuses. The monthly
bonuses could add up to about $250, in the form of ‘‘Sam’s Dollars’’
redeemable at Sam’s Club or Wal-Mart, for meeting a variety of goals.
The first was relatively simple: $50 per month for attending weekly
health and safety meetings. They could receive another $50 a month
for above-average productivity and quality. They could receive $5 per
day as an individual productivity bonus and an extra daily bonus of $10
if they exceeded 5,650 batteries per shift.
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Text Box 5.10 Sports Brace: Implicit Incentives for Training
At this company, managers do not have an explicit policy of giving
employees a raise or a promotion when they complete training, but we
found that both managers and employees had unstated ‘‘implicit’’ expec-
tations that there would be rewards from training. The company was
served by a training agency consortium using ETP funds to train ma-
chinists in CNC technology.
Sports Brace is a small, dynamic company that makes knee braces
and a few other healthcare-related products. They appear to encourage
employee initiative. If employees are able to do more or innovate, they
are encouraged and rewarded. We interviewed two trainees—both
seemed to work with very little supervision and talked with pride about
being recognized for being able to do new and more complex tasks after
completing training.
One machinist reported that he was consulted on the purchase of a
new $500,000 CNC machine. The company bought the same brand and
type this machinist had been trained on in the program, in part so he
could be more productive right away. The second employee reported
that he was given ‘‘more interesting work to do’’ and received a pay
raise. Both employees insisted that they had not been promised any
explicit rewards when they entered training, but because of the culture
of the organization, they were sure it would pay off in the long run.
3. No individual incentives
Some employers are opposed to the idea of individual re-
wards. Often they see training as a company-wide effort to
improve rather than the development of individuals. Others
simply have pay systems that tie pay to job categories and
seniority and don’t want to violate the system with special
incentives for training. Fret Musical Instruments took this
view (see Text Box 5.11).
4. Disincentives
We also found that managers sometimes inadvertently cre-
ate a system that punishes workers for participating in train-
ing, and thus provides negative reinforcement. For example,
we found instances where trainees returned from training to
find angry and hostile supervisors who had scrambled to
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Text Box 5.11 Fret Musical Instruments: No Individual Incentives
It was interesting that Fret, though it put a great deal of effort into
defining the meaning of training, did not believe in explicit individual
rewards. This nonunion company ran on a very traditional compensa-
tion system. Individuals were paid based on their job classification and
seniority only. Management was committed to a clear, orderly compen-
sation system and believed that special raises or incentives would be
disruptive.
The production manager believed strongly that being allowed to
work on interesting problems, spend time with managers and engineers,
and receive recognition created enough intrinsic motivation to sustain
the quality program.
cover for them while they were absent for training (see Text
Box 5.12).
Text Box 5.12 Wavelength: Punishing Workers for Training
Managers at Wavelength had not realized how much training would
disrupt their work. After the first week, they stopped attending training
and never supported it. Employee morale began to plummet. There
were reports that managers opposed the TQM approach, which became
the least useful component of training because managers never gave the
workers an opportunity to practice it.
‘‘Follow-up’’ consisted of managers cursing and threatening work-
ers if they didn’t catch up on work missed when training. As a result,
nothing was implemented and training had to be stopped because of
production disruptions. Workers were discouraged because they had
learned valuable skills only to be denied the opportunity to use them.
Overall, the company was worse off because of training that was, in the
words of the Vice President of Human Resources and Administration,
‘‘a catastrophe.’’
Establishing levels of participation
One question this study tried to answer was whether there is an
optimum level of participation in training programs. We explored this
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issue and found that the needs of companies varied so widely that no
general conclusions could be drawn about participation levels. In some
companies, employers viewed training a handful of specialists as very
valuable, whereas other employers deemed it essential that all employ-
ees be trained. We did encounter one important finding about partici-
pation in quality programs that bears some exploration.
The conventional wisdom in most TQM/SPC-type quality pro-
grams is that all employees should be involved, and this was reflected
in many of the TQM/SPC projects we studied. In interviewing manag-
ers, however, we found a strong belief among many of them that they
could achieve significant improvements in quality with only a minority
of employees participating. One manager at Fret Musical Instruments
described the dynamic this way: ‘‘Thirty percent think the training’s
crap; 30 percent just don’t care; and 30 percent really get it and will
lead us to substantial improvement.’’
In general, this manager does not support the TQM model in which
all workers are on teams and involved in quality improvement. Rather,
he thinks that about 25 percent of the workers have the skills and moti-
vation after training to identify and solve problems, and he wants to
work with them. He says: ‘‘I give motivated people something mean-
ingful to do. I give them praise and time to work on their problem with
management.’’ Membership in quality teams is voluntary and no cash
bonuses are paid to groups or individuals for solving quality problems.
This company reported dramatic increases in quality improvements,
yielding substantial cost savings, and the company is currently making
a major expansion, lending considerable weight to these views.
We found several other companies where, after training everyone
in TQM techniques, the management made membership in teams vol-
untary and again reported significant quality and productivity improve-
ments. In general, managers seemed to believe that innovations would
only come from employees who voluntarily took on quality problems.
Other employees who wished to remain in a traditional production
worker role would be allowed to do so. This contradicts earlier re-
search, particularly from the auto industry, where universal participa-
tion in quality teams was deemed essential to program success (Wilms
1996). The implication for ETP seems to be that different production
systems likely require different levels of participation. Employers are
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likely to be the best judges of how much participation, and thus how
much training, is sufficient.
Institutionalizing training
One goal of ETP is to serve as a catalyst for additional investments
in training. The idea is that if companies have a successful experience
with ETP training, those companies will be more willing to invest their
own money in additional training. Our fieldwork shows that successful
training often does lead to additional investment in training. For some
examples of this phenomenon, see Text Boxes 5.13 and 5.14.
One important observation we made was that the more involved
in-house staff was in the training, the more likely it was that the train-
ing would be institutionalized. The logic of this is simple—if the com-
pany owns the curriculum and has easily available trained instructors,
it is likely to continue training new employees or upgrading existing
ones. Continual training is less likely to happen if a company must
hire outside consultants.
Text Box 5.13 Techno Tubs: Integrating Agency Training into
Organizational Development
Techno Tubs is a small manufacturer of lightweight hot tubs made
of foam rubber. When a new CEO arrived five years ago, only one
employee was computer literate. To catch up to the competition, the
new CEO launched a drive to computerize the company’s paper-based
marketing, finance, customer service, and personnel systems, and to in-
stall CAD/CAM in its production areas. The company began sending
one to three employees at a time to the ETP Training Agency’s office
automation training program and continued at that rate until a sufficient
number of employees were trained. Both the company and the employ-
ees were pleased with the results of the training. Techno Tubs subse-
quently built an office automation and computer literacy requirement
into its promotion process so that people in many of the company’s
departments could not progress beyond a minimal level without these
skills. Workers now attend office automation training as needed in re-
sponse to evolving industry practices, normal worker turnover, and com-
pany expansion.
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Text Box 5.14 Flow Pumps: Successful ETP Project Leads to
Permanent Training System
Flow Pumps, the pump manufacturer described earlier, had no for-
mal employee training prior to the ETP training. Their ETP training
project led to a substantial increase in quality and a positive change
in the organization’s culture. Because of these positive outcomes, the
company established a systematic training program for both existing
employees and new hires. The company now has two permanent class-
rooms and considers some of the courses developed under ETP ‘‘core
to the company’s culture’’—all new hires take them. Courses include
basic math, SPC, problem solving, open book management (how to read
company financials), and interpersonal and team skills. To reinforce
the importance of training, the company mandated that employees must
complete training and pass related tests to get promoted.
One important reason that training became institutionalized was
that managers decided early on to use in-house trainers for most of the
training. Their trainers were managers and quality engineers who re-
ceived some training in being trainers. Initially, Fresno Community
College supplied two instructors, but they played a minor role, teaching
the first classes of basic math and safety. Another factor supporting
institutionalization of training was that many of the in-house instructors
enjoyed the teaching experience. In fact, Ralph, the company president
and an engineer by training, taught basic math. This was a powerful
experience for him. Reflecting on the experience, he noted, ‘‘I’ll never
make fun of teachers again; it’s a tough job.’’ He was delighted with
the outcome. He now knows a number of production workers person-
ally, and they know him. He continues to teach sections of the basic
math course.
In the case of training agency projects, in which classes take place
away from the work site with trainees from various companies, we
found a different type of institutionalization. In these cases, we found
that if companies sent an employee to the training and had a positive
outcome, they would send additional trainees. Eventually, participat-
ing in the agency training would be built into the company’s human
resource practices. Again, the logic is apparent—this type of ETP
training is ‘‘off the clock,’’ does not disrupt production, and is free;
there is virtually no cost in institutionalizing the training.
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Impact of ETP Training on Workers
The impact of ETP on the performance of companies, in terms of
productivity and finances, is covered in Chapter 6. Here, we examine
the impact of ETP training on the workers trained and analyze the
characteristics of ETP training associated with positive outcomes.
OVERALL IMPACT OF TRAINING ON TRAINEES
Before we look at the impact of training in individual companies,
we want to explore how the trainees, as a group, perceive the impact of
training. In the methods section, we described the evaluation question-
naire that we administered to as many trainees as possible at each site
visited. The evaluation questionnaire asked each trainee three ques-
tions to assess the impact training had on them:
1. How often did they use the skills they learned in training?
2. What impact did training have on their individual productivity?
3. How had their work environment changed since training?
Skill Use
For training to have an impact on productivity, trainees must use
the skills they learn. Almost all trainees, 95 percent, report using the
skills they learned in training at least occasionally. As Figure 5.10
shows, slightly over 50 percent of the trainees reported that every day
they used at least some of the skills they learned in training. For exam-
ple, office workers trained in office automation were likely to report
daily use of the software applications they learned. About 25 percent
of the trainees reported that they used the skills they learned once a
week or more. One example of this response came from a production
worker who had TQM training and was a member of a quality team
that met weekly to work on problems. Only 17 percent said they used
the skills less than once a week. An example of this skill use is the
production worker who learned SPC techniques, but only used it occa-
sionally to deal with specific quality problems as they occurred. Only
a very few trainees, 5 percent, reported that they never used what they
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learned in training. As we noted in the section on management rein-
forcement, one reason skills are not used after training is lack of man-
agement action to ensure that reinforcing processes are in place when
trainees return to the job. For example, a trainee who receives SPC
training will not use the skills if an SPC system does not exist on the
production line.
We also examined which types of training the trainees reported
using most often. This analysis was restricted to skill areas where we
had at least 60 respondents. Skills used more frequently than average
included skills directly related to improving production, like TQM and
Production Techniques, and basic computer skills including MS Office
and General Windows. Skill areas used least, such as SPC, tended to
be more technical.
IMPACT OF TRAINING ON PRODUCTIVITY
Overall, ETP trainees believe that their training has led to higher
productivity. As Figure 5.11 indicates, two-thirds of trainees reported
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that training led to either a ‘‘substantial increase’’ or a ‘‘major in-
crease’’ in their productivity. Slightly less than a quarter of respon-
dents reported a ‘‘small increase,’’ and less than one-tenth said training
led to ‘‘no increase’’ in productivity.
Differences by Type of Training
Using a regression analysis, we identified the factors that were as-
sociated with trainees who reported increased productivity. Clearly,
the more of the material trainees mastered and the more they used what
they learned, the more productivity impact it had.
A similar pattern occurs when we look at the amount learned, skill
use, and impact of different types of training on productivity. Figure
5.12 illustrates the types of training most commonly found in the sites
we visited. (We included all categories of training with more than 60
respondents.) We then ranked the types of training based on the impact
of productivity reported by trainees. The graphs reflect an overall pat-
tern of increase in training impact as the amount learned and skill use
increases.
Three types of training had an above-average impact. The highest-
rated impacts were ‘‘Production Techniques’’ and TQM, both of which
deal directly with improving quality and productivity. The only other
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Figure 5.12 Relationship of Amount Learned and Skill Use to Impact on
Productivity
1 2 3 4
Other MS Office











Amount learned    ( 4 point scale) How often used  (4 point scale) Impact on productivity  (4 point scale)
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
type of training that came in above the overall average was training in
MS Word, which is a very commonly used skill. These three were also
the training types rated above average for amount learned and skill use.
IMPACT OF TRAINING ON WORK ENVIRONMENT
As we began our fieldwork, we were struck by the fact that when
we asked trainees and managers about the impact of training, they
talked first about its qualitative impact. Rather than discussing scrap
rates or labor productivity, they mentioned improvements in communi-
cation, motivation, or stress reduction. Figure 5.13 illustrates that
trainees reported dramatic improvements in many aspects of their work
life. More than half the trainees surveyed ‘‘strongly agreed’’ that they
‘‘felt more motivated and involved at work,’’ ‘‘had a more positive
attitude about the company,’’ and felt that ‘‘there is better communica-
ETP at Work 111








1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Workers treated better
Better relations between workers
Less stress 
Feel more optimistic about future In co.
Better communication between mgmt. and workers
More positive attitude about the co.
Feel more motivated and involved
Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly agree
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
tion between management and workers’’ since the training. These re-
sults confirm what we saw in the field. The decision to provide training
is a powerful message and it is important for management to shape the
meaning of training, so that trainees see it in a positive light.
We expected positive qualitative outcomes from TQM and related
training, because of improvement in communication, reductions in hi-
erarchical barriers, and involvement of frontline workers in decision-
making. However, it came as a surprise when we found similar positive
results from technical training. The company’s decision to invest in
training apparently leads workers to see the work environment in a
more positive light.
We also found a relationship between qualitative outcomes and in-
creased productivity. Regression analysis revealed that when workers
more strongly agreed that stress had been reduced, that they felt more
motivated, or that they had a more positive attitude towards the com-
pany, they also reported a greater increase in productivity.
Overall, the regression analysis showed that changes in workplace
environment caused by training were significant predictors of worker-
reported changes in productivity. The results indicate that positive
changes in work environment variables accounted for almost 40 per-
cent of the variance in the productivity variable. Table 5.3 shows that
‘‘experiencing less stress on the job after training,’’ ‘‘feeling more mo-
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Table 5.3 Regression Results for Work Environment and Productivity
Standardized
Work environment variable coefficient Significance
Better communication between supervisors and workers 0.014 0.364
Less stress 0.228 0.002
Workers treated better 0.032 0.663
Better relationships at work 0.132 0.064
Feel more motivated and involved 0.242 0.003
Feel more optimistic about my future in the company 0.067 0.403
More positive attitude about the company 0.155 0.037
Adjusted R2 0.397
NOTE: Significant relationships in bold.
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
tivated and involved,’’ and ‘‘having a more positive attitude about the
company’’ are variables that were significantly associated with reported
increases in productivity. The data do not allow us to assume that
changes in work environment variables caused increased productivity,
but they do indicate that when workers report an improved working
environment, they also report improved productivity.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
ETP delivers training through a variety of institutional arrange-
ments that have evolved over the 18 years the program has been in
operation. We used data from the 23 case studies to assess each institu-
tional arrangement’s potential to achieve ETP’s goal of providing cus-
tomized training that improves worker productivity.
ETP enrolled 57,485 trainees in contracts that were completed in
the study period—fiscal years 1994–1995 and 1995–1996. Though the
training contracts differed in a variety of ways, there were three basic
types of delivery arrangement: individual company contracts, consortia
contracts, and training agency contracts.
The most common type of ETP training contract was the ‘‘individ-
ual company’’ contract in which ETP contracted with a single company
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to provide training for its own workers. In these contracts, the training
might be done by employees of the company (in-house trainers) or by
outside trainers working under a subcontract (subcontractors or consul-
tants). About 60 percent of the trainees were trained under individual
company contracts during the study period of 1994–1996.
The ‘‘consortia’’ contracts accounted for about 10 percent of train-
ees and were the smallest group. Consortia may be large companies
training their own workers and some from their suppliers, Private In-
dustry Councils (PICs) training workers for a group of companies, or
industry associations training workers for a group of member compa-
nies. Consortia contracts are similar to individual company contractors
in that there is a given set of workers who will be served, but unlike
the individual company contractors, these workers are employed in
more than one company.
Training agency contracts were the second largest group of con-
tracts and accounted for an increasing percentage of trainees during the
study period. Training agencies served just over 20 percent of trainees
in fiscal year 1994–1995 and just over 30 percent in fiscal year 1995–
1996.
Training agency contracts can be divided into two categories:
1. Industry specific
These agencies provide training in skills used by a single
industry or narrow cluster of industries (for example, CNC
machining).
2. Generic skills
These agencies provide training in skills used in almost all
industries (for example, word processing).
Training agencies are often community colleges, private training
organizations, or industry associations that contract to provide a certain
type of training to workers in ETP-eligible businesses. These training
agencies market ETP-funded training to nearby businesses and bear
the risk that recruited trainees might not complete the required place-
ment and retention on the job (90 days), in which case the trainer would
not be paid for the training.
As Figure 5.14 shows, ETP is moving away from ‘‘individual com-
pany’’ projects, and toward ‘‘training agency’’ projects. In one year,
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ETP moved from serving 64 percent of trainees through ‘‘individual
company’’ projects, to about 58 percent; during that time, trainees
served by ‘‘training agency’’ contracts rose from 23 percent to almost
32 percent.
Both consortia and training agencies help ETP to serve smaller
businesses that would not find it worthwhile to undertake the cost of
an individual company contract. Consortia serve a specific group of
businesses; training agency contractors market their training to a wide
array of businesses, limited only by the businesses’ interest in the par-
ticular type of training offered and the convenience of the training site.
We visited all three types of training contractors during the field-
work, apportioning our visits in rough approximation to the extent they
are used. Given the shifting pattern of contracts, we decided to look at
each type of contract in some detail, using our training model to con-
duct the analyses. The matrix in Table 5.4 sums up the key characteris-
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POTENTIAL TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS
BY CONTRACT TYPE
The type of contract affects the potential impact and effectiveness
of ETP training. The training model introduced earlier (and repeated
in Figure 5.15) identifies two critical components: ‘‘quality of training’’
(training design and quality of training delivered), and ‘‘management
reinforcement of training.’’ Together, training quality and reinforce-
ment determine how much of a company’s potential training gains are
realized. Both the quality of training design and the extent of manage-
ment reinforcement are likely to vary systematically with the different
types of contracts because of the nature of the contracts. Individual
company and consortia contracts are more likely to help companies
achieve their full potential gains because they do not have the limits
inherent in training agency contracts. Training agency contracts—
particularly those teaching generic skills—have structural constraints
on their ability to deliver the potential gains of training.
Figure 5.15 Training Impact Model (Repeated)
Potential gains 
(Best practice − 
current practice) 
× Quality of training 
(Training design × quality  
of training delivered) 
× Management 
reinforcement 
of training  






Individual Company and Consortia Contracts
Individual company and consortia contracts can achieve all the po-
tential gain inherent in the companies they serve. Individual company
contractors have great flexibility to shape the training to the unique
characteristics of the companies and trainees. Similarly, consortia con-
tractors have virtually the same flexibility in their approach because,
ideally, the contractor assembles a group of businesses that share the
same training requirements. For example, one large consortia contract
trains auto mechanics from many different small service centers to use
computerized diagnostic equipment. These mechanics need the same
skills and will use them in similar work environments. In this case,
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training can be customized almost as much as it could be in individual
company projects. Projects are customized by taking into account the
initial skill level of the trainees, and then providing the specific skills
they will need to perform on the job. Similarly, management can inter-
act closely with trainers and make sure that the already customized
training is reinforced on the job.
Clearly, both individual company and consortia curricula can be
poorly designed, with poor training delivery and little management
reinforcement, and consequently have little impact. Another potential
pitfall is putting together a consortium where the training requirements
are different for the various companies in the consortium. In this case,
it is difficult to customize the training when there is wide variation in
the trainees’ initial skill levels or in the skills they are expected to have
after training. The consortium should be constructed so that the initial
skill and expected skills would be similar among the consortium mem-
bers. Hence, both individual company and consortia contractors have
the potential to provide excellent training design, delivery, and rein-
forcement, thus producing highly effective training.
Training Agency Contracts for Industry-Specific Skills
The ability of industry-specific training agencies to help companies
achieve all of their potential gains is somewhat limited by the nature
of the contract. These agencies provide a particular type of training to
employees of a single industry or a narrow cluster of industries. If
trainees entering the program have fairly standard initial skill levels,
and standard skills are expected after training, then designing and rein-
forcing training will be relatively easy. However, to the extent that the
initial skills vary widely among the trainees, or the tasks to be per-
formed by the trainees after training are different, the training design
will serve the trainees poorly. If the entry-level skills of the trainees
differ and the contractor aims for some average-level competency, then
some of the trainees will not be able to master the instruction at the
outset while others will waste time being instructed in areas they have
already mastered. Also, it will be difficult for trainers to select training
exercises that are germane to all the trainees’ tasks. This is particularly
problematic in the use of SOST. It is interesting to note how one
industry-specific contract we visited, which taught CNC machining,
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dealt with this problem. First, to ensure uniform skills upon entry,
they began the program with a math unit to bring all trainees’ math
skills up to an acceptable level. Next, it decided not to use SOST.
Rather, it provided extensive lab time on the training center’s machines
to be sure class skills were reinforced.
Management reinforcement of training can also be difficult in in-
dustry-specific training agency contracts. The training is designed and
implemented by the training agency, but on-the-job skill reinforcement
is in the hands of the individual companies where the trainees work.
There are bound to be variations in the extent to which different com-
panies reinforce the training, especially since company management
does not necessarily know the exact nature of the training. For exam-
ple, in the same CNC training program, we found that some companies
kept careful track of what trainees were learning and gave them more
challenging tasks as they progressed. Other managers had very limited
awareness of the learning that was going on and made no attempt to
upgrade the trainee’s job to match his or her skill. Again, if the training
involves skills that are fairly standard throughout the industry, compa-
nies will know what the skills are and can more easily reinforce the
training on the job. However, if the tasks the companies expect the
trainees to perform vary widely, then many trainees will waste time
being instructed in skills they will not use and management cannot
reinforce. A final barrier to close ties between training and the em-
ployer is the fact that much of this training takes place ‘‘off the clock.’’
Not paying for the trainees’ time, the employer is less motivated to
ensure that new skills are put to use promptly to boost productivity.
We note that, despite these barriers, the opportunity for close ties be-
tween trainers and employers are better in this case than in the generic
skills contracts. This is because close ties between the training agency
and the industry tend to develop over time, particularly if the training
agency is formally affiliated with the industry, which appears often to
be the case.
In summary, industry-specific training by agencies will have a
higher impact on companies and will be more effective for workers if
the trainees’ entry skills are relatively standard and the tasks they are
expected to perform upon completion are uniform. Also, the impact is
more significant the closer the ties between trainers and employers.
The potential gains realized under these contracts are somewhat lim-
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ited, primarily because of the management reinforcement issue, but
also because of the difficulty of designing an appropriate training cur-
riculum for a diverse group of trainees.
Training Agency Contracts for Generic Skills
Training agency generic skills contract programs are less able to
customize their curriculum for individual employers. Also, it is less
likely that there will be effective management reinforcement of training
after these programs have been completed. By their nature, generic
skills are applied across a large number of industries, and one expects
to find many different types of applications of the skills among those
industries. The initial skill levels of the trainees also vary widely,
which makes it difficult to customize instruction. For example, we
interviewed one instructor who taught office automation in a generic
skills contract. He pointed out that some of his students were computer
literate and knew the keyboard well, while others had never worked on
a computer. This made it very difficult to find an appropriate level at
which to teach. Inevitably, appropriate starting points will be beyond
the grasp of some and a waste of time for others. Classroom applica-
tions that are relevant to some will not be to others. Very few trainees
will use all of the skills covered in a generic skills program. In another
case, we found several trainees in generic office automation training
who were engineers or accounting clerks. They took the training to
learn advanced spreadsheet applications, but to get to that section of
the training, they had to sit through many hours of word processing
instruction that was of little value to them.
Management’s on-the-job reinforcement of generic skills training
is more difficult. Managers in the companies to which the workers
return are distant from the trainers and unlikely to have much knowl-
edge of the skills taught. This creates various impediments to effective
reinforcement. First, because the trainers and managers are in different
organizations, the trainers have to coax the managers to reinforce the
training. Second, lack of knowledge of the training content makes it
difficult for managers to reinforce the training. Finally, the post-train-
ing job is unlikely to make use of all of the skills, which eliminates
any possibility of reinforcing the unused skills. In addition, trainees
are most likely attending generic skills training on their own time,
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which, as noted previously, does not motivate employers to become
involved.
The training impact model implies a limited ability of generic skills
training to realize the full potential gains from training. The limitations
derive from the difficulty in designing training that is appropriate to
workers from a wide range of industries with a wide variety of skills,
in selecting training exercises relevant to most of the trainees, and in
persuading the managers of disparate companies to reinforce the
training.
Interestingly, one of the difficulties faced by the generic skills
training agencies reduces the importance of ETP-funding for this type
of training. Generic skills training agencies must isolate some skill
areas that are useful to many industries and employees, and then design
a curriculum appropriate to a large number of prospective trainees that
work in various industries. To the extent that such skill areas exist, the
market for training has already recognized the demand for training in
these areas, and training opportunities are widely available without
ETP funding. This means that much of the ETP-funded training in
generic skill areas may replace training that would have occurred
anyway.
Another phenomenon we observed in the field is that training agen-
cies, which began by providing industry-specific or consortia training,
are moving quickly into generic training. There appears to be two
reasons for this trend: First, the market for generic training is larger
because the skills taught stretch across many industries. Second, ge-
neric training is easier and less costly to deliver because it is standard
and not customized. Thus, instructors do not need specialized industry
knowledge and a single curriculum can be used for many classes. Our
impression is that generic training is generally easier to manage and
more profitable than specialized training.
Generally, both the companies and the trainees thought that generic
skills training was beneficial to the company and made the individual
workers more productive. Of course, this means that the company and
the individuals would likely seek out this type of training in the market
even if ETP funding were not available.
The training model implies that it will become increasingly diffi-
cult to achieve excellent training as we move from consortia training
to agency training for industry-specific skills, and finally to agency
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training for generic skills. In Table 5.5, we compare trainees served by
consortia and training agencies, showing the percentage that rated vari-
ous aspects of their training as ‘‘excellent.’’ Because most of the con-
sortia and training agency projects we visited were well-designed given
the nature of the training that was undertaken, we believe that the rela-
tive percentages of ‘‘excellent’’ responses speaks to the inherent limita-
tions on training effectiveness by the type of provider. Overall, we
were impressed by the quality of training provided by some of the
generic trainers, given the challenges they faced.
These trainee responses generally confirm the limitations on train-
ing effectiveness implied by the training impact model.
WHAT WE LEARNED
Our goal in the qualitative analysis was to crack open the ‘‘black
box’’ of ETP training and look inside at what made projects successful




Aspect of Training Consortia specific Generic
Overall training quality 61 60 37
Clear training objectives 42 67 42
Usefulness of topics 40 53 32
Length of time on each topic 5 27 7
Quality of instructional materials 50 64 40
Degree training customized to company 36 15 8
Quality of instructors 100 73 55
Effectiveness of SOST 26 46 27
Ability of trainers to keep interest 86 53 47
Right level for trainee 50 53 23
How much of all training was actually learned
(Percent reporting learned 60% or more) 74 90 68
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
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or problematic. Our analysis of 23 projects does not provide a defini-
tive description of what determines success, but it does shine a strong
enough light on the shape and outline of a successful model. Paradoxi-
cally, the companies who seem least prepared to design and deliver an
ETP-funded training program are also those that have the most to gain.
Clearly, actions companies take before and after training shape the
success of training as much as the actual training delivered. Compa-
nies that invest the time and effort to customize training to their own
employees and processes, and who invest in developing in-house train-
ers, are more likely to reap the benefits of training.
Institutionally, the closer training is to the employer, and the
greater the employer’s direct investment, the more effective it is.
Hence, programs that train employees ‘‘off the clock,’’ away from the
work place and in generic skills will not yield the same benefits as
arrangements closer to home.
The challenge to policymakers and program managers is to find
ways to fuse these lessons into the design and management of their
programs—an issue we will address in the final chapter.
Note
1. Structured On Site Training is the component of training where trainees practice,





Like most incumbent-worker training programs, ETP strives to im-
prove the position of both workers and the companies that employ
them. Part of ETP’s mission is to be ‘‘a significant economic develop-
ment tool for business attraction and business retention,’’ and to ‘‘pro-
vide funds for training California’s workforce in the skills necessary
for businesses to remain viable and compete in the global economy.’’
To evaluate ETP’s performance, therefore, one must look at both the
impact on workers and the impact on companies. (Employment Train-
ing Panel 1998)
In this chapter, we examine the impact of ETP training on compa-
nies in two ways:
1. Case Studies
We first examine individual companies through case studies.
Case studies make use of the information given by the man-
agers interviewed. This allows the investigator to view
training impact from the company manager’s point of view,
rather than imposing performance measures of interest to
researchers. Using this information, we examine the impact
of training on the company and then perform a cost-benefit
analysis of the training project, using the information pro-
vided.
2. Cross-sectional Statistical Analyses
We compare the growth of a sample of ETP-trained compa-
nies to the growth of similar companies without ETP-
funded training. Cross-sectional statistical analyses use in-
formation common to all examined companies. Because
most of the companies we studied are private and detailed
financials were unavailable, we were limited to two perfor-
mance measures: growth in number of employees, and
growth in total wages paid. These data are uniformly avail-
able from the California Employment Development Depart-
ment because they are collected quarterly as part of the
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unemployment insurance system. To derive industry-ad-
justed performance measures for the ETP-trained compa-
nies, we compared ETP-trained companies to 10 industry
peers and then compared performance before training to
performance after training. The methods used are discussed
in more detail below.
An evaluation of ETP-funded training impact should try to identify
and measure training benefits. Training benefits must be judged in
some context. We used training cost as the measure of training effec-
tiveness. Given the disparate nature of the companies visited and the
kinds and qualities of data obtained, the cost-benefit approach allowed
us to make meaningful inferences and comparisons. State agencies
that consider funding training may want to consider the potential gains
and compare these with the costs. Some type of cost-benefit assess-
ment underlies all business investment evaluations. Public policy-
makers, too, are concerned about the costs and benefits of public
investment. The case studies show that training benefits exceeded
costs in almost every case. Consistent with this, we found that ETP-
trained companies grew more rapidly than similar companies not using
ETP-funded training.
Before proceeding, we provide the reader with an overview of the
industries studied. Table 6.1 compares the industry group breakdown
of ETP trainees to that of the overall labor market in California. The
most heavily represented groups were: electronic and electrical equip-
ment and component at 12.5 percent; measuring and related equipment
and miscellaneous manufacturing at 8.7 percent; and retail trade, ex-
cluding food and automobiles, at 7.9 percent. In general, manufactur-
ing, food stores, and financial institutions were overrepresented
compared to the California business profile, whereas professional ser-
vices including motion pictures and amusement were the least repre-
sented.
CASE STUDIES OF THE IMPACT OF ETP-FUNDED
TRAINING ON COMPANY PERFORMANCE
Overview
The first phase of our investigation on the impact of ETP-funded
training was fieldwork consisting of site visits to a representative sam-
Impact on Companies 127
Table 6.1 Trainees and Controls by Industry
Trainees Controls
SIC groups (percent) (percent)
Agric., forestry, fisheries, mining 0.5 4.5
Construction 1.8 4.2
Food and kindred manufacturing 3.9 1.6
Textiles, lumber, petro. chem., rubber, leather, stone, etc. 5.5 3.9
Paper and allied products 2.1 0.3
Printing, publishing, and allied products 2.2 1.2
Primary metals 0.6 0.3
Fabricated metals 4.4 1.0
Industrial/commercial machinery and computer equipment 4.3 1.6
Electronic/electrical equipment and components 12.5 1.7
Transportation equipment 4.4 1.4
Measuring and related equipment, misc. manufacturing 8.7 1.9
Transportation, communications, and utilities 3.4 5.4
Wholesale trade 4.5 5.9
Retail trade (excluding food stores, auto, and related) 7.9 12.7
Food stores, retail 5.6 2.4
Auto dealers and gasoline retailers 2.5 1.7
Depository and credit financial institutions 5.9 2.4
Financial bankers, insurance, and real estate 3.7 3.9
Hotels, lodging, and personal services 1.6 2.4
Business services 3.2 7.0
Auto repair and misc. repair services 2.4 1.5
Professional services (including motion picture and amusement) 1.6 21.3
Health services 1.6 6.4
Engineering, research, management, and related services 5.5 3.4
100.00 100.00
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from California Employment Development Depart-
ment Data and ETP Data
ple of companies that received training. (Complete details on how the
sample was selected are presented in Chapter 5.) Site visits generally
included a tour of a company’s operations. If training was confined
to only some of the company’s employees, we conducted a detailed
examination of the processes or operations actually affected by
training.
As we proceeded, it became clear that analyses of the benefits of
training would have to be tailored to the companies studied. Most
companies did not set concrete goals for training, and so did not sys-
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tematically track the impact of training on the company. This, in itself,
was a surprising finding. There are three possible sources of manage-
ment’s failure to track training’s performance impact: 1) difficulty of
measuring the impact (the most likely source), 2) management cer-
tainty that training is beneficial and so measurement unnecessary, or
3) a management view that training is a personal benefit to the employ-
ees only. In the context of a cost-benefit analysis, it can be assumed
that companies that undertook training assumed the benefits exceeded
the costs, however considered.
Because companies did not keep records quantifying the effects of
training, or kept idiosyncratic records, we found the case study method
was the best way to observe the impact of ETP-funded training on
company performance. We also realized that, because there was no
universal performance measure or impact factor usable for all compa-
nies, assessing training’s financial impact would require persistent de-
tective work—questioning managers and workers in creative ways. It
was also clear that the financial impact of training might not show up
on the corporate ‘‘bottom line.’’ The cost savings from training might
instead go to higher pay, better employee benefits, better quality prod-
ucts, better work environment, or job creation or retention, or it might
simply ensure company survival. It would be simplistic and inaccurate
to think of the financial cost savings as ‘‘corporate welfare’’ that would
be reflected in profit margins.
Also, because most private companies were reluctant to share fi-
nancial information, we had to work with incomplete, piecemeal fi-
nancial information in whatever form they were willing to share.
Sometimes this was in the form of reduced scrap rates, cost savings on
a particular production line, production increases for a product, lower
rework levels, or reduced absenteeism. Even for publicly-owned com-
panies, where accurate financial information is readily available, we
were not able to find a measurable bottom-line impact. These compa-
nies were too large for training at one small part of the company to
have observable effects on the consolidated financial statements of the
whole company; so we still had to work with the case study data.
Individual Company Training Projects
Under individual company contracts, training is more likely to be
customized to companies’ needs and should result in a greater impact.
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As one might expect, the impacts of individual company training pro-
grams were greater and lasted longer than with consortia or agency
training. We also observed that with ‘‘in-house’’ trainers, the impact
tended to be greater and was more likely to lead to further training.
We attribute this observable success to a greater ‘‘buy in’’ by top man-
agement due to their involvement in the design and execution of the
training. These companies often incurred additional expenses in em-
ployee training time and out-of-pocket cash expenditures for employ-
ees not covered by ETP funding, or for additional training to round out
the program in a customized manner.
While interpreting these results, it is important to remember that
ETP training is a joint investment by the company, the state, and the
trainees. One can view ETP’s funding as a leveraged investment taking
advantage of additional investments by the client company. ETP funds
generally pay the direct costs of training, including instructors’ sala-
ries, materials, and equipment. The companies typically pay for the
employees’ time and the cost of lost production, and often provide
training facilities. A full cost-benefit analysis would have to document
all of these costs. We were unable to estimate all employer costs, but
we did have an accurate figure for the public’s investment in the form
of ETP funding. Thus, the results of this analysis will be of interest
to policymakers interested in leveraging the public’s investments in
training.
TQM training improves quality and reduces per-unit costs
Basic Batteries (‘‘BB’’) is a major producer of lead/acid batteries,
primarily for automobile and marine use, with three facilities in the
Los Angeles area. We visited the main manufacturing facility. BB’s
major competitors are large, multinational companies. The company
produces batteries under a number of private labels. Average wages
were $13 per hour plus benefits. This wage was above average pay in
the local area, considering that workers only needed to be semiskilled
and semiliterate—as a result, turnover was low. Unlike many of the
firms we studied, BB kept detailed records of quality and productivity.
By looking at the performance before and after training, we could infer
the impact of training on the company in terms of dollars (see Text
Box 6.5).
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• Scrap reduction: $1,230,000 (one year)
• Additional cost reductions: $1,040,000 (one year)
• Benefit-to-cost ratio: over 450 percent for the first year
BB had on-site training in SPC and TQM, using in-house trainers,
and they trained 619 workers. According to their own records, the
company achieved both scrap rate reductions and unit volume produc-
tion increases, resulting in an annual benefit to the company of about
$2.27 million. Before training, daily production was 8,500 units per
day; after training, production rose to 10,300 units per day. This 21
percent increase was not due to greater investment in machinery or
labor, but reflects an increase in operational productivity after training.
They saved about $250,000 in ‘‘assembly junk.’’ Because of the TQM
emphasis, QC tests now destroy only 2 percent of units tested com-
pared to 38 percent before training. Scrap costs have declined from
$0.61 to $0.27 per unit. These savings add up to $3,502 daily and
$1.23 million annually, based on a 350-day work year—about half of
the total cost savings achieved.
Overall manufacturing cost per unit dropped to $6.87 from $7.50
in 1994 and was expected to drop further to $6.34 in 1999. Average
production is currently 10,300 units per day, which translates into sav-
ings of $6,489 per day and $2.27 million per year in a 350-day work
year. Compared to ETP’s $500,876 investment in training, the $2.27
million from cost-saving improvements amounts to a 453 percent cost-
to-benefit ratio in the first year after training. Even if as much as three-
fourths of the benefits were attributable to other factors, the return on
ETP’s investment would still be over 100 percent. Moreover, unit pro-
duction rose 21 percent.
Fret is a premier manufacturer of musical instruments and accesso-
ries. The company underwent a management buyout in the 1980s, and
growth has been rapid since then. From about 50 employees at the
Southern California site in 1986, Fret has grown to over 400 employ-
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Text Box 6.2 Fret Instruments
Trained 350 of 350 workers
ETP cost: $677,968
Estimates of benefits:
• 95 percent reduction in scrap rates
• Rework savings of over $400,000 per year
• Increase in ‘subassembly efficiency’ from 63 percent to almost 100
percent
• Elimination of 20 percent planned overproduction for scrap
• Creation of more than 300 jobs
• Retaining hundreds of jobs in Southern California
• Benefit-to-cost ratio of at least 100 percent per year
ees. In addition to making musical instruments, the company has
added an electronics factory that produces amplifiers. Fret considered
moving its operations to Texas or Tennessee in the late 1980s, but a
state ‘‘Red Team’’ of government officials got involved and the com-
pany decided to stay. It was during this involvement with the ‘‘Red
Team’’ that Fret learned of ETP and decided to do ETP training. Fret
used their independent safety-training consultant to design the program
and to help with the ETP application process. Trainees consisted of
managers, supervisors, and hourly workers. The first ETP training,
consisting of TQM and SPC modules, was a success, and Fret has
another ETP-funded program under way.
The training had a significant impact on the company (see Text
Box 6.2). The production manager commented that the training im-
proved people’s ability to solve problems: ‘‘Now they have tools to
bring closure to problems.’’ He also noted that there is improved com-
munication between departments. The trainees also had many positive
comments. An instrument tuner claimed that scrap rates declined from
12 racks of instruments every 2–3 days to one rack a week—
approximately a 95 percent reduction. A lead person commented that
they went from ‘‘63 percent efficiency in subassembly up to 100 per-
cent in the past eight months.’’ Interestingly, trainees commented that
they miss the overtime they got for reworking bad product. Another
commented that he had ‘‘developed a system to avoid rework.’’ The
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head of instrument production had the most revealing information re-
garding the benefits of training. He said that rework was 25–30 percent
before training and has now declined to 5 percent. They now have only
one rework person instead of four. On average, it takes 40 minutes to
do rework at a total cost of $40 per hour. Assuming the more conserva-
tive estimate of improvement from 25 percent to 5 percent, and the
current production of 325 instruments per day (actually lower than in
the recent past), this works out to a savings on rework alone of $1,733
daily, $8,665 weekly, and $433,250 annually (50 weeks). He also com-
mented that they no longer schedule a 20 percent overproduction in
order to produce enough quality instruments.
To summarize, annual savings were at least $433,200 from reduced
rework alone. This does not include obvious increases in other areas
of production efficiency, such as improved scheduling and higher out-
put. In spite of the fragmentary financial and production information
we obtained, it is not unreasonable to assume that there were other
savings at least as great as the rework savings (as with Basic Batteries
in Text Box 6.1). Annual savings around $800,000 is a reasonable
estimate and the benefits can be expected to continue well beyond the
first year after training, further increasing the impact of ETP training.
In addition, Fret stayed in California, providing several hundred jobs
that would otherwise have been lost at great expense to the local
economy.
Relative to ETP’s $667,968 investment, the benefits have been
enormous. By our estimates, the first year benefits alone exceeded the
state’s one-time cost of training. Finally, not only were jobs retained in
California but new jobs were also created when Fret moved its Oregon
production to California to capitalize on the trained workers and im-
proved processes. State-funded training can improve a state’s ability
to attract business.
Training triggers TQM innovations for both low tech and high
tech companies
TQM training’s universal applicability and its power to change
company cultures is most impressive. TQM training seems to be a
catalyst for high-quality production. It fosters an interest in quality
and instills an attitude of problem solving, independent thinking, and
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collaboration for improvement. Taught in individual company training
programs customized to company needs, its impact is significant on
companies that are high- or low-tech, large or small.
T-Bar, located in Fresno, is a small manufacturer of roll bars, trac-
tor cabs, and bulldozer-type blade extensions. The products are decid-
edly low-tech and unglamorous, but are used all over the United States
and the world. The company did not measure training impact in any
way. However, in discussions with workers and managers, it was clear
that TQM training had an important impact. The workers now meet
twice a month in quality and problem-solving groups. They are repre-
sented at top management meetings where their suggestions and re-
quests receive moral and material support. Workers are now able to
get the equipment they need to do their jobs better and work as a team
to train new workers. They report that TQM and SPC training helped
them qualify for a quality certification from Case, the multinational
heavy equipment maker, and that the ETP training helped them pass
Case’s quality audit. Case certification is a valuable and well-known
credential that qualified them to work for other quality-conscious and
demanding customers. They are also SQA approved. They wrote a
new ISO 9000-based quality manual and established an in-process in-
spection system. The training created momentum and structure that
enabled them to more than triple sales since training, from $6 million
to $20 million, with a concomitant increase in well-paid workers (see
Text Box 6.3).
Correct Disk is a large, publicly-traded Silicon Valley company
producing state-of-the-art components for computer disk drives. It
competes head to head with industry leaders in the global marketplace.
Text Box 6.3 T-Bar
Trained 55 of 55 workers
ETP cost: $118,276
Estimates of Benefits:
• Sales, employment, and quality increased dramatically
• Sales increased from $6 million to over $20 million
• Widely-recognized quality certification received from Case, the
global heavy equipment manufacturer
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Text Box 6.4 Correct Disk
Trained 463 of 1,600 workers
ETP cost: $834,051
Estimate of benefits:
• Over $5 million saved
• Cost of down time for tooling changes reduced by $500,000
• Machine costs reduced by over $4 million per year
• Time reduction on one process provided over $650,000 of additional
annual revenue
• Immediate benefit-to-cost ratio: over 400 percent (not including long-
term repeated gains)
Correct Disk’s ETP-funded training had an impact on both production
workers and professional engineers (see Text Box 6.4).
Correct Disk used ETP funding to train 463 workers on-site in SPC
and TQM. Immediate savings due to training exceeded $5 million
dollars. The full-time TQM coordinator supplied us with the following
quotes from TQM teams on what they achieved during training:
• Reduced HGA inventory discrepancies from 16 percent to 9 per-
cent by October 31, 1995.
• Reduced average monthly Comptech tooling shortages; conse-
quent downtime reduction resulted in more than $500,000 an-
nual savings by December 6, 1995.
• Reduced R2A-D defects from 5.4 percent to 2.7 percent by June
2, 1995.
• Reduced Phase 1 MR Slider Fab from 2 percent to 0.5 percent
by the third fiscal quarter of 1995.
• By May 1, 1995, reduced scrap due to plating parameter input
errors—went 11 weeks without error and have maintained a
lower error rate.
• Reduced cost of HGA by 14 percent by the end of the 1995
fiscal year.
• Reduced pallet treatment cycle time by 44 percent in RRC, from
136 minutes to 76 minutes, resulting in $18,000 savings in RRT
setup and even more savings from reduction in treatment time.
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• Reduced ‘‘material starts’’ from 62 percent to 40 percent by Au-
gust 24, 1995.
• Reduced down time on the Mini JIT UV cure systems from 0.4
percent to 0.0 percent. Assuming that this down time created
an output bottleneck, the reduction added $667,000 to annual
revenue.
• UPII went from 97.4 to 116.7. This equated to savings of
$864,000 per quarter and $4 million in machine costs.
This company made TQM a part of its culture—years after the
training, a TQM coordinator continues to track the impact of TQM
practices, follows up with training, and encourages TQM teams to meet
to solve problems. The immediate benefits of this training amounted
to over $5,000,000, which compares favorably to the $834,051 cost.
Long-term effects should amplify the benefits.
Not all ETP-funded training was successful. We observed that
managerial involvement and support are absolutely vital for a success-
ful training experience. Without top management’s involvement, the
workers are unable to apply the training, and the time and money spent
is mostly lost. Managers first need to carefully assess whether they
want to invest in training, and then they have to plan for it. Training
can fail, even in the hands of a high-tech, global technology leader
located in Silicon Valley, when management does not support the train-
ing. The failure discussed below vividly illustrates the need for top-
management involvement in individual company training, and shows
what happens when management withdraws its support.
Wavelength makes a wide variety of high-tech electrical devices
for commercial and defense purposes. Formerly, the company was
primarily a defense contractor, but the early 1990s reduction in military
spending forced the company to change its focus. Wavelength stands
in stark contrast to Correct Disk.
Text Box 6.5 Wavelength
Trained 212 of approximately 365 employees
ETP cost: $115,029
Results: ‘‘Catastrophe’’
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The training began as a consortia project and then changed to an
individual company contract. The training became, in the words of the
Vice President of Human Resources and Administration, ‘‘a catastro-
phe.’’ The on-site training served about 212 of about 365 full-time
employees (see Text Box 6.5). After about a week, the managers
stopped attending training and never supported it, and there were even
reports that managers opposed the TQM approach. ‘‘Follow-up’’ con-
sisted of managers cursing and threatening workers if they didn’t catch
up on work missed when training. As a result, nothing was imple-
mented. In fact, the training had to be stopped for a while because
of production disruptions, some of which were attributed to excess
paperwork, SOST, and ‘‘homework’’ associated with the training.
Overall, the company was worse off because of the training. Workers
were discouraged because they had learned valuable skills only to be
denied the opportunity to use them. ETP’s $115,029 could have been
better spent elsewhere.
In-house trainers have a big impact
We found that the impact of training was greater with in-house
trainers. This is not surprising because training can be better custo-
mized to the company, and training expertise is retained in the com-
pany. Also, spending money to train an employee-trainer who
becomes the resident expert better communicates to workers that man-
agement considers training important. Interestingly, our review of re-
lated research uncovered a study done from Department of Labor
(1993) survey data that also found that employer-provided training
raised earnings 5 percent, whereas increases were insignificant with
vendor-provided training (Lengermann 1996). Below, we discuss the
main findings regarding individual company training.
We have already discussed the very successful Basic Batteries
training, which used in-house trainers trained by an outside consultant.
Another example, Flow Pumps, shows a company that took the in-
house trainer idea to the limit—the president of the company did some
of the training.
Flow Pumps is a company that makes high-end stainless steel
pumps (see Text Box 6.6). The project trained 190 workers in a variety
of areas including production techniques, basic math, and SPC.
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Text Box 6.6 Flow Pumps
Trained 190 of 320 workers
ETP Cost: $215,880
Estimated Benefits:
• 25–30 percent improvement in ‘‘Direct Labor Productivity’’
• 75 percent reduction in scrap rates
Among the 190 were 24 managers and 24 supervisors who received
training in management skills. Initially, the company used a few com-
munity college instructors for basic math training, but most training
was provided by supervisors, engineers, and workers who had trained
as trainers. The president, an engineer by training and profession,
taught basic math to a number of trainees.
The president sent us a graph showing ‘‘direct labor productivity.’’
This important measure varied between 75 and 80 percent of baseline
expectations before training; since then, it has varied between 80 and
120 percent, hovering mostly around 100 percent. This suggests that
productivity rose by one-fourth to one-third. Overall, the president
believes ‘‘the teams have done a good job on what they can control.’’
He claims there has been a 75 percent reduction in scrap rates, from 10
to 2.5 percent, and believes that return and warranty work has declined
dramatically. In addition, turnover and absenteeism have declined sig-
nificantly, but no hard numbers were available to support this claim.
About half of the trainees (47 percent) reported that training led to a
‘‘substantial’’ or ‘‘major’’ overall increase in productivity. They fur-
ther report that SPC and production techniques had the greatest impact
on productivity. Trainees also agree that training led to positive
changes in the work environment.
Training by an outside party may be a customer requirement.
Some companies were required by major customers to train their work-
ers; in order to survive, they had to train. Such training may not have
the performance impact seen in companies that undertake training to
address production or quality problems. This raises the issue that train-
ing may have little noticeable impact beyond allowing the company to
retain a major customer or to simply stay in business. It also illustrates
that training benefits are not always easily quantifiable in terms of be-
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fore and after performance. Needless to say, the impact may be large
even if it cannot be easily and objectively quantified.
TAC Aviation is a small, privately owned union shop engaged in
sheet metal fabrication for the aerospace industry. SPC and TQM
training was required by Boeing, one of the company’s major custom-
ers. TAC trained 92 of its workers but was not forthcoming with fi-
nancial data on training impact (see Text Box 6.7). The workers
commented that TQM was beneficial and improved communications
with managers and engineers. There was little attempt to keep records
of training impact. However, the head of Human Resources said that
TQM-inspired ideas are providing direct savings in the neighborhood
of $25,000 per year. She also commented that some trainees left for
higher paying jobs after their training. If the above estimate is correct,
the benefits from ETP funding paid back the $50,150 spent in two
years. An additional impact is the increase in wages of trainees who
left for higher pay elsewhere.
Text Box 6.7 TAC Aviation
Trained 92 of 150 workers
ETP cost: $50,150
Estimated benefits:
• $25,000 per year
• Retained a key customer
• Benefit-to-cost ratio: about 50 percent per year, over and above sur-
vival
Conclusion
The case studies from the fieldwork indicate that ETP-funded train-
ing has beneficial impacts on the companies it served. ETP’s invest-
ments may be viewed as leveraged in the sense that client companies
and individuals also invest in the training. This leveraging of ETP
funds appears to provide high rates of return to the ETP funds invested.
Training Agency and Consortia Training
During the fieldwork, we probed the companies’ managers for any
indications they could provide of the overall impact of ETP training
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and combined these indications with what we could glean from stan-
dard financial sources. Determining ETP’s impact proved particularly
difficult for training that occurred in consortia and training agencies
for a number of reasons associated with the size of the companies
involved and the nature of training agency and consortia contracts.
Also, we only visited three companies in each training agency or con-
sortia project when, in fact, the workers trained often came from doz-
ens of companies.
The advantage training agencies and consortia had in reaching
small companies became a distinct disadvantage in our assessment of
the impact of training on those companies. Smaller companies gener-
ally have less formal record-keeping systems and generally engage in
less financial analysis and planning. This meant that less insight, data,
and analysis were at the fingertips of the managers who were queried
about the impact. Furthermore, smaller companies are less likely to
show up in the financial databases that were searched for companies’
financial histories. In consequence, neither management nor the stan-
dard financial databases could provide much reliable information about
the financial impact of training.
Even if financial data were available for the companies involved,
the nature of training agency and consortia programs militates against
detecting the financial effects of training on a specific company. Espe-
cially under training agency contracts, training tends not to be a single
event in calendar time. Rather, companies send one small contingent
at a time (1–3 workers) to more or less ongoing training agency ses-
sions. This spreads the training of employees over a number of years
so that any financial impact is also dispersed. The fact that employers
send a small contingent of workers at any one time also limits the
immediate impact on the company at any one time. The absence of
the ‘‘training event,’’ as it occurs in large individual company ETP
contracts, makes before-and-after financial comparisons impossible be-
cause there are no distinct before-training or after-training periods.
With those cautions in mind, our fieldwork and financial analyses
revealed a general pattern of more notable training impacts on compa-
nies involved in training agency or consortia training for specific indus-
tries. These impacts were detectable because workers trained in
industry-specific skills and ‘‘made things,’’ so changes in scrap rates,
shop capabilities, and production time were noticed and tracked. Con-
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sortia training generally involved intact work groups that worked in
notably different ways after training, so the results were more likely to
be noticed by management.
In contrast, generic training by agencies produced few detectable
impacts on companies. The small contingents of company workers
who were trained tended to be in support roles where changes in pro-
ductivity could not be conveniently measured. Also, these support
activities were likely to be small relative to overall company activity,
diminishing any measurable impact of the training. In one case, where
a significant number of company workers were trained on new soft-
ware, the company was simply switching from one type of software to
another, which was a change that did not materially alter the trainees’
capabilities or productivity.
To summarize our findings on training agency and consortia train-
ing, we detected the greatest impact on companies that trained under
consortia or industry-specific training contracts. The results of this
training tended to be measurable and tracked (though not always pre-
cisely) by management. Training in generic-skills, training-agency
contracts produced little discernable impact on the companies involved.
This may be due to various factors, such as the companies’ usage of
the training availability (over several years), the small number of em-
ployees involved, or the trainees’ support roles where the training did
not much affect the company’s capabilities or productivity.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF TRAINING
ON COMPANY GROWTH
Overview
This section examines the cross-sectional impact of ETP-funded
training on companies that received training, and presents a statistical
analysis of the employment and wage growth of companies served by
ETP during the 1995–1996 period. The statistical analysis supports
the fieldwork observations reported in our case studies above—ETP-
funded training is indeed beneficial to companies.
The analysis compares total employment and wage growth in com-
panies with ETP training to the growth in similar California-based
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companies without ETP training. We chose these two factors as the
only uniform data available for all companies served by ETP and a
comparable group of other California companies. We assume that
greater growth in these factors is a proxy for company success. This
approach is similar to Bartel’s paper (1992), where she measures wage
growth for individual workers in a single company.
Our analysis found that:
• Companies with ETP-funded training grew faster, in terms of
total employees and total wages paid, than similar companies in
the same industry (based on 3-digit SICs).
• Companies that had ETP training through direct contracts (em-
ployer contracts) grew faster than companies that received ETP
training through either consortia or training agencies.
• Employee growth varied with the proportion of employees
trained. Companies in which 10 to 50 percent of workers were
trained grew faster than companies in which less than 10 percent
of workers were trained. Training more than 50 percent of work-
ers seemed to yield about the same growth as training 10 to 50
percent.
Research Approach
Growth as a performance measure
ETP’s mission is to provide training that helps California busi-
nesses ‘‘remain viable’’ and ‘‘compete in the global economy.’’ As a
concrete measure of ETP’s ability to achieve these goals, we tried to
determine if ETP-funded training promoted company growth. We as-
sumed that companies that grew more than others in their industry
were more viable and better able to compete. Specifically, we focused
on percentage growth in the number of employees and total wages paid
before and after training. Percentage growth was used because it is
more informative than raw numbers—an increase of 100 employees
would represent a 100 percent increase if there were 100 employees
before training, but only a 1 percent increase if there were 10,000 em-
ployees before training.
142 Moore, Blake, Phillips, and McConaughy
Industry-adjusted growth
To better understand growth numbers in context, we compared
them to industry norms. For instance, a company that increased em-
ployment by 25 percent did poorly if its industry averaged employment
growth of 50 percent, but its growth was impressive if the industry’s
growth rate was only 10 percent. Therefore, we examined industry-
adjusted growth as well as simple growth rates, because industry ad-
justments filter out broader economic and industry changes to provide
a more meaningful measure of training impact.
For each company receiving ETP training, we created a compari-
son group by selecting nine similar California-based companies that
did not receive ETP training during the period and were closest to the
trainee company in size and industry (3-digit SIC code). The industry
average used in each case was the average of the nine control compa-
nies for that trainee company, and it provides a benchmark for the
trainee company’s characteristics. Because ETP training was the dif-
ference between trainee companies and their industry peers, cross-sec-
tional differences between them should reflect company-specific
‘‘abnormal performance’’ associated with training.
Industry-adjusted measures were calculated by subtracting the av-
erage industry value from the trainee company’s value. Industry-
adjusted performance is informative because it discounts many factors
that might affect the performance of similar companies. For instance,
for industry-adjusted wage growth, we would subtract trainee company
wage growth from industry-average wage growth so that the difference
would reflect the trainee company’s performance with general industry
factors removed. If a company’s wage growth is 15 percent and the
industry average is 25 percent, then 15 percent looks poor when shown
as an industry-adjusted growth of 10 percent. On the other hand, if
industry wage growth was 5 percent, then a 15 percent growth rate
gives a 10 percent industry-adjusted growth.
Event time
We examine company performance in terms of event time. This
allows us to view ETP-funded training as a ‘‘treatment.’’ Given the
treatment, we want to determine whether it affected the trainee compa-
nies. Because treatments occurred at different times, we standardize
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time relative to the training period, which is considered to be time zero.
All other time is measured in quarters of a year, both before training
and after training. The periods of special interest are the first year prior
to and the first year after training. The prior period shows what compa-
nies were like just before training, and the period after reflects the impact
of training, if any. We examine impact on the company by comparing
company characteristics before training to the same characteristics in
the year after training, and by comparing companies’ experience to that
of peers not receiving ETP training during the corresponding period.
Event Time Model 
Q−4 Q−3 Q−2 Q−1 Training Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4 
Data
Because of the data problems noted in previous sections, we were
limited to two performance measures: number of employees and total
wages paid. These data are uniformly available from the California
Employment Development Department and are collected quarterly as
part of the unemployment insurance system.
The trainee company sample is drawn from the group of all compa-
nies in which 10 or more employees received ETP-funded training in
1995–1996. We did not believe it was reasonable to expect companies
to show a significant change in their overall growth as a result of train-
ing fewer than 10 people.
The following definitions include the calculation methods used for
variables:
• Total Earnings
Average quarterly total wages paid to all employees by the
company, calculated both for the four quarters before and
the four quarters after training, from data reported quarterly
to EDD
• Total Employees
Average quarterly total number of employees of the com-
pany, calculated both for the four quarters before and the
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four quarters after training, from data reported quarterly to
EDD
• Total Earnings per Employee
Total Earnings divided by Total Employees for the com-
pany, using the above variables for the four-quarter periods
before and after training
• Total Earnings Growth
Total Earnings before training compared to Total Earnings
after training
• Total Employee Growth
Total Employees before training compared to Total Employ-
ees after training
• Total Earnings per Employee Growth
Total Earnings per Employee before training compared to
Total Earnings per Employee after training
• Employer Contract
Training for which there was a contract between the individ-
ual employer and ETP; this is also referred to as ‘individual
company’ training
• Consortia Contract
Training in which ETP contracts with an industry associa-
tion or major employer to train employees of several compa-
nies
• Training Agency Contract
Training in which ETP contracts with a training agency to
provide training to employees of several companies
For each company, growth rate measures were calculated as change
from the year before training to the year after training. Growth is
calculated as:
Growth 




Earnings were adjusted for inflation to 1995 dollars.
We dropped trainee companies showing a 100 percent decline, as
this suggested that they no longer existed or the data were missing.
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We also dropped 3 companies showing employment growth over 600
percent, as this suggested that they likely underwent a merger or acqui-
sition and were, therefore, not comparable to their past or their industry
peers.
Company characteristics
Table 6.2 details the characteristics of the average company before
beginning ETP-funded training. The data show that, despite matching
ETP companies to the nine companies in their industry that were clos-
est in size, ETP companies were substantially larger on average. That
is because a few ETP companies are much larger than any other com-
pany in their industry. This pattern makes the median statistic a better
comparison than the mean. Examining the median figures, we see that
the typical ETP company employed 200 people and had a quarterly
payroll of about $1.8 million—about $9,100 per employee. On a me-
dian basis, the control companies were similar—if somewhat smaller—
overall.
Comparison of ETP Companies and Industry Controls
Companies using ETP-funded training grew faster than similar-
industry companies not using ETP training. Table 6.3 shows that ETP-
trained companies grew faster in number of workers employed and
total earnings paid out, but were about the same in earnings per em-
ployee. The average ETP-trained company’s Total Employees in the
year after training was 14.3 percent higher than the year before train-
ing. This is highly favorable compared to the 0.8 percent decline in
the control companies over the same period. Similarly, comparing year
before training to year after figures, ETP-trained companies increased
wages paid by 25.8 percent compared to the control companies’ 10.2
percent increase. Total Earnings per Employee in ETP-trained compa-
nies rose 11.9 percent; this varied little from the 11.7 percent of control
companies because the control companies’ work forces declined
slightly. The trainee companies, experiencing more rapid growth,
spread their rising payrolls over more people. Furthermore, companies
that grow rapidly tend to add more lower-paid, entry-level workers to
the workforce base, which reduces average employee wage.
Most ETP companies grew faster than their non-ETP counterparts












Deviation Median Maximum Minimum
Quarterly average employees in year
before ETP training:
ETP-trained firm 177 851 2,346 200 24,527 10
Industry average —a 429 920 163 7,860 11
Quarterly average wages paid in year
before ETP training:
ETP-trained firm 177 $8,973,298 $28,393,400 $1,849,860 $322,626,000 $79,194
Industry average —a $4,202,157 $10,668,100 $1,489,045 $104,169,000 $110,424
Quarterly average earnings per
employee in year before ETP
training:
ETP-trained firm 177 $9,487 $3,640 $9,111 $25,711 $1,698
Industry average —a $9,251 $2,696 $9,110 $17,084 $3,311
aIndustry average is calculated as the average of the nine California-based firms closest to trainee firm based on size and industry
(3-digit SIC). Hence, industry figures represent an average of averages.
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a
Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees, Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training Panel.











Deviation (%) Median (%) Maximum (%) Minimum (%)
Growth in employees:
ETP-trained firm 169 14.3 49.1 7.4 260.0 80.9
Industry average —a 0.8 24.4 0.8 74.5 68.3
Growth in wages paid:
ETP-trained firm 169 25.8 50.8 15.0 241.9 73.2
Industry average —a 10.2 28.2 9.0 107.9 57.0
Growth in earnings per employee:
ETP-trained firm 169 11.9 15.1 8.8 63.7 35.1
Industry average —a 11.7 12.9 11.9 61.2 35.1
aIndustry average is the average of the nine California-based firms closest to trainee firm, based on size and industry (3-digit SIC).
Hence, industry figures represent an average of averages.
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a
Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees, Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training Panel.
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panies, 57 percent had employee growth rates that exceeded their in-
dustry peers by more than 1 percent, and that 40 percent had growth
rates at least 1 percent lower than their industry peers. About 3 percent
of the trainee companies were within plus or minus 1 percent of their
peers’ growth rates. We observed almost the same results for growth
in earnings paid: 56 percent experienced more than 1 percent higher
growth, 41 percent experienced growth at least 1 percent lower, and
about 3 percent experienced similar growth. With respect to earnings
per employee, only 41 percent experienced growth exceeding their in-
dustry peers by more than 1 percent, while 53 percent experienced
growth rates at least 1 percent less than industry peers, and 6 percent
experienced similar growth rates.
The employee growth results deserve more comment. Much of
our sample was composed of manufacturing companies, which have
experienced very little employment growth and are expected to grow
only slightly in the near future, according to a recent forecast by UCLA
(Lee 1999). The 0.8 percent decline of the control companies from the
before-training period to after-training period is consistent with this.
ETP-trained companies’ employment levels grew at a 14.3 percent rate
over the same period, in spite of an overall no-growth trend in manu-
facturing, providing strong evidence that ETP is doing its job. Though
we cannot ascribe causality, two possible explanations come to mind
for the high growth of ETP companies, either of which suggests that
ETP is effective. Either ETP training is causing these companies to
grow, or else ETP has targeted companies poised for growth. In all
likelihood, there is some truth to both explanations. In either case,
ETP is contributing to overall economic growth in the state.
Company Impact by Type of Contract
We also examined the relationship between types of ETP contracts
and the impact these had on the company. Table 6.4 shows that there
were differences between the characteristics of companies served under
different types of contract. The average company using training agen-
cies had almost $11.9 million in payroll during the four quarters before
training and employed 1,107 workers, for an average of $10,067 in
quarterly earnings per employee. (It is important to remember that
companies training fewer than 10 people were dropped from the analy-
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Table 6.4 Pre-Training Comparison of ETP Firms by Contract Type
Average total
Type of Quarterly Earnings Number
contract earnings ($) Employees per employee ($) of firms
Employer 8,418,795 794 9,685 68
Consortia 3,138,463 354 7,668*** 32
Training agency 11,887,854 1,107 10,067††† 77
***Significantly different from Employer at the p  0.01 level (2-tailed).
†††Significantly different from Consortia at the p  0.01 level (2-tailed).
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
sis.) Training agencies often serve small groups from many companies,
so the data here do not represent all companies served by agency con-
tracts. Companies served by consortia were smaller, with an average
payroll of $3.1 million per quarter and 354 employees, for an average
of $7,668 in quarterly earnings per employee during the four quarters
before training. Companies contracting directly with ETP were be-
tween the other two groups with quarterly average payroll of $8.4 mil-
lion and 794 workers earning an average of $9,985 per quarter before
training. The companies in the three groups, taken as a whole, pro-
vided well-paid jobs averaging annual pay per worker from $30,000 to
more than $40,000.
Table 6.5 shows that employers contracting directly with ETP were
associated with the greatest industry-adjusted growth from the year
before training through the year after, in terms of wages paid out (21.0
percent growth) and number of people employed (19.1 percent
growth). Then came companies using ETP-arranged consortia con-
tracts, with payroll growth of 16.9 percent and employee growth of
18.0 percent, followed by companies using agency contracts, with pay-
roll growth of 7.6 percent and employment growth of 8.1 percent.
These results suggest that companies contracting directly with ETP
benefit most. This supports the findings discussed in Chapter 5, indi-
cating that employer projects had greater potential for improving pro-
ductivity and growth, consortia projects had somewhat less potential,
and training agency projects had the least. We drew these conclusions
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Earnings (%) Employees (%) per employee (%) of firms
Employer 30.1 17.5 12.1 66
Consortia 31.7 16.7 14.0 31
Training agency 19.4 10.3 10.7 72
Industry-adjusted growth
Earnings Number
Earnings (%) Employees (%) per employee (%) of firms
Employer 21.0 19.1 0.5 66
Consortia 16.9 18.0 2.1 31
Training agency 7.6 8.1 0.7 72
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
by observing that with all trainees in the same company, employer
contracts had greater potential for customization of training and greater
organizational change associated with on-site training. We also found
that a deeper management commitment to the goals of training was
associated with employer contracts. Conversely, there was much less
potential for improving productivity and affecting growth in training
agency projects, where workers from several employees are taught ge-
neric skills, often on their own time, in a class drawn from many differ-
ent companies and industries. These results are consistent with
Lengerman (1996), who found that training is associated with higher
wages and that training of a generic kind (‘‘vendor’’ training) had the
smallest impact and this impact seemed to depreciate rapidly.
The Impact of the Proportion of Workers Trained
Only employer contracts allow us to observe directly the relation-
ship between growth and the proportion of workers trained. This is
because, with consortia and agency contracts, we do not know how
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many employees came from a particular company, and so the number
of workers covered by a contract is the sum of workers from many
companies. Table 6.6 divides employer contracts into three groups,
based on the percentage of employees trained. The smallest interven-
tion was in companies training fewer than 10 percent of their workers.
Next were those training 10 to 50 percent of their workers, and the
largest intervention was in companies training over 50 percent. Not
surprisingly, smaller companies trained the largest proportion of their
workers.
Table 6.7 examines the impact that the proportion of workers
trained has on company growth. Generally, the greater the proportion
of workers trained in a company, the higher the growth from the year
before training to the year after. This is especially striking for compa-
nies training more than 10 percent of their workers. However, the
marginal benefits are not proportionate to the increase in the share of
workers trained. Training 10 to 50 percent of the workers does not
result in two to four times the amount of growth that training less than
10 percent does. Moreover, training above 50 percent does not result
in much more growth than training 10 to 50 percent of the workforce
at a single time.
Summary and Conclusions
The cross-sectional analysis reinforces what the case studies
showed; namely, that worker productivity rose after training. Our re-
Table 6.6 Pre-Training Comparison of ETP Firms by Percent Trained
Earnings Number
Percent Trained Earnings ($) Employees per employee ($) of firms
Less than 10% 19,380,300 1686 10,731 19
10–50% 6,201,000*** 666*** 9,196 29
More than 50% 1,222,000*** 666*** 9,401 20
***Significantly different from ‘‘ 10%’’ at the p  0.01 level (2-tailed).
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
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Earnings (%) Employees (%) per employee (%) of firms
Less than 10% 12.5 3.2 15.7 19
10–50% 37.5 25.0* 12.5 27
More than 50% 35.5 27.0* 8.5 20
Industry-adjusted growth
Earnings Number
Earnings (%) Employees (%) per employee (%) of firms
Less than 10% 13.1 8.4 2.1 19
10–50% 24.9 21.6 2.1 27
More than 50% 23.4 25.9 3.0 20
*Significantly different from ‘‘ 10%’’ at the p 0.10 level (2-tailed).
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
sults are consistent with Bartel (1992), who finds that training is associ-
ated with greater wage growth on the individual employee level and at
the company level (Bartel 1991). Likewise, Lengermann (1996) finds
that training is associated with increased wages. He notes that training
is ‘‘far less prevalent than what is socially optimal’’ (p. 378). The
statistical studies presented in this chapter show that companies with
ETP training grow faster than similar companies without ETP training.
Growth rates vary by type of contract and proportion of workers
trained. Employer contracts are associated with the greatest growth,
perhaps because they are more customized and usually train a larger
proportion of the workforce. Also, training a larger proportion of
workers has a greater (though not proportionally so) impact on growth.
We cannot prove causality, but two things may be at work: Either ETP
training causes greater than expected growth, or companies with the
greatest growth potential choose to use ETP. In either case, ETP pro-
vides companies with services they need to expand workforces and





The ETP program has two primary economic goals that are shared
by many other state programs—saving UI funds and serving as an
economic development tool for the state. Any evaluation of the pro-
gram’s economic impact should focus on these goals. UI funds can be
saved if retraining incumbent workers who are about to lose their jobs
actually reduces unemployment, and thus saves UI payments. ETP is
an effective economic development tool if by educating the workforce,
it increases workers’ productivity and thereby increases California’s
competitive advantage, particularly in companies engaged in national
or international trade. Enhanced competitiveness reduces layoffs and
promotes the expansion of California’s businesses and economy. In
this chapter, we assess ETP’s effectiveness in achieving the goals of
saving UI funds and promoting economic development through in-
creased productivity. As in the previous chapters, we confine our esti-
mates to the impact of the incumbent-worker portion of the training
program.
This section presents estimates of UI fund expenditure reductions
and California economic impact attributable to ETP’s 1994–1996
incumbent-worker cohort. The underlying methodology and assump-
tions are detailed in the context of the estimates’ development. The
methodology and procedure presented also pertain to similar estimates
made for earlier training cohorts. In both the earlier and the current
estimates, UI fund savings are treated as one portion of ETP’s overall
impact on the California economy.
For the 1994–1995 and 1995–1996 ETP contracts, the total impact
on the California economy was estimated at over $400 million in the
first year after training. Components of that estimate are itemized
below. Although only $62.8 million of ETP training contract funds
were directly invested to achieve the $400 million impact, this should
not be taken as a return on investment as there are substantial costs and
returns omitted from the estimates.1
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The estimated impact of ETP training is the difference between
economic benefits that occurred with ETP’s training programs in place
and those that would have occurred without them. This suggests that
the key to benefit estimation is using the non-ETP comparison group
to estimate what would have happened had the trainees not been
trained. The estimated economic benefits of training will derive from
positive training outcomes relative to the non-ETP comparison group.
In this chapter, we identify several training outcomes and their associ-
ated economic benefits. For the reader’s convenience, we have first
summarized the estimated magnitude of those benefits to the California
economy, and we explain why those benefits are expected and detail
their empirical derivation. In each case, we have been careful to in-
clude only net benefits to California, excluding benefits to California
workers or companies that come at the expense of other California
workers or companies.
THE TRAINING OUTCOMES AND THEIR ECONOMIC
BENEFITS
Benefits for trainees can lead to economic benefits for the state as
a whole. For example, training that increases employment stability
reduces UI claims, while training that increases productivity adds to
workers’ earnings and may boost economic activity. Table 7.1 lists the
three types of ETP training outcomes with their primary economic
benefits. Estimated payoffs for the first year after training are given to
the nearest million dollars.
These ETP training program outcomes and associated benefits to
the California economy are cross-referenced in Table 7.2. We estimate
that the ETP cohort’s training had an impact of about $413 million on
the California economy in the first year after training. Saving jobs
threatened by out-of-state competitors was the greatest benefit, totaling
over $360 million in UI fund savings, trainee earnings impact, and
indirect (or multiplier) effects. The largest component was the earn-
ings impact. Increasing productivity was the second largest benefit,
totaling nearly $50 million from $31.8 million in earnings impact and
$16.8 million in indirect effects. The smallest benefit was increased
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Table 7.1 Training Outcomes and Economic Benefits
Training outcomes and benefits Payoff ($)
Increase in trainees’ employment stability
Savings to Unemployment Insurance fund 2 million
Increase in trainees’ productivity
Increase in trainee earnings 32 million
Increase in employment at other California businesses 17 million
Saving of California jobs
Savings to Unemployment Insurance fund 61 million
Prevention of trainees’ temporary earnings losses 167 million
Prevention of other California businesses’ losses 134 million
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
employment stability, which saved a little under $2 million in UI funds
during the first year after training.
Table 7.2 can also be read to determine which ETP training out-
comes are the sources of a particular type of economic benefit. For
example, the source of UI fund savings, totaling over $63 million, was
both increased employment stability and saved jobs. ETP’s earnings
Table 7.2 ETP Impact on the California Economy
UI fund Earnings Indirect
Outcome savings ($) impact ($) effects ($) Total ($)
Employment stability 1,978,000 NC NC 1,978,000
Productivity increase NE 31,803,000 16,766,000 48,569,000
California jobs saved 61,115,000 167,305,000 133,845,000 362,265,000
Total 63,093,000 199,108,000 150,611,000 412,812,000
NC: Not calculated separately. Improved employment stability would lead to higher
trainee earnings by lowering unemployment. We did not net this number out of the
productivity increase for trainees; employment stability effect is included in produc-
tivity increase or indirect effects.
NE: Not estimated. Because UI taxes only apply to the first $7,000 of annual earnings,
and annual earnings already averaged about $25,000, any effect on UI funds would
be both small and difficult to estimate.
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
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impact, totaling just under $200 million in the first year after training,
derived from both increased productivity and saved jobs. Indirect ef-
fects, totaling over $150 million, resulted mainly from saving jobs and
only secondarily from productivity increase.
Some may find the indirect effects suspect, given that claims of
indirect or multiplier effects often have little logical justification and
even less empirical basis for the multipliers used. However, the multi-
plier effects claimed here have been carefully justified and meticu-
lously tracked and estimated. Further evidence of their existence can
be found in Chapter 6, in the section on the impact of ETP training on
companies. In that section, companies with ETP training programs
show faster growth than similar-size companies in their industry. It is
reasonable to expect that as these ETP-contracting companies grow
faster, they will order more from their California suppliers, creating a
multiplier effect. Further discussions of the estimated multiplier ef-
fects are presented in the following sections, which detail the analysis
leading to the estimates in Table 7.2.
Outcome 1: Employment Stability—$2 Million
A major goal of ETP is providing workers with ‘‘secure employ-
ment.’’ Achievement of this goal can be measured in unemployment
claim reductions and lower UI payments. As shown in Chapter 4,
trainees experienced a decrease in unemployment after training relative
to the comparison groups (measured in average UI weeks claimed).
An improving economy during part of the study period also produced
lower unemployment in the comparison group, but the trainee claims
rate fell significantly more than that of the comparison group. UI Fund
savings are a result of lower UI claims associated with relatively low
post-training unemployment.
We estimated the reduction in UI payments by tracking the unem-
ployment and UI claim experience of ETP trainees relative to the com-
parison group. Because we were interested in estimating total UI
savings associated with ETP training, we tracked the experience of all
trainees relative to all members of the comparison group. We did not
restrict the analysis to a subset of trainees in the labor force during
certain quarters before or after training, or to comparison group mem-
bers in the labor force in corresponding quarters. Our analytical proce-
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dure first determined the percentage of trainees expected to experience
unemployment if not trained and then compared that percentage to
their actual rate of post-training unemployment. The trainees’ UI pay-
ment rate was then applied to the estimated difference between trainee
and comparison group unemployment rates.
We used the comparison group2 experience to estimate the likely
unemployment experience of ETP trainees had they not been trained.
However, because ETP contracts’ selective requirements imply that
trainees might differ from average California workers, we could not
simply apply the comparison group’s unemployment percentages to
the trainees. ETP contracts require that trainees must be workers
threatened with displacement, transitioning to a high-performance
workplace, or in a company that is diversifying its product line. Be-
cause of these selective contract requirements, ETP trainees may not
have the same unemployment levels as the random sample of Califor-
nia workers that was used as the comparison group. What can be
expected is that ETP trainees will experience the same trend in unem-
ployment as the comparison group, because that trend is produced by
the general conditions and dynamics of the California economy. We
therefore assumed that without training, the ETP trainees would have
experienced the same unemployment trend or change as the compari-
son group. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show the calculations resulting in esti-
mates of this source of UI fund savings for the trainees.
Table 7.3 details the procedure for estimating UI savings due to
training. The first two rows report the average quarterly percentage of
trainees and comparison group members making UI claims during the
year before training and the two years after. The ‘‘normalization ratio’’
in the third row is the ratio of the average quarterly percentage of
trainees that made UI claims in the year before training to the average
quarterly percentage of comparison group members that made claims.
The normalization ratio indicates that in the four quarters preceding
training, the claims rate of the trainees was 0.954—or 95.4 percent—of
the claims rate of the comparison group. The normalization ratio was
applied to the comparison group’s after-training claims rate to estimate
the expected claims rate for the trainees, shown in the fourth row as
the estimated quarterly average of claims that trainees would have
made had they followed the same trend as the comparison group. The
trainees’ after-training expected claims rate was then divided by their
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Table 7.3 UI Savings Attributable to Retraining
Year Year Second
Item before after year after
Trainees: average percentage
making quarterly claims 6.82% 5.29% 4.42%
Comparison group: average
percentage making
quarterly claims 7.15% 7.04% 6. 43%
Normalization ratioa 0.954 0.954 0.954
Trainees: expected
percentage making
quarterly claims 6.82% 6.71% 6.13%
Trainees: expected claim rate
as percent of actual claim
rate 100.00% 126.96% 138.79%
Trainees: actual UI payments $9,303,400 $7,338,217 $6,020,201
Trainees: estimated UI
payments without training $9,303,400 $9,316,600 $8,355,437
Trainees: estimated UI
savings $1,978,383 $2,335,236
aNote that the normalization ratio is the retrainees’ year-before claims divided by the
comparison group’s year-before claims. Applying this ratio to each of the comparison
group’s claims rates produces the expected claims rate for the trainees. The trainees’
year-before expected claims rate is just what it actually was, because of the definition
of the normalization ratio. The trainees’ year-after expected claims rate is the com-
parison group’s rate times the normalization ratio and is what the trainees would have
experienced if their claims rate had followed the same trend as the comparison group.
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Gheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
actual claims rate to obtain the expected rate as a percentage of actual
rate. This was applied to the actual trainees’ UI payments to obtain
estimated total UI payments to trainees had they not been trained. The
trainees’ actual UI payments were then subtracted from expected pay-
ments to obtain estimated UI savings due to training. In other words,
this procedure assumes that the trainees would have continued to expe-
rience unemployment claims at 95.4 percent of that of the comparison
group had they not been trained. This procedure also assumes that any
difference between the trainees’ expected and actual unemployment
claims was due to training.
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Table 7.4 Earnings Impact
Year Year Second
Item before after year after
Trainees: total earnings $999,135,817 $1,060,014,095 $1,051,697,931
Trainees: earnings percentage of
year before 100.00% 106.09% 105.26%
Comparison group: earnings
relative to year before 100.00% 102.91% 105.33%
Trainee’s expected earnings based
on comparison group pattern $1,028,210,670 $1,052,389,756
Trainees’ excess growth in
earnings $31,803,426 $(691,825)
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
The total UI fund savings associated with the lower UI claims rates
from ETP trainees in the study period is estimated to be about
$1,980,000 in the first year after training. As indicated in the preceding
tables, we estimated another $2,335,000 in UI fund savings for the
second year after training, but this is not included in our subsequent
calculations because our estimates only pertain to first-year impact of
ETP training.
Outcome 2: Productivity Increase—$48.5 Million
Earnings impact: $31.8 million
The productivity of ETP trainees may increase either because they
produce more per hour or because they work more hours. Any training
program that increases the marketable skills of participants adds pro-
duction capacity. ETP programs may have an advantage over other
training programs because of the placement requirement in ETP con-
tracts. Other training programs create the potential to produce more,
but that potential is only realized when the newly-trained workers are
placed in jobs. ETP contracts require placement as a condition of
training, so when ETP training is completed, the economic potential
of enhanced productivity is realized and manifested immediately in
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increased economic output. Also, trainees’ new skills may allow them
to work more hours by avoiding the periods of unemployment associ-
ated with less marketable skills.
Direct measurements of productivity changes are difficult and ex-
pensive, requiring accurate data on physical input and output for peri-
ods before and after training. Such data are generally not available,
and ETP projects are no exception. Even if data were available, direct
measurement of individual productivity is complicated in that newly
trained workers typically work with different equipment, different ma-
terials, and differently skilled co-workers than they did before training.
It is difficult to separate a single worker’s change in productivity from
the contributions of new equipment, new materials, and differently
skilled co-workers.
In our analysis, as in most studies, change in earnings is used as an
indicator of change in worker productivity. Standard economic theory
implies that workers are paid the value of their contribution to produc-
tion (their marginal product). Accordingly, an increase in productivity
should result in an increase in workers’ earnings (Becker 1993). The
advantage of using earnings as an indicator of productivity is that earn-
ings data are much more readily available than physical output data
and are reported for individual workers. Lacking uniform records of
physical change in production levels for ETP projects, we used earn-
ings change data as the productivity change indicator.3
Worker productivity can be influenced by a variety of factors other
than training. These factors include investment in capital equipment
(new machinery, computers, or software), improvement in infrastruc-
ture (usually transportation, utilities, and communications systems),
growth in technology, more efficient regulation, or simply an increase
in the value consumers place on the products produced. In view of
that, to estimate the increase in worker productivity attributable to ETP
training, we need to adjust for the productivity increases due to other
factors. We used the comparison group’s pattern of earnings change to
adjust for changes other than ETP training.
The increase in productivity attributable to ETP is the difference
between trainees’ actual earnings growth and the earnings growth they
would have had without ETP training. We used the comparison
group’s earnings as an indicator of the average rate of productivity
increase for workers not in ETP training.4 Again, because we were
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trying to capture the total impact of ETP on productivity, we used the
experience of all trainees and all comparison group members in these
estimations.
Table 7.4 shows the before-and-after earnings patterns for trainees.
Earnings patterns are shown in dollars and as percentages of earnings
in the year before training. The before-and-after percentage earnings
patterns of the comparison group are then provided for comparison.
Trainees’ pretraining earnings are multiplied by the comparison
group’s percentage change to show what trainees would have earned
had they followed the comparison group’s earnings trend, and then the
dollar difference between the expected and actual patterns is given.
The trainee productivity increase, attributable to ETP training, is esti-
mated to be about $31,803,000 in the first year after training.
The estimated productivity difference in the second year after
training is given to illustrate a major finding of this analysis: the effects
of ETP training in a recovering economy appear to be substantially
different from its effects in a slowing economy. Table 7.4 shows that
the positive productivity effects of ETP training disappeared in the
second year after training. This result is quite different from the results
of earlier ETP studies, where productivity gains persisted for at least
three years. Other studies, more or less consistent with the earlier ETP
study results, have suggested that training-related productivity gains
last about 12 years (Lillard, Hong, and Tan 1986). Unfortunately, addi-
tional years of data were not available for the trainees we studied, so
we could not determine whether any productivity-enhancing effect re-
turned during the third or fourth year after training. We have omitted
any projection of long-term ETP training effects because of the near
equality between trainee and comparison group earnings growth in the
second year after training. Without earnings growth data for later
years, we are unable to determine whether there is a long-term en-
hancement of trainee productivity in an expanding economy with fall-
ing unemployment.
Indirect effects—$16.8 million
ETP training programs have a potential economic impact beyond
the direct effects these programs have on program participants and
their companies. These indirect or ‘‘multiplier’’ effects are transmitted
162 Moore, Blake, Phillips, and McConaughy
from companies experiencing growth to supplier companies through
increased orders. Realization of these indirect effects of training de-
pends on the nature of the companies in which the trainees are placed.
Specifically, to realize the potential indirect economic impact, the
trainees must be in basic industries. We explain the reasons for this
after a brief explanation of regional multipliers.
In standard economic theory, regional multipliers are derived from
the distinction between ‘‘basic’’ activities and ‘‘service sector’’ activi-
ties. Businesses that compete in and ‘‘export to’’ national and interna-
tional markets are the region’s ‘‘economic base.’’ Besides these
regional export-oriented activities, the economic base includes the visi-
tor-serving portion of local hotel, restaurant, entertainment, and retail
trade; governmental activity funded by nonlocal sources; and interre-
gional financial, insurance, transportation, and utility networks. Ac-
cording to the regional theory, these ‘‘basic’’ activities generate the
‘‘service sector’’ jobs in the local economy through local suppliers and
household demand generated by payroll expenditures. The services
sector includes all businesses supplying local industries and house-
holds—in other words, businesses that respond to locally generated
demand for goods and services. These would include retail trade, local
business services, most personal services, local government activities,
and any local suppliers of exporting firms. Regional theory postulates
that variation in basic industry output spawns variation in local orders
and payroll, which in turn causes variation in demand for the local
service sector products. Regional multipliers show the relationship
between change in a region’s basic industry output and its overall out-
put (basic plus service sector). Basic industries with a high proportion
of local suppliers and high local payrolls relative to output have larger
multipliers, and those with weaker linkages to the local economy have
smaller multipliers (O’Sullivan 2000).
The bottom line is that basic industries are those that compete with
out-of-state businesses. Whether a particular retraining program has a
multiplier effect in the California economy, then, depends critically on
the location of the business’s competitors. If the company’s competi-
tors are out of state, then increased sales of the company and its suppli-
ers come mainly at the expense of out-of-state firms and suppliers.
This produces a net gain in production and jobs for California. Simi-
larly, if the company loses its competitive position, out-of-state compa-
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nies and their suppliers will likely pick up its lost sales, resulting in a
loss of economic activity in California. On the other hand, if a Califor-
nia company competes only with other California businesses, then its
gains or losses and those of its suppliers would generate offsetting
effects in other California businesses, yielding no significant net gain
or loss for the California economy.
For example, a computer printer manufacturer is in a basic industry
because it competes with companies that are out of state or in other
countries. A gain by this company likely would come at the expense
of an out-of-state company. On the other hand, most restaurants do
not compete with out-of-state restaurants but with other local restau-
rants and so restaurants are not in a basic industry. A newly opened
restaurant’s business is likely to come at the expense of existing restau-
rants.
ETP training projects that enhance the competitive advantages of
‘‘basic’’ California businesses are likely to produce economic impacts
beyond the direct effects on those businesses and workers. Because
ETP retraining programs upgrade both workers’ skills and the jobs they
fill, ETP training strengthens California businesses’ advantages relative
to their out-of-state competitors. California companies will experience
increased production and ETP training will increase sales and jobs for
in-state suppliers, to the extent that California businesses with ETP
training programs either gain sales or preserve sales they would other-
wise have lost to competitors. The impact of training programs on
California’s economy is the increased production in businesses with
training programs, plus the increased activity of their various suppliers.
The aggregate increased production of their suppliers is the ‘‘indirect
effect.’’ This indirect economic impact, called a ‘‘ripple, or multiplier,
effect,’’ excludes any offsetting negative effect on other California sup-
pliers.
California’s current economic environment is particularly condu-
cive to widespread multiplier effects. California has the largest econ-
omy of any state in the nation and is a major trade center for the Pacific
Rim. Recent advances in communications and information processing
technologies, along with falling transportation costs, have produced
keen competition in the markets for nationally and internationally
traded commodities and services. Consequently, California businesses
that produce, warehouse, transport, or sell nationally and internation-
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ally traded goods and services face rigorous domestic and international
competition.
Whether a particular training program will have multiplier effects
is usually determined by whether the firm’s industry is in the basic
rather than the service sector. In some cases, however, training pro-
grams in the service sector can have multiplier effects. This happens
when a firm’s market consists of local customers, but the firm competes
with out-of-state producers to supply the local market. This is the case
of ‘‘import substitution,’’ where an increase in the firm’s output re-
places imported goods rather than locally produced goods. If new
local production replaces imported consumer or production goods and
services, then the new production generates additional local jobs. In
short, service activity of the import-substitution type can have multi-
plier effects. An example would be a new bakery serving local super-
markets that previously imported their baked goods from outside the
region. In sum, if all ETP training in the service sector were in busi-
nesses competing with non-California suppliers, then the productivity
enhancement in those industries would also have a multiplier effect on
local jobs.
The other reason for indirect benefits from ETP incumbent-worker
training is that it upgrades jobs as well as workers’ skills. By upgrad-
ing jobs, businesses gain a competitive edge in the market and will
then order more goods and services from suppliers. We assume here
that companies will increase all of their inputs more or less in propor-
tion to the increased productivity of their retrained workers.5 This
means that their orders from local suppliers will rise in proportion
to their workers’ increased productivity (measured by earnings). An
additional multiplier effect comes as the trainees become more produc-
tive and earn and spend more in the local economy, which generates
additional economic activity.
This analysis suggests that ETP could most effectively foster Cali-
fornia’s economic growth by concentrating incumbent worker pro-
grams on companies in basic industries or those involved in import
substitution. Training in these industries would increase output both
directly (the productivity effect) and indirectly (the multiplier effect).
In fact, since January 1, 1994, legislation requires that all ETP incum-
bent worker contracts occur in basic industries except for contracts
involving Special Employment Training (less than 10 percent of the
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budget). However, many of the contracts completed during our study
period began before January 1, 1994, and so were not subject to the
basic industries requirement.
The California Department of Commerce’s Office of Economic
Research developed the multipliers used in this study (Office of Eco-
nomic Research 1995). We used industry-specific, statewide job multi-
pliers including the effects of both additional industry and consumer
spending in response to increases in basic activity. To obtain an over-
all, average multiplier, we weighted the industry multipliers by the per-
centage of trainees in each industry. The weighted average multiplier
for both industry and consumer spending was 1.8. This multiplier
value indicates that for each $100 of new basic sector activity, an addi-
tional $80 of service sector activity is created.
Multipliers are commonly applied to changes in basic activity to
find the effect on total activity. To determine which training programs
were in basic industries or industries involved with import substitution,
we used a list of industries categorized as basic industries in California
and ETP contract information. Our analysis of ETP projects indicates
that 65.9 percent of trainees were in companies with potential multi-
plier effects.6
Table 7.5 shows the calculation of ETP training programs’ multi-
plier effect on the California economy. Of the $31. 8 million increase
in trainee productivity estimated in Table 7.5, 65.9 percent or about
$21 million was taken to be in basic industries. This productivity in-
crease was multiplied by the 0.8 indirect effects portion of the weighted
multiplier of 1.8, to estimate that the indirect benefits to the California
economy from trainees’ increased productivity was $16.8 million. This
Table 7.5 Indirect Effects
Percent of
retrainees Increased Weighted
in basic Increased productivity in multiplier for Indirect impact
industries productivity basic industries basic industries of retraining
65.9% of $31,803,000  $20,958,000  0.8 (of 1.8)  $16,766,000
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
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means that the enhanced productivity of trainees employed in basic
industries generated an additional $16.8 million of activity for suppli-
ers and businesses patronized by trainees.
Outcome 3: California Jobs Saved—$362 Million
UI fund savings—$61 million
One purpose of ETP training is to prevent displacement of workers
whose employers are not successfully competing with out-of-state
companies. If employers are not competitive, they will lose market
share, cut production, and lay off workers. The threat of worker dis-
placement is one of the bases for an ETP funding application. Compa-
nies applying on this basis must show that incumbent worker training
will enhance their competitive position and reduce the threat of dis-
placement. These ETP incumbent worker contracts directly enhance
the competitiveness of California businesses by increasing both work-
ers’ skills and the skill requirements of those workers’ jobs. Without
the ETP contracts, the training and job upgrading presumably would
not have occurred, and these companies would have lost sales and cut
jobs. If in basic industries, these jobs could have been lost to the
California economy, at least temporarily. A temporary loss of these
jobs could occur while the companies restructure, or until other Cali-
fornia businesses recognize the market opportunity and restore the lost
jobs. If the threatened jobs were not in a basic industry, then some
other California business would have gained the lost sales, and there
would have been no net loss to the California economy. Therefore,
benefits to the California economy from preventing job loss come only
through training programs in companies with out-of-state competitors.
The economic benefits of reducing the threat of layoffs are two-
fold. The first is that UI funds are saved that otherwise would have
been drawn by laid-off workers as UI benefits. We estimated UI fund
savings from this source by using the number of trainees threatened
with displacement, the estimated number of weeks they would have
been unemployed, and their UI weekly payment rate. The second eco-
nomic benefit of preventing layoffs is that the earnings that trainees
would have lost while unemployed are not lost. We estimated the
‘‘saved’’ earnings of trainees by using the number of trainees threat-
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ened, the estimated number of weeks they would have been displaced,
and their pretraining earnings.
The percentage of trainees threatened with displacement during the
study period is reported in Table 7.6. Our estimate of the number of
potentially unemployed trainees came from examining ETP retraining
contracts. Under current regulations, most ETP retraining contracts
must satisfy one of the following three requirements: 1) workers must
be threatened with displacement if not retrained, 2) the company must
be transitioning to a high-performance workplace, or 3) the company
must be diversifying its product line. This regulation took effect for
contracts initiated after January 1, 1994. Before then, all ETP retrain-
ing contracts required that workers be threatened with displacement.
Some training contracts in the study period were initiated before Janu-
ary 1, 1994, and we assumed that all trainees covered by those con-
tracts were in jeopardy of layoff. For contracts initiated after January
1, 1994, we only included those trainees in contracts that were justified
by a threat of worker displacement.
Our estimate of the average number of weeks that experienced,
newly unemployed workers would be unemployed in the following
year came from the comparison groups. We identified workers in the
1993, 1994, and 1995 comparison groups who made an unemployment
claim in their selection quarter, but not in the previous quarter, and
then tabulated their average weeks of UI claims during that year (the
selection quarter plus the next three quarters). Because the number of
UI weeks claimed varied by industry and by year, we averaged the
annual UI weeks claimed, weighting by trainees’ industry composition
and training completion date (before 1994, during 1994, after 1994).
Table 7.6 Breakdown by Displacement Threat
1994–95 1995–96 Both
Contracts (%) Contracts (%) years (%)
Percent threatened by displacement 95.3 55.9 81.0
Percent not threatened by displacement 4.7 44.1 19.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
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Table 7.7 shows average annual UI weeks claimed by workers in indus-
tries similar to the trainees’ in 1993, 1994, and 1995. As an aside, the
reason for the slight rise in UI weeks claimed between 1994 and 1995
is simply the SIC weighting of the experience of the comparison group.
The unweighted UI weeks claimed by the newly unemployed in the
comparison group actually dropped slightly between 1994 and 1995.7
Finally, we estimated the average UI payment that would have been
received by the trainees if they had lost their jobs. These calculations
are shown in Table 7.8, where the total number of trainees, 42,036, is
multiplied by the 81.0 percent of training completers whose jobs were
in jeopardy, to estimate 34,049 threatened trainees. To estimate trainee
UI payments if they had been laid off, we used the average weekly UI
payments during the year before training, on the assumption that the
average reflected the level of UI payments they would have received.
The average UI payment of $112 per week times the number of threat-
ened trainees times the average 18 weeks unemployed totals
$68,642,784. We estimate that this $68,642,784 would have been
drawn on UI funds during the subsequent year if 81.0 percent of the
trainees had become unemployed because they did not receive ETP
training. The UI payments actually made to these trainees averaged
$174 during the subsequent year and totaled $5,924,526; the difference
is $62,718,258. However, we have already attributed some of this dif-
ference to what the trainees would have been paid if they had not been
retrained and had followed comparison group unemployment trends.
That amount is $1,978,383 (see Table 7.3), and the 81 percent associ-
ated with trainees threatened with displacement is $1,602,490. Sub-
tracting this from the $62,718,258 difference yields $61,115,768 in UI
fund savings from preventing unemployment of trainees.
Table 7.7 Average UI Weeks Claimed
1993 1994 1995 Weighted
average average average average
Annual UI weeks claimed 21.6 17.4 17.5 18.0
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
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Table 7.8 UI Fund Savings Attributable to Saving Jobs
Trainees placed 42,036
Times Displacement percentage  81
Equals Trainees threatened  34,049
Times Average UI payment per week  $112
Times Average annual weeks of unemployment  18.0
Equals UI payments retrainees would have received  $68,642,784
Minus UI payments trainees did receive  $5,924,526
81% of the reduction in UI payments
Minus due to increased job stability  $1,602,490
Equals Estimated UI fund savings  $61,115,768
SOURCE: Moore, R.W., D.R. Blake, G.M. Phillips, D. McConaughy, and A. Cheung-
von Hamm. 2000b. Training that Makes a Difference: ETP’s Impact on Trainees,
Companies and the State’s Economy. Sacramento, California: Employment Training
Panel. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 4327562.
Earnings impact: $167 million
The second benefit of saving jobs is preventing trainees from los-
ing earnings. The benefit of avoiding these earnings losses comes in
two ways: directly to the trainees and indirectly to the California econ-
omy. A total of 34,049 trainees were threatened with job loss during
the study period. The estimated value of displacement prevention to
trainees would be their average weekly wages times the additional
weeks that they would have been unemployed during the next year.
Table 7.7 shows that 18.0 weeks of unemployment were expected,
given displacement. Trainees actually averaged 1.5 weeks of unem-
ployment, so 16.5 additional weeks of unemployment would have been
associated with displacement. Trainees’ average weekly wages in the
year before training was $460. Therefore, trainees’ expected loss of
earnings was 16.5 weeks times $460 per week times the number of
34,049 threatened trainees: $258,431,910. However, not all trainees
worked in basic industries and so not all lost earnings would have been
lost to the California economy. If companies in nonbasic industries
had suffered temporary job losses when they were unable to meet their
competition because employees were not trained, then their sales, jobs,
and earnings would have decreased but their California competitors
would have expanded sales, jobs, and earnings. Although particular
170 Moore, Blake, Phillips, and McConaughy
workers would have lost earnings, overall jobs and earnings would not
have been lost to the California economy.
The earnings lost to the California economy would be those lost
by trainees in basic industries because those lost jobs and earnings
would have been picked up by out-of-state competitors. In basic indus-
tries, 22,043 trainees were threatened with job loss. The estimated
value of this earnings loss to the California economy is the average
weekly pretraining earnings times the additional annual weeks of un-
employment associated with displacement times the number of af-
fected workers. Specifically, the expected earnings loss for the
California economy during the first year after training was 16.5 addi-
tional weeks of unemployment at $460 average weekly earnings for
22,043 trainees in basic industries: $167,306,370.
Note that the estimate of a possible $167,305,000 loss in earnings
assumes that those trainees in jeopardy would, in fact, temporarily lose
their jobs. Because these jobs are in basic industries, our analysis also
assumes that these jobs would not be picked up by other California
companies, at least not for the typical duration of unemployment. Our
analysis further assumes that after the expected 18-week duration, new
jobs would develop and that these workers would find those or other
suitable jobs.
Indirect effects—$134 million
The loss of $167,305,000 in earnings in California’s basic sector
implies some indirect or multiplier effects of the lost earnings because
basic sector jobs generate supply activities for job materials and ser-
vices, as well as consumer expenditures by jobholders. If basic sector
jobs and earnings disappear (even temporarily) there will be a loss of
sales by supplying firms and consumer-oriented producers, and there-
fore the local economy will suffer decreased employment and earnings.
Applying the 0.8 indirect portion of the multiplier derived above to the
estimated earnings loss yields about $133,845,000 in indirect effects
on the California economy. The sum of estimated direct and indirect
effects of preventing temporary basic industry job losses through ETP
retraining is $301,150,000 for the study period.
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Summary
We estimated ETP’s total impact on the California economy at
$413 million during the first year after training. The largest portion of
this total came from saving California companies and workers from the
economic disruption of temporary business and job losses. The $362
million estimate of these savings may seem large to some, but it is the
product of careful analysis and conservative assumptions. Workers and
company officials will testify that losses of business by a company
and the resulting economic dislocations of downsizing and layoffs are
economically painful, even if only temporary. In the case that our
conservative estimate of the temporary pain of economic dislocation
were off by a factor of two, that would still leave an impact of $180
million saved by avoiding lost sales and the related layoffs.
We also estimated that the $62.8 million in direct ETP contract
costs during the study period produced a $51.5 million gain in the first
year after training due to increased employment stability and the direct
and indirect effects of productivity increases. It is worth noting that
our estimates regarding the extent of economic growth due to produc-
tivity increases are conservative. These estimates do not include any
company growth beyond what is directly associated with demonstrable
training effects on the trainees, plus the indirect requirements related
to those training effects. Our estimates did not include any increase in
profitability or subsequent sales and employment growth that the train-
ees’ companies might have enjoyed because of training. Even though
our analysis of the company effects of training shows evidence that
training increases both company profitability and employment growth,
our estimates of economic impact do not include these effects.
Notes
1. This amount includes only the training funds in the ETP contracts paid to trainers
of incumbent workers. All training costs borne by the individual trainees and
companies, along with ETP’s administrative costs, were excluded on the cost side.
All benefits to companies were excluded along with any benefits accruing to ei-
ther trainees or to state funds after the first post-training year.
2. The comparison group experiences used throughout this analysis are those of the
industry-adjusted comparison group. That is, the experience of the comparison
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group in UI claims, earnings, or other variables was derived by weighting the
comparison group according to the industrial composition of the trainees. This
was done by determining the experience of the 25 industry-based subgroups of
the comparison group and then weighting data from each industry subgroup by
the proportion of trainees in that subgroup. This procedure yields a comparison
group with the same industrial composition as the trainee group.
3. Some researchers argue that changes in wages underestimate the increase in pro-
ductivity because of some common pay practices (e.g., Bishop 1995). If this is
correct, then these estimates understate the real impact of ETP training.
4. Note that this use of comparison group earnings would include the productivity
effects of the average level of training going on in the California economy, be-
cause that training would affect the average earnings in the labor force.
5. This assumption is based on the large body of empirical evidence, which supports
homogeneous production functions as applicable to most production activities.
These production functions, of which the popular Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion is one example, have the property that all inputs are increased proportionately
when input prices are relatively stable. That is, an increase in labor productivity
would result in an increase of other inputs as well.
6. For the list of basic industries, see California Economic Growth, Center for Con-
tinuing Study of the California Economy, Palo Alto, California, pp. A1–A5, 1999.




Our recommendations are presented in two major sections:
• Policy recommendations for states with incumbent-worker
training programs
• Methodology recommendations for evaluators of these pro-
grams
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
Policy recommendations for state-sponsored, customized, worker
training programs must begin with a fundamental question—should
states invest in such programs at all? Based on our evaluation of Cali-
fornia’s Employment Training Panel program, we believe that there is
a strong rationale for investing in these programs. Our reasoning be-
gins with the premise that there is an underinvestment in training non-
college-educated workers. The research reported in Chapter 3 shows
why rational firms would underinvest in these workers. The primary
motivation is that companies pay all of the costs of training but, be-
cause employees may leave, they do not believe they will capture all
of the benefits. Furthermore, many companies have limited experience
with training and they are unsure if training will yield an acceptable
return on investment. This leads managers to choose not to train,
though their company may actually benefit substantially from training.
Federal investment in training tends to overlook employed workers
and focus on disadvantaged workers who are unemployed, such as out-
of-school youth, unemployed workers, and people living in poverty.
Public community colleges and technical institutes provide govern-
ment-subsidized opportunities for workers to upgrade their skills, but
workers must do so on their own time and at least partially at their own
expense. Many workers do not take this opportunity—some do, but
they receive training that is not specific to their job or company and
may benefit little from such training, making it a relatively risky invest-
ment compared to employer-provided training.
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Given the multiple barriers to investment in private training, we
believe that it is appropriate for states, with their understanding of local
economic conditions, to step in and provide targeted incentives to those
companies and workers who can benefit most from additional training.
Such incentives reduce the training investment risk for both employers
and workers and lead to increased training. Furthermore, we are con-
vinced that successful experiences with state-funded training encour-
age companies to increase their own training investment and thus, over
time, reduces training underinvestment by much more than the public
investment.
Based on the results of our research, we recommend seven policies
that state-sponsored incumbent-worker training programs can adopt to
improve their success.
1. Share governance between labor, management, and public rep-
resentatives.
As noted in Chapter 2, these state-sponsored programs have
been attacked in the past as corporate welfare. Participation of
labor in program governance can ensure that the interests of
both workers and employers are considered, and it can insulate
programs from charges of corporate welfare as well. Also, in-
volving both groups recognizes that training will benefit both
workers and management—it upgrades workers’ skills and,
more often than not, increases their earnings while improving
company productivity. The participation of both employers and
labor, in our experience, brings a practical appreciation of busi-
ness needs to the policymaking process. Operating a training
program within a working business is far different from operat-
ing a program in an institutional setting, such as a training center
or a community college. Policies need to be developed that
recognize the constraints created by attempting to train while
maintaining production. Similarly, representation of the public
through elected or appointed officials ensures that the public’s
larger interests are considered in policy developments. Though
shared governance by these often-contentious groups can slow
policymaking, we believe that the participation of all three
groups ultimately yields better policy and broader support for
the program.
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Finally, when controversy does erupt, as it inevitably will,
the fact that governance of the program is not in the hands of a
single stakeholder group helps to insure the survival of the pro-
gram. We believe this principal is amply illustrated throughout
ETP’s history, where controversies over funding decisions have
periodically threatened the program’s existence.
2. Make sure that state investment generates additional training
and does not simply replace existing training.
A significant hazard for any state-sponsored training is that,
rather than adding to the total investment in training, it will lead
businesses to use the state subsidy to replace existing training
investment. As our economic impact shows, unless state invest-
ment leads to additional training and productivity, it has no posi-
tive economic impact. States can take several steps to avoid this
pitfall:
• Careful targeting by program managers can lessen the chance
of state investment replacing private investment. We recom-
mend targeting frontline workers, who are seldom trained by
employers, rather than professional and technical workers, on
whom employers typically invest the bulk of their resources
and where states make a huge investment through the public
higher education system.
• States can give priority to training that introduces new pro-
duction techniques and technology rather than to routine
training. This helps ensure that public investment does not
replace routine private investment and promotes the diffusion
of innovative techniques such as TQM.
• States can target companies that are unlikely to invest in
training but could benefit greatly. Ideal targets include com-
panies far below their industry’s best practices, small busi-
nesses, and businesses seriously threatened by out-of-state
competition.
Enforcing these standards is a difficult task because staff
and governing bodies must acquire some industry expertise, ex-
ercise judgement rather than simply apply rules, and occasion-
ally challenge the claims of large employers. We believe this is
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worth doing and that it can be done. If governing bodies do not
make a point of ensuring that state funds do not replace existing
training investment, the message to the swarm of consultants
hovering around these programs is that they can get ‘‘free’’ gov-
ernment money for their clients. In a short time, the program
will find itself mainly funding large corporations’ routine train-
ing that would have occurred without state subsidy.
3. Pay for performance.
A unique feature of ETP is its one-hundred-percent, pay-for-
performance provision; employers or training agencies are only
paid for trainees who complete training and are retained in a
related job for 90 days. Though we can imagine other pay-for-
performance systems that would work just as well, we firmly
believe that some kind of pay-for-performance standard is es-
sential to provide discipline. In a pay-for-performance system,
both employers and trainers select trainees carefully and do not
inflate the length of training (which would increase the chances
of dropouts). Pay-for-performance seems particularly appro-
priate for state programs focusing on incumbent workers, where
the risk and uncertainty is much less than in programs serving
displaced workers in disadvantaged populations.
The pay-for-performance policy is likely to be attacked as
promoting ‘‘creaming’’ by those who value equity over effi-
ciency. Equity advocates will argue that strong performance
requirements encourage employers and trainers to ‘‘skim off the
cream’’ (the most able workers) for training and leave out disad-
vantaged workers. In our view, this type of selection is a good
thing in incumbent-worker training programs because it in-
creases the chances that training will actually improve produc-
tivity, which is the program’s goal. One factor that mitigates
‘‘skimming’’ is that if training is to introduce a production inno-
vation such as TQM or SPC, companies will typically train all
workers on a given production line rather than select the most
able workers. In our view, by increasing workers’ productivity
and earnings, the program improves the viability of companies
and thereby strengthens the state’s overall economy. Everyone
in the state, including the disadvantaged, ultimately benefits
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from stronger basic industries. Finally, there are many other
federal and state programs that do target the most disadvantaged
sectors of the population, but few that target frontline workers.
A second, and in our view more valid, criticism of the pay-
for-performance system is that it discourages companies from
participating because they do not want to run the risk of not
being reimbursed for the cost of training. As we noted in the
introduction, this dynamic initially constrained the growth of
ETP. But we have observed that over time, as methods for man-
aging performance-based projects diffuse among companies, the
willingness of employers to take on the risk of incumbent-
worker training increases dramatically. As we noted, in its early
years ETP could not contract for all its funds, but over time,
demand for ETP funding increased until it far exceeded avail-
able funds and funding priorities became an issue.
4. Subsidize training, but don’t foot the whole bill.
Research cited in Chapter 3 clearly shows that employer-pro-
vided training leads to increased earnings and productivity for
employees. Returns from public investment in training, through
programs such as JTPA, are much less certain. One can concep-
tualize training decisions on a continuum from purely private
decisions, driven by return expectations, to completely public
decisions, where many factors other than investment return
come into play. The strength of the ETP program is that, while
representing a public training investment, the employer’s deci-
sion to train with ETP funds is similar to a completely private
training decision; employers will only enter into an ETP project
if they believe they will receive a substantial return on their
investment. (As noted earlier, the ETP subsidy increases the
likelihood of an acceptable return but does not guarantee it.)
The problems that arise when people spend someone else’s
money are well known and should be avoided. In most ETP
programs, trainees are ‘‘on the clock’’—paid by their employer
for the time they are in training. This makes the employer’s
investment in the training at least equal to ETP’s investment.
Substantial cost sharing by employers brings market discipline
to the training decision, much as co-payments are intended to
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reduce wasteful medical treatments. As noted in Chapter 7,
when trainees were trained ‘‘off the clock’’ (at no cost to the
employers), the impact of training appeared to diminish substan-
tially. In this situation, employers were less careful in selecting
employees for training and made less effort to customize train-
ing to their company, thus weakening the impact of training.
Finally, subsidizing a portion of training costs rather than reim-
bursing the entire cost allows the state to leverage its money to
reach many more companies and workers.
States need to ensure that employers share training costs.
Pay-for-performance is one method and requiring that trainees
be ‘‘on the clock’’ is another. Employers can also contribute by
providing classroom space, equipment, or trainers. The chal-
lenge for states is to design their reimbursement system so that
the state’s investment is large enough to motivate employers to
undertake training that they normally would not, but not large
enough to remove market discipline from the decision. The
history of ETP’s fee structure shows that this is a delicate bal-
ance, and that the required incentive will probably vary from
company to company and industry to industry. Though more
research is needed in this area to help states fine-tune their reim-
bursement systems, the principle of reimbursing less than the
full cost of training is a firm policy benchmark.
5. Target basic industries and threatened companies.
Almost all states justify their programs by arguing that they con-
tribute to economic development. Our economic impact model
shows that, if this is a program goal, targeting basic industries
is an effective way to maximize economic impact. In states with
programs supported by a broad-based employment tax or by the
general fund, this may be controversial, as workers in nonbasic
industries pay the tax but are ineligible for training. The ratio-
nale for this targeting decision is that all workers will benefit
from the overall economic growth generated by basic industries.
Workers in service industries will benefit from increased earn-
ings and employment opportunities when basic industries gener-
ate greater demand for their services.
We also recommend that states target companies that are
threatened by out-of-state competition or are far below their in-
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dustry’s best practices—in both cases, workers’ jobs are at risk.
Our economic impact model in Chapter 7 clearly shows that
preserving jobs has the greatest economic impact. Therefore,
training that keeps jobs in the state by increasing the competi-
tiveness of companies faced with out-of-state competition
clearly has the greatest economic impact. Similarly, workers
are at risk in companies that are far below their industry’s best
practices, and such companies have the greatest potential to gain
from training because there is a clear path to improved produc-
tivity and competitiveness. This puts program managers in a
bind. Companies that are threatened or are poorly managed are
likely to be much more difficult to work with than prosperous,
well-run companies that are not threatened and are using best
practices. Nevertheless, though it may be more costly to serve
the less successful companies, that is where the greatest poten-
tial benefits lie. Some argue that it would be more efficient to
let low-performing companies close and let others take up the
slack. This may not be the case if the company is in a basic
industry that faces out-of-state-competition. In this situation, if
the company closes, the work may go out of state or out of the
country.
Targeting only basic industries is often controversial. In
Text Box 8.1, we lay out in detail the economic reasoning under-
lying this recommendation.
6. Avoid exclusive training providers.
As public programs, state incumbent-worker training programs
are often pressured to designate a public education or training
agency as the exclusive training provider. This is not the best
policy. The strength of state training programs for incumbent
workers is that training is customized to the needs of the com-
pany and the workers. In our view, the best way to promote
customization is to allow employers to select their own training
providers. Many industries that use unique technology and
methods are served by specialized trainers. Companies should
be allowed to tap these resources. No single public or private
training agency can reasonably be expected to customize its
training to the unique needs of all industries and companies in a
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Text Box 8.1 Rationale for Targeting Basic Industries
Training in the nonbasic sector generally does not enhance state
economic growth and may, in fact, simply shift unemployment to other
local competing firms. This conclusion is based on the regional growth
theory, which postulates that demand for local goods derives from out-
of-state demand for basic industries’ products. This out-of-state de-
mand determines the amount of output that basic industries will produce
and, by extension, the amount nonbasic industries will produce to sup-
ply the basic industries. Nonbasic industries supply the demands of
basic industries and of all people and institutions comprising the local
economy, but the size of the local economy as a whole responds to
demand from outside the region. Furthermore, this theory suggests that
the relationship between the outputs of basic and nonbasic sectors is
approximately constant and is expressed by the regional multiplier.
The approximate constancy of the regional multiplier is the source
of the problem with training incumbent workers in the nonbasic sector.
If workers in one local nonbasic company are trained and made more
productive, that company will presumably take business from other non-
basic companies. But if the size of the nonbasic sector is fixed relative
to the basic sector, training in nonbasic companies may simply lead
to layoffs in competing nonbasic companies, increasing unemployment
there. An exception to this possible unfortunate result is if the local
economy is at approximately full employment and the basic sector is
growing. Then, growing demand for nonbasic sector output would ab-
sorb the higher productivity of the newly-trained workers. Nevertheless,
training incumbent workers in the nonbasic sector is probably not a
fruitful use of training program funds, as it only leads to increased out-
put in a very tight labor market when unemployment rates are extremely
low.
Note that this result does not apply to training unemployed workers
for jobs that already exist in the nonbasic sector. Presumably, those
new jobs exist because the basic sector has grown and spawned new
nonbasic sector jobs. Training lesser-skilled, unemployed people to
qualify for existing nonbasic jobs does reduce unemployment and at the
same time enhances the productive capabilities of the labor force.
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state. Designating a single training agency often results in ge-
neric training with a very limited potential to improve competi-
tiveness.
As we pointed out in Chapter 3, allowing companies to
choose their own trainers creates a vigorous market for training
services and an interest group of trainers and consultants who
will try to influence program policies to their advantage. Man-
aging this market may be the major policy task of the state pro-
gram, but we believe it can be managed successfully if
policymakers are aware that they govern the program through
the incentives they create for these consultants and trainers.
Generally, we recommend that governing bodies’ best approach
to managing consultants and trainers is to create an open market
where objective data about contractors and their performance is
readily available to companies considering a project. In Chapter
3, we provide a list of specific recommendations for managing
the role of consultants and trainers. We also note that even
when there is a single provider, that provider will still become a
powerful interest group that attempts to shape policy.
7. Focus on management reinforcement of training.
The fieldwork in Chapter 5 clearly shows that the productivity
impact of training is ultimately determined by the quality of
training and that of management reinforcement after training.
As we noted in the case studies, the quality of management rein-
forcement varies dramatically across projects. Many policy-
makers and program managers focus primarily on the mechanics
of training fund allocation, pay little attention to the quality of
training, and seldom consider what management does after
training.
We recommend that state agencies promote management re-
inforcement of training by providing employers and training
consultants with case examples of successful management rein-
forcement of training. These cases might include examples of
how management can
• tie compensation to the implementation of innovations and
reforms growing out of training;
• provide career growth after training;
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• give workers a larger role in decision making; and
• infuse new technology into production.
METHODOLOGY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
EVALUATORS
Textbooks on program evaluation often recommend that programs
devote one percent of their budget to program evaluation. These texts
also recommend that evaluators be brought into programs during the
design stage so that carefully designed evaluation can be built into the
program (e.g., Rossi and Freeman 1993, or Patton 1996). In reality,
program evaluations tend to be episodic, poorly funded, and designed
when the program is almost over or in response to particular problems
that have emerged during implementation. Consequently, evaluators
need to be light on their feet and quick to respond to whatever circum-
stances confront them. State incumbent-worker training programs are
no exception. Few programs have been systematically evaluated, and
we know of none that had evaluations designed into them from day
one. Thus, our recommendations acknowledge that our fellow evalua-
tors likely will be designing evaluations on a limited budget and after
programs have been operating for some time.
Throughout several changes in leadership, ETP has been willing to
open itself to objective evaluation of its performance. It has also toler-
ated fairly wide experimentation with evaluation methods, ranging
from large-scale follow-up studies of employment and earning, through
traditional surveys of projects, to in-depth case studies. In this section,
we make a series of recommendations for evaluating state incumbent-
worker training programs based on our experience, knowledge of avail-
able data, and understanding of evaluation methods. We begin with
some overall recommendations for evaluation approaches and then give
specific recommendations related to particular methods.
Triangulate, Triangulate, Triangulate
Triangulation simply means collecting data on a single program
from several perspectives. For example, in the most recent study of
ETP’s impact (Moore et al. 2000b), we conducted 23 case studies of
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projects, followed up on the earnings of over 57,000 trainees, and stud-
ied the impact of training on company growth. Combining these three
perspectives provided insights into the ultimate impact of the program
in terms of changes in employee earnings and company growth, and
into how the program achieved its impact. It also generated a new
understanding of how ETP was actually implemented in the field.
Using this larger perspective, we were able to help both managers and
policymakers see the program in new ways. This led to a number
of policy changes and a richer understanding of the program, which
continues to inform policy discussions.
To be effective, evaluations need to triangulate in two ways: by the
methods employed, and by the perspectives from which they measure
impact. Evaluation approaches that use a single method are subject to
some standard criticisms. Traditional follow-up studies that only look
at trainee earnings or earnings changes are criticized for being black-
box assessments—program investment goes into the box and earnings
come out, but there is little insight into how the program achieves its
effects. On the other hand, qualitative approaches that look at a few
programs in depth can provide rich detail about those particular pro-
grams but are often criticized for being unrepresentative or subjective.
We find that a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods
yields the most valuable results and answers the common methodologi-
cal criticisms that cause people to resist accepting the results of a single
method approach.
Measure Program Impact on All Key Players
Incumbent-worker training programs are designed to have multiple
impacts. Most programs aim to increase the earnings and improve the
employment stability of trainees; to attract, retain, and enhance the
competitiveness of companies; and to improve the state’s economy.
Measuring only one type of impact does not reveal whether or not the
program is achieving its overall mission. During several studies, we
have cast about for available data and methods that can be used to
collect both qualitative and quantitative data on the three aspects of
ETP’s mission. We present here our recommendations for other evalu-
ators, organized by various perspectives from which programs may be
evaluated.
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Employee perspective
It is critical to measure the impact of training on employees’ earn-
ings and employment. Effective evaluations must go beyond the mea-
surement of earnings, to collect detailed data on whether employees
learn the skills they are taught, are able to use the skills they learned,
and whether their productivity improved as a result.
Quantitative measures of employment and earnings
Chapter 4 shows that, in California, we can track most trainees
through the unemployment insurance system. We recommend this ap-
proach because no mail or phone follow-up can find as high a propor-
tion of trainees. As we noted in our analysis, there are some
populations, such as the self-employed, who are missed by this ap-
proach. Also, states that share a substantial part of their labor market
with another state will need records from that state. Nevertheless, the
comprehensiveness of UI systems and the reliability of reported earn-
ings are their strengths. That said, these systems are designed for col-
lecting taxes and paying unemployment insurance claims, so it is a
challenge to use them for research purposes. A seemingly simple proc-
ess of collecting trainees’ social security numbers and getting their
earnings records before and after training quickly becomes a complex
problem of data cleaning and measurement. Over the past decade, a
number of researchers have developed methods for working with the
UI earnings data and creating valuable measures (e.g., Stevens and
Shi 1996). For readers interested in technical matters, Text Box 8.2
summarizes some of the primary problems we encountered using data
from unemployment insurance systems and how we dealt with them.
Another problem with unemployment insurance databases is that
workers appear, disappear, and reappear. The handling of these work-
ers may profoundly affect study results. Again, this is a complex prob-
lem, and we discuss it in Text Box 8.3 for readers who are prepared to
delve into the issues involved.
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, the key question is what would
have happened to the trainees had they not been trained? To answer
this question, evaluators need to collect data on similar workers who
did not receive training. We have experimented with various ap-
proaches: We have compared individuals who completed the program
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Text Box 8.2 Common Problems with Unemployment Insurance
Data
California’s large size and unique demographics make working
with the base-wage file a unique challenge. The large number of undoc-
umented workers in the state raises some particular issues that must be
resolved in order to use the file as a research tool.
False social security numbers (part 1)
There are numerous checks that the Social Security Administration
prescribes to determine whether a social security number has any chance
of being valid. We have found that in state unemployment data, there
can be thousands of social security numbers that are invalid.
False social security numbers (part 2)
Even if a social security number is not invalid per se, it might be
the result of fraudulent duplication. The easiest test of fraudulent dupli-
cation is an extraordinary number of employers submitting UI payments
on behalf of the same SSN. In any given year, we would find anywhere
from a few dozen to a few hundred social security numbers with over
500 employers in a given quarter. The record was a SSN that purport-
edly had several thousand employers each quarter.
Some legitimate social security numbers may look false. Not every
SSN with twenty-five employers in a quarter is necessarily fraudulent.
Some occupations treat workers as employees even if they only work a
few hours a month. For example, Hollywood studio musicians are
sometimes paid as employees, even though they may perform for 50
different projects in the course of a quarter. We use as a first test
whether the SIC codes of the employers are in a coherent group. If the
SIC codes are all in an entertainment related industry, for example, we
would flag the record but allow it to be included in some calculations.
If the SIC codes are all over the map, ranging from chemistry to banking
to warehouse services in a single quarter, we would conclude that the
SSN was fraudulent and treat it accordingly.
False social security numbers (part 3)
Some social security numbers are not sold on the black market but
are shared within a household or small community. These are extremely
difficult to detect as anything but standard multiple jobbing by workers.
However, if the SSN appears to have ongoing wages from multiple em-
ployers at the same time that UI payments are being made, we would
conclude that the SSN was probably fraudulent.
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The challenge of extraordinary reported income
Some incomes reported in the UI databases are so extraordinarily
high that they can impact the averages for an SIC category. For exam-
ple, one individual in our control group reportedly had earnings in ex-
cess of $100,000,000 per quarter, which would have resulted in a nearly
$10,000 higher quarterly average income in the relevant SIC group.
False UI claims
Unfortunately, the UI system sometimes makes payments based on
fraudulent claims. While many of these are not apparent, repeated UI
claims without intervening employment—which can also be viewed as
UI claims in excess of the maximum permitted number of benefit
weeks—are viewed as data error and treated accordingly.
The challenge of split employers
Some individuals are apparently employed by two or more employ-
ers in equal shares. This is usually because they work for a conglomer-
ate with multiple employer identification numbers and UI accounts. For
example, an individual might work full time on a project for Acme In-
dustries but receive half of his paycheck from Acme Holdings and half
from Acme Research Co. If Acme Holdings and Acme Research Co.
are in separate SIC categories, there is ambiguity in assigning the em-
ployee’s efforts to an industry. We normally use the industry of the
employer paying the largest amount in a given quarter. If, however,
Acme Holdings and Acme Research took turns paying the employee’s
monthly check, this would indicate a flip-flopping SIC code (as well as
a cyclical pattern in the identity of the primary employer) that would
suggest significant employment instability—even if the employee in
question had the most stable job in the state. In our research, we at-
tempted to identify these cases using special computer logic and then
assigned one SIC (and employer number) or another on a case-by-case
basis. One logical test we employed was to see whether the raises in
pay from one employer were mirrored by raises in pay from the other
employer.
to those who dropped out. We have also constructed ‘‘comparison
groups’’ from the unemployment insurance system that we use to infer
the unique impact of training on earnings. The federal government has
supported large-scale experimental studies using random assignment
to training, in an attempt to measure training impact. Still, we believe
that comparison groups drawn from the unemployment insurance sys-
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Text Box 8.3 The Challenge of Missing Workers
The labor force
The labor force is operationally defined as all individuals receiving
UI payments plus all individuals receiving labor earnings. We compute
this for each time period in our evaluations by merging the UI wage
records and UI benefits databases. Another important component of the
labor force are new entrants or re-entrants seeking employment—these
don’t show up in our data until they receive employment and later, per-
haps, unemployment payments.
Vanishing workers
Individuals listed in the datasets will vanish from time to time. This
might be because they died, retired, or moved out of the state. They
might have moved into non-reporting jobs (e.g., self-employed real es-
tate broker, federal agency). They might have dropped out of the labor
force for personal reasons (e.g., soccer mom) or because of discourage-
ment regarding job prospects. Sometimes individuals who had pre-
viously vanished come back.
How to handle the zeros? (Part 1: the problem)
When individuals leave the measurable labor force, it may be inap-
propriate to count their earnings as zero. (For example, consider a fac-
tory worker in Gary, Indiana, who now works in Chicago, Illinois. The
Indiana UI datasets might suggest this worker had left the labor force.)
Still, a certain number of these formerly employed individuals truly did
fall out of the labor force and have no income. If they are people who
are not working, then their absence of earnings is important when com-
puting averages representing the labor force. However, if they are other-
wise employed, counting them as ‘‘zero earners’’ could generate a
massive downward bias in earnings averages. This is particularly im-
portant when comparing ‘‘before’’ and ‘‘after’’ measures. How one han-
dles the workers in the ‘‘before’’ period who aren’t in the ‘‘after’’ (and
workers who weren’t in the ‘‘before’’ but are in the ‘‘after’’) must be
addressed when designing an evaluation.
How to handle the zeros? (Part 2: one solution)
Until better data or a better algorithm comes along, we use the fol-
lowing approach in our research. We impose a participation test in prior
quarters and subsequent quarters but without necessarily mandating
continuous participation. For example, we might check whether the
worker was found in the labor force two years prior to training and two
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years after training; if so, all intermediate data—including zeros—
would be used in computing averages. Sometimes we find it appropriate
to impose strict labor force participation—workers must be found every
quarter during some period before training as well as every quarter for
some period after training.
tem provide the best and most cost-effective method for estimating
the impact of training when it is impossible to create a large-scale
experimental study.
Qualitative measures of employee experience
To discover why some programs succeed and others do not, one
has to examine the qualitative experience of trainees. We have found
that the best way to do this is to treat selected training contracts as case
studies. First, we familiarize ourselves with the context of the case
(the company’s industry, recent history, and reason for training). We
then collect data retrospectively on trainees’ experience and their per-
ception of the impact of training. In Chapter 5, we reviewed in some
detail the methods we employed. Overall, we found that we could
efficiently collect data through group interviews, observations of the
production process, and use of a standard evaluation questionnaire.
Selecting projects for case studies is difficult. Seldom are there
sufficient resources to select a group of projects large enough to com-
prise a representative sample for traditional statistical analysis. In-
stead, we recommend that evaluators try to capture a group of projects
representing the diversity of project types funded so that they can ob-
serve program implementation in a variety of settings. For example,
we deliberately chose a group of sites that included large and small
employers, manufacturing and service industries, and different types
of training providers. Another alternative is to select for study projects
that were particularly successful or unsuccessful. Examining these
‘‘outlier’’ projects can be a powerful method for identifying the factors
that contribute to success or failure. We suspect a ‘‘live’’ case study
would be superior to our retrospective case study approach. In a live
case study, evaluators would live with a project through its develop-
ment, into its implementation, and during some follow-up period. This
would allow the evaluator to study the project in real time and avoid
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the inherent biases of trainees recalling their experiences. Evaluators
could observe training as it was delivered and follow trainees back to
their job to observe its impact. In our experience, support for such a
thorough and time-consuming evaluation is hard to come by, but we
believe it would be a valuable approach if the opportunity were to arise.
Company perspectives
The least-developed area of study appears to be the evaluation of
the impact of state-funded incumbent-worker training programs on
companies. Conventional evaluation designs tend to begin and end
with a follow-up on employee earnings. There are a few studies, cited
in Chapter 3, that document the impact of training on companies’ fi-
nancial performance. We believe measuring the impact of these pro-
grams on companies is crucial to effective evaluations, since it is
through the companies that state-funded training affects the economy.
We see our effort to evaluate the impact of ETP on companies as the
first step in what we hope will be a series of studies with increasingly
sophisticated methods.
Quantitative approaches
We began this project believing that we could get uniform, reliable
financial data on most companies’ performance before and after train-
ing, along with industry benchmarks from commercially available data
services. This turned out not to be the case, however. Many ETP
project sites were small companies not covered by the proprietary data
systems, were divisions of a larger company for which separate data
was unavailable, or were simply absent from the database. Once again,
we had to turn to the Unemployment Insurance system for reliable data.
Chapter 6 shows that we were able to reliably measure company
growth in terms of employment and total wages paid, and could create
groups of similar companies to serve as industry benchmarks. This
approach had many limitations, but did prove a valuable method for
comparing the experience of companies with ETP training contracts to
similar companies without ETP training over the same time. Since this
type of data is available in every state, we believe our method is a
replicable model for retrieving valuable data in other states.
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As an alternative, states could consider asking companies to sub-
mit, as part of the training application, financial and productivity data
related to the goals of the training, and then require them to provide
similar data for the year after training. For larger companies, the data
might need to be subdivided. Our fieldwork provides examples of the
types of data that could be reported. For example, if a goal of training
was to improve product quality, the company could report existing data
on scrap rates or warranty returns. These data are particularly valuable
if there are industry benchmarks to compare against.
Qualitative measures
As part of the case studies, we tried to collect detailed before-and-
after financial data on each site. We wanted to see if we could tie ETP-
funded training to changes in financial performance in each case. We
encountered many barriers: Some companies were unwilling to share
financial data even after being promised complete confidentiality. In
large corporations, we were dealing with lower-level managers, such
as plant managers, who did not have access to this data or did not have
the authority to release it. More interestingly, we found that companies
did not really track training-induced performance changes, and many
had not even considered doing so. This being the case, our site visits
focused on getting a quick overview of the company’s production proc-
ess. Once we had a basic idea of what was going on, we focused our
questions on possible performance measures that we might use. We
often thought of performance measurement methods that the managers
of the firm had not considered. The performance measures we used
were very specific to each company and process. Managers were more
likely to be able and willing to answer very specific questions about
matters such as scrap rates, labor inputs, or quality criteria. Every
firm was different, and the managers in the firms had different views
depending on what part of the process they managed. Most company-
specific data were anecdotal. If we obtained documents, they generally
focused on a very specific aspect of the company.
For readers who would like to look at this issue in depth, we pro-
vide Text Box 8.4, which includes suggestions for measuring the im-
pact of training on a single company’s performance.
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Text Box 8.4 Measuring Training’s Impact on Company
Performance
• Get an overview of what is going on, either through background re-
search or through a quick tour or oral overview. This will help to
develop strategy and tactics for information gathering.
• From the very beginning of the site visit, be aggressive in informa-
tion gathering while showing great appreciation to the person helping
you and taking an interest in the firm.
• Take lots of notes.
• Do not act like you are entitled to information, as this will alienate
those upon whom you depend for information. When taking ETP
funding, firms agreed to provide information to individuals such as
ourselves, but they did not seem to take this seriously. Some refused
to deal with us.
• Be persistent in pursuing information. If you can help the interview-
ees think about ways to measure performance changes, you are more
likely to get information out of them—many people are willing to
help but need the proper prodding. This process requires that you be
sincerely interested in the process and understand it. Your active
interest in their work will motivate interviewees to cooperate more
actively.
• Help the interviewees with their memories and find various ways to
ask the same question. Many of them will not have really thought
about the impact of training on the company or on a process. Train-
ing is one of many aspects of their jobs, and it fades in their memo-
ries, especially if a year or two has passed.
• If the interviewee does not have the information you’re seeking, ask
them who can help you.
• When you return to your office, immediately write up your observa-
tions before memory fades. After a while, the companies are just a
blur.
• Be creative in your analysis, entering it with an open mind. The
information you obtained is all you have to work with going forward.
What are the data telling you?
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Measuring the Impact of Training on a State’s Economy
Training programs typically have specific goals that are laid out in
the enabling legislation and the mission statement, and these goals are
the basis upon which evaluation must rest. The program’s intended
economic impact may be a general contribution to economic growth,
or there may be a specific objective such as reducing the welfare rolls
or the unemployment rate and UI claims. It is also important to be
sensitive to collateral effects of the program and to measure those im-
pacts as well.
The ETP program goals are typical of many state training pro-
grams: to reduce unemployment and UI claims and to promote eco-
nomic development. Our measures of the economic impact of ETP,
discussed in detail in Chapter 7, focus on these two intended outcomes
of the program. The following recommendations include both general
advice on measuring economic impact and issues specific to measuring
the attainment of ETP goals.
Use a comparison group to isolate the training effect on critical
variables
Measuring the economic impact of a program begins by develop-
ing accurate measures of the program’s impact on individuals. The
analysis needs to focus on ‘‘critical variables,’’ which are indicators
directly tied to program goals. For example, we identified the amount
of UI payments as a critical variable, because one goal of the program
was to reduce UI cost. Once identified, the impact of training on criti-
cal variables has to be isolated from other effects present in a dynamic
economy. Many people underestimate the extent of change occurring
in a dynamic economy. People continually enter and leave the labor
force—not only teenagers or college graduates entering and 65-year-
olds retiring, but also many middle-aged people moving into and out
of the labor force. Overall employment and unemployment rates have
both seasonal and sectoral variations. Technical progress and change
in incomes and tastes lead to changing demands that affect some indus-
tries and occupations positively and others negatively. Consequently,
earnings and unemployment experience can vary significantly between
industries and occupations. Also, geographical clusters of industries
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will vary in employment and earnings growth. Researchers can expect
these dynamic forces to be continually present in the economy, and
so any before-to-after tracking of trainees’ experiences must take into
account changes that would have happened without training.
The construction of some type of comparison group is essential to
isolating the effects of training. The comparison group’s experience
should approximate what would have happened to the trainees had they
not been trained. A simple before-to-after rise in earnings or fall in
unemployment would not estimate the effect of training, as these
changes could be due to generally rising wages and declining unem-
ployment. Since all states have access to the base wage file in the UI
system, we believe that the best way to benchmark the experience of
trainees is to compare them with a similar group of workers who did
not receive training, using before-to-after changes in critical variables.
The comparison group should be selected or adjusted to be as simi-
lar as possible to the trainee group. A group randomly selected from
the labor force would not be an appropriate comparison group for a
training program that focused on particular industries or occupations.
A randomly selected comparison group can be broken into subgroups,
however, and by weighting subgroup experience to reflect the composi-
tion of the trainees, an appropriate comparison group can be con-
structed. Given the many barriers to constructing large-scale
experiments in this field, we believe this to be the best method available
to evaluators for measuring training’s impact on trainees’ labor market
experience. In Chapter 4, we detailed how we constructed measures or
labor market outcomes; other researchers have also worked extensively
with the UI base wage file to create measures appropriate to various
vocational education and training programs (e.g., Stevens and Shi
1996). This is an area in which more work can be done to increase the
value of measures, but we do not see any other data source that offers
a similar opportunity to create comprehensive and reliable measures of
training’s impact.
Use the correct population when aggregating estimates of
program effects
If the average change in variables, such as earnings or unemploy-
ment, is based on the experience of some subset of the trainee popula-
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tion, care must be taken in applying that average to an overall
population to estimate the program’s aggregate effect. For example, if
an aggregate estimate of trainees’ earnings change is based only on
full-time workers, then applying that same earnings change to all pro-
gram participants—whether working full time, part time, or not even
found in the labor force—would vastly overstate the program’s true
effect on earnings. Similarly, if the average unemployment reduction
of those found in the labor force were applied to a population of train-
ees, including those both found and not found in the labor force, then
the reduction in unemployment produced by the training program
would be overstated.
Similar caveats apply to estimating aggregate effects over time. It
would be inappropriate to obtain an annual aggregate effect by apply-
ing a change-in-earnings estimate based on the first two quarters after
training, because the effects of training are known to change over time.
Some training program evaluations have produced unmistakable over-
estimates of training program effects by multiplying the highest post-
training quarterly earnings by four to estimate the annual aggregate
earnings of trainees.
Base estimates of a training program’s impact on an
understanding of the dynamics of the state’s economy
An understanding of the main factors determining a state’s eco-
nomic growth is required to more effectively identify training program
outcomes that cause or enable growth. The productivity of a state’s
economy is generally limited by the size and skills of its labor force,
available resources, and ability to compete in national or international
markets. Furthermore, according to accepted regional growth theory,
growth in the basic sector of the economy can spawn expansion in the
nonbasic sector but not vice versa. Training programs can promote
economic growth in two ways: 1) by enhancing the skills and effective
size of the labor force, and 2) by increasing the competitiveness of the
state’s basic industries.
ETP promotes economic growth through incumbent-worker train-
ing that targets basic industries—those that compete in national or in-
ternational trade. Training is designed to upgrade both workers’ skills
and the jobs they occupy, making the workers more productive and the
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companies more competitive in national and international markets. We
estimate that companies’ sales increases in those markets are at least
equal to their workers’ productivity increases. Growth in sales by these
basic industries requires additional purchases from their local suppliers
to support the greater output. Thus, state economic growth resulting
from incumbent-worker training is the sum of increased sales by basic
companies, plus any concomitant increase in sales by local suppliers.
These additional local sales are estimated using local industry multipli-
ers, which are usually available. Further discussion of this procedure
appears in Chapter 7.
Training programs’ labor force effects derive from the impact of
training on workers’ skills and unemployment. A paramount purpose
of training programs is to raise trainees’ skills and productivity, which
effectively enlarges the state’s productive capacity. Also, to the extent
that these programs lower unemployment, they increase output by put-
ting more people into the active workforce. Furthermore, if a training
program can avert layoff and the subsequent period of unemployment
for laid-off workers, state output will be larger by the amount that
would have been lost while workers find other jobs.
Final Thoughts
In their best selling book, Reinventing Government, Osborne and
Gaebler observed that ‘‘If you don’t measure results you can’t tell suc-
cess from failure’’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1993, p. 147). We agree.
An aging workforce, continued technological change, and employers’
continuing reluctance to invest in training frontline workers convince
us that state-funded incumbent-worker training programs have a sig-
nificant role to play in the future. The uniqueness of each state pro-
gram makes a nationwide evaluation impossible, while at the same
time offering a wide range of policy innovations for study. We hope
this comprehensive look at ETP will trigger evaluations of other states’
models, which in turn will lead to a robust discussion of what policies
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AL 18,000,000 5 0 0 100 18,000,000 General fund 650 N.A. Contracting Y Education
AK 3,200,000 3 0 0 100 3,200,000 Special tax N.A. N.A. Contracting Y Other
AZ 5,000,000 34 0 0 100 5,000,000 General fund N.A. N.A. Contracting N Commerce
AR 1,500,000 42 10 150,000 90 1,350,000 General fund 750 40,000 Contracting Y Commerce
CA 117,200,000 6 90 105,480,900 10 11,720,100 Special tax 1,300 400,000 Contracting Y Independent
CO 5,700,000 29 37 2,109,000 63 3,591,000 General fund 400 50,000 Contracting Y Education
CT 4,024,882 33 75 3,018,662 25 1,006,221 General fund;
bond
450 N.A. Contracting Y Labor
DE 902,432 36 96 866,335 4 36,097 Special tax 635 25,000 Contracting Y Commerce
FL 4,000,000 43 0 0 100 4,000,000 General fund 800 N.A. Contracting Y Commerce
GA 10,200,000 30a 0 0 100 10,200,000 General fund 320 N.A. Training N Education
HI 2,500,000 17 95 2,375,000 5 125,000 Special tax N.A. N.A. Contracting N Labor
ID 3,000,000 10 0 0 100 3,000,000 Special tax N.A. N.A. Contracting Y Labor
IL 20,573,000 24 90 18,515,700 10 2,057,300 General fund 235 246,000 Contracting Y Com.; ind.
IN 13,000,000 18 80 10,400,000 20 2,600,000 General fund 500 N.A. Contracting Y Commerce
IA 43,402,000 1 5 2,170,100 95 41,231,900 bonds 2,517 N.A. Contracting Y Commerce
KS 33,000,000 2 5 1,650,000 95 31,350,000 Bonds;
general fund
N.A. 850,000 Contracting Y Commerce
KY 3,099,000 39 50 1,549,500 50 1,549,500 General fund N.A. N.A. Contracting Y Independent
LA 7,500,000 22 40 3,000,000 60 4,500,000 General fund 2,500 250,000 Contracting Y Com.; ed.
ME 3,200,000 11 90 2,880,000 10 320,000 General fund 500 50,000 Contracting Y Labor
MD 9,100,000 21 30 2,730,000 70 6,370,000 General fund N.A. 10,000 Contracting Y Commerce
MA 9,000,000 28 75 6,750,000 25 2,250,000 Special tax N.A. N.A. Contracting Y Labor
MI 30,000,000 9 87 26,100,000 13 3,900,000 General fund 600 N.A. Contracting N Other
MN 7,650,000 26 70 5,355,000 30 2,295,000 General fund 900 300,000 Contracting N Other
MS 5,500,000 16 80 4,400,000 20 1,100,000 General fund 50 15,000 Contracting N Education
MO 28,000,000 4 50 14,000,000 50 14,000,000 General fund 700 50,000 Contracting Y Commerce
NB 2,775,000 25 36 1,000,000 64 1,775,000 General fund 1,000 50,000 Contracting Y Commerce
NV 500,000 44 0 0 100 500,000 General fund 1,000 100,000 Contracting N Commerce
NJ 20,000,000 15 75 15,000,000 25 5,000,000 Special tax 1,000 180,000 Contracting Y Labor
NM 6,000,000 7 0 0 100 6,000,000 General fund 3,300 490,000 Contracting Y Commerce
NC 19,800,000 13a 43 8,514,000 57 11,286,000 General fund N.A. N.A. Training N Education
ND 900,000 27 80 720,000 20 180,000 Bonds N.A. N.A. Contracting Y Education
OH 13,000,000 35 50 6,500,000 50 6,500,000 General fund 500 67,000 Contracting Y Commerce
OK 7,865,967 12 40 3,146,387 60 4,719,580 General fund 600 85,000 Training N Education
PA 29,000,000 13a 50 14,500,000 50 14,500,000 General fund 1,500 N.A. Contracting Y Commerce
RI 1,200,000 32 75 900,000 25 300,000 Special tax N.A. 20,000 Contracting Y Other
SC 7,670,000 19 0 0 100 7,670,000 General fund 1,100 60,000 Training N Education
SD 7,500,000 37 15 112,500 85 637,500 Special tax N.A. N.A. Contracting N.A. Commerce
TN 4,500,000 40 50 2,250,000 50 2,250,000 General fund 850 90,000 Contracting Y Commerce
TX 66,500,000 8 65 43,225,000 35 23,275,000 Spec. tax;
gen. fund
900 300,000 Contracting Y Comm.;
Other
UT 2,800,000 30a 65 1,820,000 35 980,000 General fund 500 14,000 Contracting N Education
VT 570,000 38 60 342,000 40 228,000 General fund 1,000 17,500 Contracting Y Commerce
VA 13,000,000 23 5 650,000 95 12,350,000 General fund 770 N.A. Contracting Y Commerce
WA 558,000 45 70 390,600 30 167,400 General fund 250 25,000 Contracting N Education
WV 3,000,000 20 60 1,800,000 40 1,200,000 General fund 200 30,000 Contracting Y Other
WI 4,550,000 41 75 3,412,500 25 1,137,500 General fund N.A. N.A. Contracting Y Commerce
Total 593,191,281 54 317,783,184 46 275,408,098






aIndicates a tie in rankings.
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